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JOHN FITZGIBBON 
THESIS SUBMITTED FOR DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
EUROSCEPTIC PROTEST MOVEMENTS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN 
IRELAND, THE UK, ESTONIA AND DENMARK 
 
SUMMARY 
 
The aim of this thesis is to add to the growing literature on Euroscepticism by providing an 
in-depth comparative study of groups in civil society that actively campaign against European 
integration in Denmark, Estonia, Ireland and the United Kingdom.  This study labels these 
groups as ‘Eurosceptic Protest Movements’ (EPMs).  Five explanatory factors drawn from 
the literature on Euroscepticism and social movements are used to ask the research question 
of why EPMs are formed. These are namely, Euroscepticism in the party system, the number 
of referendums in each case study, the availability of resources, the openness of the policy 
making process, and the perceived pro-EU bias of the media. 
 
Empirically it proceeds on a case by case basis, providing an in-depth account of each state’s 
relationship with the EU from party system, public opinion, referendums to case specific 
factors to allow for an appreciation of the environment in which EPMs are formed.  Data is 
gathered primarily from interviews with the founders and both current and former members 
of EPMs, with additional information coming from EPM documents, referendum manifestos 
and posters.  Contextual information is provided by interviews with academics, journalists 
and pro-European activists, and secondary literature in EU studies and social movements.   
 
The thesis comes to two key conclusions.  Firstly, in relation to the literature on social 
movements, EPMs conform strongly to the political opportunity structure paradigm in that 
body of work.  More specifically is the importance of referendums to EPM formation, an 
element of the political opportunity structure that has not been researched in relation to social 
movements.  Secondly, with regard to Euroscepticism the thesis concluded that EPMs emerge 
because of a lack of available space for contestation on the EU issue and the inability of 
political parties to act as an interlocutor between the electorate and the EU.   
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“We are not Eurosceptic, we are pro-Europeans in that we believe that a 
different Europe to this one is possible”.  (Declan Ganley former 
Chairperson of Libertas, interview 14
th
 August, 2008) 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 
Taken together, the rejections of the Lisbon Treaty in the 2008 Irish referendum, 
the EU constitutional treaty in the 2005 Dutch and French ratification referendums, the 
earlier 2003 Swedish No to EMU membership, the 2001 Irish rejection of the Nice Treaty 
and the two Danish No votes in 2000 on EMU membership and in 1992 on the Maastricht 
Treaty have heightened awareness of public opposition to European integration.  The 
social and political effects of these referendum votes have been compounded by a 
significant decline in positive public opinion towards the EU among the electorate of 
member states, with support falling from a high of 66% across the EU in 1990 to 51% 
across an enlarged EU in 2010.
1
  In pursuit of understanding these developments an 
established body of literature has emerged that has largely focused on political parties 
and public opinion.
2
  Yet, thus far no clear answers or wide ranging generalisable theories 
have emerged that explain the declining support for European integration.  Research into 
Euroscepticism in party systems has focused on its origins being located within the party 
system itself, more specifically in either party competition or party family membership.
3
  
                                                 
1
 Leconte, Cécile (2010). Understanding Euroscepticism, London: Palgrave MacMillan, p. 164. 
2
 The body of research expands each year.  A list of publications that are amongst the most important as 
they set the standard for the debate as a whole includes the following; on public opinion: McLaren, Laruen 
(2006). Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration, Palgrave: Basingtstoke; Franklin, Mark et. 
al. (1995). ‘Referendum outcomes and trust in government: Public support for Europe in the wake of 
Maastricht’, West European Politics, 18: 3, pp. 101–17; Karp, Jeffrey et. al. (2003). ‘To know it is to love 
it? Satisfaction with democracy in the European Union’, Comparative Political Studies, 36: 3, pp. 271–292; 
and on party based Euroscepticism: Taggart, Paul (1998). ‘A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism’, in 
European Journal of Political Research, 33: 3, 363-88; Szczerbiak, Aleks and Taggart, Paul (2002). ‘The 
Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate Countries’, Sussex European Institute 
Working Paper No. 51. Szczerbiak Aleks and Taggart, Paul (2008) (eds.) Opposing Europe? The 
Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
3
 Sitter, Nick (2002). ‘Opposing Europe: Euro-scepticism, Opposition and Party Competition’, Opposing 
Europe Research Network Working Paper No 9, Sussex European Institute; Kopécky, Peter and Mudde, 
Cas (2002). ‘The two sides of Euroscepticism.  Party positions on European integration in East Central 
Europe’, European Union Politics, 3: 3, pp, 297-326.   
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Moreover, the literature on public opinion towards Europe has not come to a consensus 
on why individuals oppose European integration.
4
 
It is the intention of this study to complement this body of research and the 
increasing attempts to understand opposition to the EU across the member states by 
examining a particular aspect of Euroscepticism that has largely been ignored in the 
literature: civil society based protest movements, which I label as Eurosceptic Protest 
Movements (EPMs).  This study will qualitatively examine four case studies in detail to 
locate what factors caused Euroscepticism to emerge in these countries in the form of 
EPMs.   
This study brings a new dynamic to the research of Euroscepticism by locating 
the reasons why opposition to European integration comes to be expressed through civil 
society based protest movements instead of in political parties, European Parliamentary 
elections or in EU referendums.  In achieving these ends this study utilises four in-depth, 
case study analyses of EU member states – the Republic of Ireland, the United Kingdom, 
Denmark and Estonia – to explore some of the issues which have thus far been under-
analysed in the field of Euroscepticism.  The fundamental question it seeks to answer is: 
why does opposition towards European integration become articulated in the mobilising 
of protest movements and not through other means such as political parties?  Existing 
work has tended to be regionally specific (e.g. Scandinavia
5
, the Mediterranean states
6
), 
focused on larger states (e.g. France
7
 and the UK
8
) or as is most common, that of single 
case studies combined in special issues of journals or edited texts.
9
  This study brings 
together conclusions on Euroscepticism in four very different EU member states that 
allow for a wider set of patterns of Eurosceptic formation to be identified.  These patterns 
                                                 
4
 McLaren, Lauren (2007). ‘Explaining Mass-Level Euroscepticism: Identity, Interests and Institutional 
Distrust’, Acta Politica, 42: 2, pp. 233-5. 
5
 Sitter, Nick (2001). ‘The politics of opposition to European integration in Scandinavia: Is Euro-scepticism 
a government-opposition dynamic, West European Politics, 24:1, pp. 22-39. 
6
 Llamazares, Iván and Gramacho, Wladimir (2007). ‘Eurosceptics amongst Euroenthusiasts: An Analysis 
of Southern European Public Opinions’, Acta Politica, 42: 2, pp. 211-32. 
7
 Milner, Susan (2000). ‘Euroscepticism in France and changing state-society relations’, Journal of 
European Integration, 22: 1, pp. 35-58. 
8
 Gowland, David and Turner, Arthur (2002). Reluctant Europeans: Britain and European Integration, 
1945-1998, London: Longman 
9
 See for example: Special issues of Acta Politica ‘Understanding Euroscepticism’, 2007 Volume 42, 
Numbers 2-3 edited by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks; Szczerbiak and Taggart, Opposing Europe? The 
Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism. 
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are articulated and contextualised in Chapter Six, the comparative chapter, and their 
implications for the literature on Euroscepticism are discussed in the conclusion.   
The principal aim of this first chapter is to provide a road-map to the rest of the 
thesis by summarising the key issues to be explored and survey the existing literature on 
the topics covered.  It begins by addressing the important distinction between the 
proposed study of EPMs and that body of work which has already been conducted on 
Euroscepticism.  The second section completes the introductory framework of the thesis 
by conceptualising EPMs and providing a framework by which they may be classified.  
The third section provides justification for the choice of case studies listed above, before 
the fourth and final section articulates the findings of the study.   
 
 
 
 
1.1 Why do we need to understand Eurosceptic Protest Movements? 
 
There are four main reasons why it is necessary to understanding EPMs.   
 
1. As stated earlier, voters have rejected referendums for European integration with 
increasing regularity and this study affords the opportunity to analyse the role of 
EPMs in these No votes and in the mobilisation of opposition to the EU in 
general.   
 
2. Despite a long tradition of scholarship on protest movements in general, the 
literature has yet to focus to any significant degree on how they mobilise around 
the European issue specifically.  Drawing upon the framework developed by 
Kitschelt
10
, my research represents an opportunity to test the assertion of Imig and 
Tarrow
11
 that civil society protest would take an increasingly European 
dimension.  More recently Kohler-Koch, in her overview of civil society and the 
EU, questions why there is so little evidence of grassroots civil society opposition 
                                                 
10
 Kitschelt, Herbert (1986). ‘Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear 
Movements in Four Democracies’, British Journal of Political Science, 16: 1, pp. 57-85. 
11
 Imig, Doug, and Tarrow. Sidney (2000). “Political contention in a Europeanising polity.” West European 
Politics, 23: 4, pp. 73-93. 
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to European integration.
12
  This study plugs directly into the debate on the 
relationship between civil society and the EU by providing a new approach from 
the angle of Euroscepticism.   
 
3. A systematic study of EPMs adds to the study of Euroscepticism in general.  This 
study helps to clarify the reasons why Euroscepticism mobilises in civil society in 
addition to the presence of Eurosceptic political parties in each of the case studies.  
The difficulty of party systems in dealing with the EU permeates the case studies 
and the relationship between parties and the EU remains a theme throughout the 
thesis.   
 
4. By drawing upon four representative country cases in its analysis of EPMs this 
research helps to understand two broader features of the European integration 
process.  Firstly, just as studying the direction European integration takes can tell 
us about which EU policies work, so we will be able to learn about where it fails 
by examining around which EU policies opposition to European integration 
mobilises through protest movements.  Secondly, the research engages directly 
with the important academic debate on whether the EU is a first or second order 
issue for the electorate.  This can be achieved by understanding whether EPM 
formation is motivated by European concerns or simply reflects debates on the 
domestic politics of each country.
13
   
 
1.2 Euroscepticism: Existing Approaches 
 
The research question of this thesis is part of the growing literature on 
Euroscepticism.  While Euroscepticism has emerged as one of the most dynamic fields of 
European political research, no clear consensus on a strict definition has been achieved 
                                                 
12
 Kohler-Koch, Beate (2010). ‘Civil society and EU democracy: “astroturf” representation?’, Journal of 
European Public Policy, 17: 1, pp. 100-116. 
13
 See: Franklin, Mark (2003). ‘Learning from the Danish case: A comment on Palle Svensson’s critique of 
the Franklin thesis’, European Journal of Political Research, 41: 6, pp. 751-7; and Svensson, Palle (2003). 
‘Five Danish Referendums on the European Community and the European Union: A Critical Assessment of 
the Franklin Thesis’, European Journal of Political Research, 41: 6, pp. 733-50. 
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and it remains an “elusive concept”.14  This failure has been accounted for by the belief 
that “the scope and intensity of Euroscepticism came as a surprise” to academics with the 
result that a myriad of approaches towards understanding it have been developed.
15
  At 
this point it is important to clarify what actually constitutes Euroscepticism, specifically 
what makes an actor Eurosceptic or what are the requirements for an actor to be labelled 
Eurosceptic.  This will allow for the findings of this research to be located in the 
literature on Euroscepticism.   
The starting point for an understanding of the term Euroscepticism then must 
begin at the most general level.  Szczerbiak and Taggart have sought to conceptualise 
Euroscepticism in the Political Science literature and took the approach of establishing a 
broad definition of Euroscepticism that could encompass the range of studies into the 
phenomenon of Euroscepticism from differing perspectives.
16
  They describe 
Euroscepticism as “encompassing a range of critical positions on European integration, as 
well as outright opposition”17.  They break this concept down further into principled and 
contingent components of Euroscepticism.  They present hard Euroscepticism as the 
principled rejection of the continuation of the EU itself; while soft Euroscepticism is the 
contingent scepticism towards specific aspects/policies contained within European 
integration.
18
  
Hooghe and Marks in their ‘state of the art’ analysis of Euroscepticism, seek an 
understanding of the concept by disaggregating it by actors, principally public opinion 
and political parties.  They do not make reference to social movements which they do not 
consider as a relevant Eurosceptic actor.
19
  This is typical of the literature on 
Euroscepticism which is dominated by the context of either public opinion or political 
parties.  Approaches that seek to understand actors outside of these two are few and far 
                                                 
14
 Flood, Christopher (2002). ‘Euroscepticism: A Problematic Concept’, Paper presented at the UACES 32nd 
Annual Conference and 7
th
 Research Conference, Queen’s University Belfast,  p.2.   
15
 Hooghe, Liesbet and Marks, Gary (2007). ‘Sources of Euroscepticism’, Acta Politica, 42:2, pp. 119-27. 
16
 Taggart, Paul and Szczerbiak, Aleks (2004). ‘Contemporary Euroscepticism in the party systems of the 
European Union candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe’, European Journal of Political Research, 
43: 1, pp. 1-27. 
17
 Ibid, p. 3. 
18
 Szczerbiak, Aleks and Taggart, Paul (2008). ‘Introduction: Opposing Europe? The Politics of 
Euroscepticism in Europe’, Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart (eds.) Opposing Europe? The Comparative 
Party Politics of Euroscepticism , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 7-9. 
19
 Hooghe and Marks, ‘Sources of Euroscepticism’, p. 119.   
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between, though more recently they have started to appear more in the literature.
20
  This 
has been very much the case after analyses of the French No vote to the EU 
Constitutional Treaty showed that non-party actors were an important element in 
understanding the rejection.
21
  Szczerbiak and Taggart’s wide definition of 
Euroscepticism is therefore taken as the working definition for this study as its broad 
scope allows for EPMs to be included along with political parties and public opinion in 
understanding their opposition to European integration.   
The phenomenon of Euroscepticism has come to be framed largely through the 
prism of party politics, more specifically on party positions towards European 
integration.  Parties have the role of political representatives in the EU at the domestic 
level, in national parliaments and governments, and at the European level, in the 
European Parliament and European Council.
22
  As parties are intrinsic to the process of 
European integration, seeking to understand why Eurorscepticsm emerges or does not 
emerge in parties has become an important question for political scientists to answer.  
The early study of Euroscepticism was often associated with research on ‘extreme’ 
political parties and the reasons underlying the emergence of Euroscepticism within West 
European party systems was explained through issues of party competition or the 
ideology of the hard left and hard right.
23
  More recently this approach appears to have 
been validated by the work of Ray and his analysis of the EU position of mainstream 
political parties.  He found an almost universal pro-EU sentiment across the mainstream 
parties of member states, apart from the one glaring example of the Conservative Party in 
the UK.
24
  This research was expanded by Kopécky and Mudde who sought to 
understand Euroscepticism in the party systems of the new member states.
25
  They 
concluded that party ideology along with party strategy were the most important 
                                                 
20
 Usherwood, Simon (2002). ‘Opposition to the European Union in the UK; The Dilemma of Public 
Opinion and Party Management’, Government and Opposition, 37: 2, p. 21. See also: Usherwood, Simon 
(2004). Beyond Party Politics: Opposition to the European Union in France and the UK, 1985-1999, PhD 
Thesis, London School of Economics. 
21
 Leconte, Understanding Euroscepticism, pp. 219-45. 
22
 Szczerbiak and Taggart, ‘Introduction’, p. 2. 
23
 Sitter, ‘The politics of opposition to European integration in Scandinavia’; Kopécky and Mudde, ‘The 
two sides of Euroscepticism’.   
24
 Ray, Leonard (2007). ‘Mainstream Euroskepticism: Trend or Oxymoron?’, Acta Politica, 42: 2, pp. 153-
172.  
25
 Kopecky and Mudde, ‘’p. 321. 
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determinants of Euroscepticism.  Seeking a more nuanced interpretation of the factors 
underlying contestation of the EU Hooghe and Marks suggest a two dimensional model.
26
  
The centre-left prefers ‘regulated capitalism’ and will become more pro-European as the 
European debate focuses more on market regulation.  The centre-right however, favours 
economic and monetary integration but becomes less supportive of European integration 
once this is achieved.  While this model was ostensibly created to explain political party 
positions on European integration its focus on core ideological values as opposed to more 
party system related structures, as the basis for support or rejection of the EU is an 
important consideration in EPM formation.   
The second set of actors that Hooghe and Marks identify as intrinsic to 
understanding Euroscepticism is the public.  Gabel and McLaren have been at the 
forefront of explaining declining public support for European integration.
27
  Their 
findings have led them to conclude that concerns over the growth of EU competencies 
and opposition to Turkish membership of the EU are important factors.  Using evidence 
from referendums on Europe and not wider public opinion, Franklin et. al. argue that the 
public is largely unconcerned over events at a European level and tend to vote according 
to ‘second order’ national issues in European referendums.28  This approach is criticised 
by Svensson who argues that in some cases citizens do vote in European referendums on 
the basis of their attitudes towards European integration rather than simply using proxies 
derived from domestic politics.
29
  Nevertheless a consensus of sorts has emerged that 
basic factors like “utilitarianism and national identities, attitudes to national and 
European institutions” play an important role in shaping attitudes toward European 
integration.
30
  But to come to a deeper understanding of public opinion and European 
integration, the literature needs to disentangle “the various causal linkages” of “mass-
level Euroscepticism”.31  
                                                 
26
 Hooghe, Liesbet et. al. (2002). ‘Does left/right structure party positions on European integration?’, 
Comparative European Politics, 35: 8, pp. 965-89. 
27
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Journal of Politics, 60: 2, pp. 333-54; McLaren, ‘Explaining Mass-Level Euroscepticism’, pp. 233-51.   
28
 Franklin et. al. ‘Referendum outcomes and trust in government’. 
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As with the literature on party based Euroscepticism, there is a degree of 
contention in the literature between the various approaches as to the cause of public 
opposition to European integration.  Both sets of literature, without offering a conclusive 
definition of Euroscepticism do, however, offer a substantial set of approaches with 
which to investigate EPMs.  Szczerbiak and Taggart provide a working definition of 
Euroscepticism for this thesis.  The Hooghe-Marks model and the more recent literature 
on party based Euroscepticism argues that opposition to European integration can be 
motivated by values and ideology and not just strategic considerations.  McLaren on the 
other hand emphasises that certain factors such as strength of national identity and 
sentiment toward European institutions need to be considered in any analysis of 
opposition to European integration.  Studying the origin of EPMs thus expands the 
research of Euroscepticism to actors not considered by the majority of the literature.  
Such an expansion can only benefit the wider investigation into opposition to European 
integration that has been a process of continuing evolution. 
 Civil society based opposition to European integration has not gone entirely 
unnoticed.  Usherwood has conducted an insightful analysis of civil society based 
Eurosceptic movements.  He identifies developments at a European level, most notably 
the Maastricht treaty, as the key drivers for protest group formation.  In his analysis of 
Euroscepticism in the UK and France he argues that civil society based opposition to 
European integration play a vital role in the respective countries’ European debates.  He 
concludes that policy outcomes emanate from the EU itself, and it is this fact that is of 
primary concern to those opposed to the EU, rather than the relative importance of 
national and supranational elements within the EU system.  He also notes that those 
opposed to the EU would prefer an enhanced role for national institutions, and that there 
is a keen awareness of how those latter institutions have been affected by the integration 
process.
32
   
While Usherwood identifies non-party-based actors as significant to the national 
debates on Europe in France and the UK, his thesis is rooted firmly in an analysis of the 
party system and the related political institutions.  This thesis expands upon Usherwood’s 
                                                 
32
 Usherwood, ‘Opposition to the European Union in the UK’, p. 21. See also: Usherwood, Simon (2004). 
Beyond Party Politics: Opposition to the European Union in France and the UK, 1985-1999, PhD Thesis, 
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original findings on the link between social movement formation and events at the 
European level due.  Though Usherwood makes a compelling and convincing case for the 
conclusion drawn, his findings need to be contextualised further by testing them against 
more explanatory factors across more case studies.  This research pursues this end by 
examining EPMs across more case studies with greater variance on EPM formation.  
Adopting such an approach allows for more concrete conclusions as to whether the 
factors underlying EPM formation were a case specific occurrence or part of a wider pan-
European phenomenon.   
 
1.3 Exploring ‘European’ Phenomena at the National Level 
Before articulating how this study engages with this collective body of work on 
Euroscepticism it is important to firstly address why this study engages with the EU issue 
by focusing on national level case studies.
33
  It is a generally accepted view that many of 
the seemingly ‘European’ phenomena that are observed are actually best understood as 
expressions of national political arenas: European Parliament elections, European 
referendums, party-based Euroscepticism, all have been explored through use of Reif and 
Schmitt’s ‘second-order’ model.  At the centre of this model is the idea that there is a 
dominant national political arena and that political events either occur within it (first-
order) or are conducted elsewhere, but are shaped by it (second-order).  Reif and Schmitt 
developed this model after consideration of the first direct elections to the European 
Parliament in 1979 and suggested that such elections would be characterised by lower 
turnouts than for national elections (since less is at stake), poor performances by national 
government parties (since voters perceive an opportunity to make a low/zero-cost 
expression of disapproval of that government) and relatively strong performances by 
small parties (since there is no link to the formation of a government and voters can give 
full flight to their preferences, without a need for tactical voting).
34
  Thus, voters in 
                                                 
33
 For the purposes of brevity and clarity the term EU will be used in the place of the various incarnations 
of the European project over the course of European integration such as European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), Common Market, European Economic Community (EEC) and European Union (EU), 
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commas: e.g. Irish EPMs were strongly opposed to the concept of the European ‘Common Market’.   
34
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European Parliament elections might be ostensibly choosing MEPs on the basis of what 
they will do once elected, but practically make their decision primarily with reference to 
domestic politics.  Likewise, referendums on European topics become votes on the sitting 
government, rather than the substantive topic of the question asked: opposition parties 
that might support a particular vote become disinclined to mobilise their supporters when 
there is a chance of embarrassing the governing parties.
35
  Such a model both suggests 
and explains the poor turnout in such elections, the difficulties that government parties 
often face in such situations and the apparent mismatch between measured public opinion 
and voting outcomes. 
Implicit in the second-order approach is the idea of levels of political action.  
While we are concerned with the national and European levels in these cases, it is 
important to recognise that these are fundamentally interlinked at a certain point, not least 
because “the European level is significantly the product of state interaction”36.  States 
operate simultaneously at a number of levels: in the EU, states are involved in decision-
making in the European Council and the Council of Ministers; in confirming personnel in 
the Commission, Court of Justice and other institutions; in implementing most EU law; 
and in financing the EU’s budget.  While this is not to deny the existence of essentially 
autonomous actors at the European level (most clearly the European Parliament), it must 
be emphasised that the output from the ‘European’ level is in no small part the result of 
developments at the national level.
37
 
“[T]he European level is not the place where formal decisions 
are taken on typical ‘European issues’, and in particular on such issues 
as the further transfer of sovereignty from the national to the European 
level, or further enlargement, and so on. These are European ‘polity’ 
issues, and hence are subject to the intergovernmental rather than the 
supranational level of European decision-making. In other words, they 
require the consent of national governments and, at least in principle, 
are subject to the control of national parliaments and national 
electorates. Insofar as parties fail to offer a meaningful choice to the 
voters on these issues, it is therefore a problem of representation at the 
national rather than the European level.”38  [emphasis added] 
                                                 
35
 Franklin et. al. ‘Referendum outcomes and trust in government’. 
36
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How useful is such an approach in understanding the creation of EPMs?  
Taggart’s original work suggested that political parties develop Eurosceptic stances when 
there is a coincidence of a peripheral position in a country’s party system with an 
ideology that is not favourable towards European integration.  In this view, such stances 
are largely tactical, designed to lever an advantage from that party’s ‘outsider’ status by 
staking out a clear policy divergence from mainstream parties, and effectively dependent 
upon domestic political circumstances.
39
  For example when a party moves into a position 
within the party system where it might potentially gain elected office, its Eurosceptic 
element becomes marginalised and comes to be represented by a party faction.  Such 
movements have been highlighted by Sitter’s work on government-opposition shifts 
towards the EU.  Sitter views party-based Euroscepticism as driven by competition 
between cartel parties (which may or may not agree on policy towards the EU), which in 
turn stimulates policy orientation by more peripheral parties.  For those parties hoping for 
power, especially if as part of a government coalition, strongly expressed opposition 
towards the EU is not seen as a palatable policy position, thus requiring a moderation of 
views.
40
  While Taggart and Szczerbiak have subsequently recognised that the formation 
of parties can occasionally be driven by European factors, this is still seen as exceptional, 
especially in states that have only recently become members of the EU.  Due to the ever-
changing nature of European integration, it is relatively simple for parties to shift position 
as best suits their tactical needs.
41
  Applying this approach to EPMs, it might be expected 
that movements would form primarily as a response to national stimuli: be that the 
holding of referendums on European integration or a dramatic change in government EU 
policy.  Central to this view is the notion that political space is organised solely on a 
national basis, thus privileging national concerns over European ones.  Events at the 
European level are therefore, at least ostensibly, driven by national concerns and by 
combining these sets of approaches the utility of focusing on the national level in 
understanding the causes of Euroscepticism is a fruitful strategy.   
                                                 
39
 Taggart, ‘A Touchstone of Dissent’, pp. 385-6.   
40
 Sitter, ‘Opposing Europe’. 
41
 Taggart, Paul and Szczerbiak, Aleks (2008) ‘Conclusion: Opposing Europe? Three Patterns of Party 
Competition over Europe’, Szczerbiak, Aleks and Taggart, Paul (eds.) Opposing Europe? The comparative 
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This focus on the national level in seeking to understand opposition to European 
integration has been given further impetus by Neunreither who examined the role of 
opposition in the EU.
42
  Starting from the position that dissenting opinions are considered 
vital in any functioning liberal democracy, he analysed the distinct lack of alternative 
voices concerning the processes of European integration.  He concluded that opposition 
cannot be fully expressed at the European level, since there are limited opportunities for 
dissenting voices within the institutional system, so it has to move back into the existing 
national systems where the necessary institutional space does exist.
43
  Thus the very 
structure of the EU pushes opposition down to a national level, even though it is 
generated by concerns about the trajectory of European integration.   
Looking at the body of work into social movement contestation of international 
issues, a similar pattern of political contestation focused on the national level can be seen.  
Kitschelt found that even though each national anti-nuclear lobby group in his study had 
the same ultimate goal in mind, their actions were driven primarily by concerns about the 
effects of nuclear technology at a national level.  While frequent reference was made to 
international events such as Chernobyl and nuclear weapons proliferation, the emphasis 
of each anti-nuclear group campaign was on the impact of these events on their own 
nation.
44
  Similarly EPMs have focused their contestation on the national government as 
“intermediaries” in the European integration process and resisted the temptation to march 
on Brussels as Imig and Tarrow believed would be the inevitable conclusion of growing 
civil society protests against European integration.
45
  The result of this preference for the 
national over the supranational is usually manifested in the programmes of oppositional 
groups, which more often than not are more concerned with changing their own country’s 
relationship with the EU than with changing the EU as a whole.  The study of both 
Euroscepticism and social movements is therefore one that is primarily focused on the 
national level.  Scholars of both party based Euroscepticism and interest group interaction 
                                                 
42
 Neunreither, Klaus (1998). ‘Governance Without Opposition: The Case of the European Union’,  
Government and Opposition, 33: 4, pp. 419-441.   
43
 Ibid.     
44
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45
 Imig and Tarrow, ‘Political contention in a Europeanising polity’, p. 90. 
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with the policy process, have repeatedly focused on the national as the arena of 
contestation that their research focuses on.   
 
 
1.4 Conceptualising European Protest Movements 
 
There are three constituent parts to the concept of ‘Eurosceptic Protest Movements’:  
Euroscepticism; protest; and movement.  This section will operationalise each of these 
individual elements so as to clarify what exactly is the focus of this study, and perhaps 
just as importantly what is not being studied. 
 
1.4.1 A concise understanding of Euroscepticism in EPMs 
This study proposes that a distinction be made between those groups in civil society 
that are: 
a. solely or primarily focused on the question of opposing European integration 
(EPMs) 
b. those that have only a secondary focus on the subject (secondary focus interest 
groups). 
 
For the purposes of this study secondary focus interest groups will not be considered 
for research.  This is due to the main concern of this study being formation on the EU 
issue exclusively.  The more general approach of the EU dimension of social movement 
formation has been well documented but such studies do not consider Euroscepticism 
much less opposition to European integration and are rigidly focused on the European 
level.
46
   
These primary focused groups can be further divided into two, based on the two types 
of Euroscepticism that different EPMs can express: 
 
a. those who oppose the entire project of European integration through the EU 
(which can often lead them to advocate their country’s withdrawal from EU) 
                                                 
46
 Greenwood, Justin (1997). Representing Interests in the European Union, London: McMillan; Trenz, 
Hans-Georg (2009). ‘European civil society: between participation, representation and discourse’, Policy 
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b. those who only oppose certain elements of the project or EU policies (who can 
foresee the resolution of their grievances while still remaining within the EU 
system) 
On the basis of this, the following four-fold classification of EPMs in the four country 
case studies has been constructed (with some illustrative examples from my four case 
studies) in Table 1.1:  
Table 1.1: Classification of EPMs 
 Oppose EU system Oppose elements/policies 
Primary focus EPMs People’s Movement 
(Ireland) 
June Movement (Denmark) 
Movement No to EU 
(Estonia) 
Bruges Group (UK) 
Business for Sterling (UK)  
Save British Fish (UK) 
UKVE: Research Centre Free 
Europe (Estonia) 
Secondary focus EPMs 
(not considered for this 
study) 
No to EU/RMT Union 
(UK) 
AfrI: Action from Ireland 
(Ireland) 
 
 
The classification of groups is based on the groups’ own materials, but there is 
also use made of other sources, notably newspapers from the period and face-to-face 
interviews.  This is for two reasons.  Firstly, groups are often not explicit in saying why 
they have formed.  Secondly, even when they do give reasons, groups may not be 
providing the whole picture, especially when the circumstances are of a delicate nature: 
inter-personal rivalries are in some ways a defining feature of anti-EU communities in 
both countries. 
From Table 1.1 it can be concluded that groups such as No to EU/RMT Union and 
Action from Ireland while both Eurosceptic and drawn from civil society are not 
considered for this study because both are primarily concerned with issues other than 
Europe.  No to EU/RMT Union and Action from Ireland are concerned with trade 
union/workers’ rights and global justice issues respectively, with opposition to the EU an 
ancillary issue to these positions.   
This is not to deny that such groups are driven by a clear ideological opposition to 
European integration that stretches beyond simple interest representation.  The French 
ATTAC movement protest against the processes of globalisation, in both its EU and 
WTO form.  ATTAC put forward their alternative of a tax on financial transactions to 
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provide aid for the developing world.
47
  This has a definite EU dimension but European 
integration is clearly not the sole focus of their efforts.  Rather it is the inequities of the 
global financial system and the interests of the developing world that are the foundations 
of their movement.  Such issues would be a cause for mobilization whether the EU 
existed or not.  Similarly, nationalist groups such as the English Defence League (EDL), 
while strongly opposing European integration, focus more on campaigning against 
specific domestic issues such as immigration and Islamic extremism.  They perceive the 
EU to be, along with these issues, a threat to English identity and so protest against 
European integration.
48
  Again it is more than likely that a group similar to the EDL 
would exist with our without the EU. 
The engagement of both these groups in Eurosceptic contestation can be labelled 
as multi-positionality.  This is a process whereby civil society groups hold several, and 
possibly contradictory positions, on specific policies or events at any one time.
49
  As will 
be discusses in the case studies, namely Denmark and Ireland, both secondary focus 
EPMs and their members sought to become involved, or align, with primary focus EPMs.  
While such developments are interesting, and are duly noted in the case studies where 
they occur, the thesis is concerned with primary focus EPMs as they are mobilized and 
contest solely on European integration.  Taking a wider approach, that included multi-
positionality based Euroscepticism, would have detracted from an analysis of the causal 
factors of mobilization specifically related to the processes of European integration. 
From a different perspective it could be argued that groups that propose European 
federalism could be classified in this system as they are critical of the current trajectory 
of European integration for its failure to centralise power within the EU.  These groups 
are not considered for this study as while they have been critical of Treaties for not 
advancing the cause of European federalism far enough, they still broadly welcome them 
as a step in the right direction and do not seek their reversal, as Eurosceptics do.   
                                                 
47
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Other studies investigating civil society-based opposition to the EU by 
Usherwood and Gray
50
 have used far more extensive typologies by which to categorise 
the groups and movements at the centre of their respective studies.  This body of previous 
work sought to elaborate upon hypotheses that placed emphasis on a single causal factor 
in movement formation.  This thesis, by bringing together the body of research dedicated 
to both Euroscepticism and movement formation, will provide a more nuanced evaluation 
of the phenomena of EPMs.  The inclusive, yet tightly defined, framework that is 
outlined here equips this thesis with the tools required by which suitable examples of 
Euroscepticism can be identified. 
 
1.4.2 Understanding ‘protest’ 
The term protest has been added to the working definition of the subject of this 
study, as using the word protest emphasises that the groups are engaged in active 
contestation of European integration and are not passive.  This is an important distinction 
as Usherwood raised the issue of the sheer multitude of solely internet based “one man” 
Eurosceptic groups who did not operate beyond the virtual world.
51
  His research, and 
this study, discounts them, as to include them would be to give them an importance that 
their presence does not merit (other than to acknowledge their existence and multitude).  
The extensive work of Tarrow on social movement protest emphasises this point as his 
collective focus is not on groups that raise awareness of issues but on those that take 
action to contest and provoke conflict.
52
  Such movements come to represent a 
heightened and intense collective concern that has come to express itself outside of the 
institutionalised venues.  Using the term, protest, therefore not only allows this study to 
further prioritise the subjects under its consideration but places greater emphasis on their 
reasons for formation and the wider conclusion of what these reasons mean for how 
European integration is being perceived by EU citizens.   
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52
 Tarrow, Sidney (1994). Power in movement: Social movements, collective action, and politics, 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p. 153. 
  
17 
 
Kriesi et. al. have sought to clarify the term in relation to the study of social 
movements and the policy process.  They refer only to those actions that are “any kind of 
public action of a demonstration, confrontative or violent form”53.  They exclude legal 
actions, conventional political actions and conventional media-orientated actions and 
strikes.   But they specifically include action such as petitions, demonstrations, boycotts, 
disturbances to violent attacks against persons and, crucially, direct-democratic forms of 
action (i.e. citizen initiatives and referendums).  Their approach therefore is to classify a 
protest movement by the actions they take.  Contrasting this to the empirical findings of 
this study it is quite clear that there are many similarities.  In order to engage with groups 
that are Eurosceptic and utilise many of the criteria established by Kriesi et. al. this study 
expands the definition of protest to include legal and media actions.  Such an action is 
clearly logical when considering European integration, given its basis in legal text, while 
taking media actions into consideration is necessary as given the lack of salience and elite 
level basis of European integration, the media is a vital arena for both the pro and anti 
European integrationist sides.   
 
1.4.3 What is a ‘movement’? 
There is a vast amount of literature on social movements, with the majority firmly 
based in the discipline of Sociology.  The combination of protest and movement 
however, has incrementally increased the interest of Political Scientists who have sought 
to understand the origin and influence of protest movements in respect of the political 
system.  Starting with Kitschelt and expanded by Tarrow and more latterly Kriesi et. al. 
the study of protest movements by Political Scientists has been an important subset of the 
study of social movements more generally.
54
  A brief analysis of the study of social 
movements follows as it not only aids in the clarification of the subject of the research 
question it additionally provides the wider theoretical context of why formation occurs in 
the first place.   
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Firstly, what is a movement?  Meyer and Tarrow have spoken of contemporary 
society being a “movement society” given the proliferation of protest, demonstration and 
mass movement that has developed from the watershed era of the 1960s onwards.
55
  
Definitions of movements tend to be made with strong reference to the specific 
movement that that researcher has been focusing on.  Seeking to decontextualise all of 
these definitions, Snow et. al. have synthesised the definitions into a ‘one size fits all’ 
conceptualisation.  They articulate social movements as “collectivities acting with some 
degree of organisation and continuity outside of institutional or organisational channels 
for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally 
or culturally based, in the group, organisation, society, culture, or world order of which 
they are a part”.56  Putting it more succinctly and citing examples such as the 1989 pro-
democracy movements in China, the anti-war protests in the UK in 2003 as well as local 
so-called ‘NIMBY’ movements; they cite the common thread between all of them as 
being their “challenge to institutional, organisational, or cultural authority or systems of 
authority”57.  Clearly then social movements are a means by which organised and 
sustained challenge can be made to authority outside of existing institutional channels.  
For the purposes of this thesis’s research question, this interpretation of what social 
movements are can be rephrased as: a means by which an organised and sustained 
challenge can be made to authority outside of the existing political system. 
This concept of a movement as referred to in the political science literature is 
intimately associated with the processes of contestation and protest, specifically when 
they take place outside of existing channels of political participation.  With such a 
definition there is an ostensible overlap between movements and civil society 
organisation.  The fundamental difference between the two is that movements seek to 
directly challenge existing power structures through protest and contestation.  Civil 
society organisations, on the other hand, seek to work within existing power structures to 
achieve their goals.  In this respect, contestation is not central to civil society organisation 
mobilization, whereas contestation is the raison d’être of movements.  Movements are 
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formed almost singularly to contest, to challenge and to protest.
58
  An example of this 
distinction would be the differences between the civil society organisation Oxfam, and 
the anti-globalization Occupy Movement.  Both are concerned with questions of social 
justice in relation to the processes of globalization.  Oxfam, as a civil society 
organization, seeks to work within existing political and economic structures to achieve 
social justice in the developing world.  The Occupy Movement on the other hand wants 
to achieve its social justice goals by challenging existing political and economic 
structures. 
While the literature on social movements has not had as problematic a time with 
definitions as that of the literature on Euroscepticism, it has instead focused on seeking 
the answer to two questions:  1.) What causes social movements to form in the first 
place?  2.) What causes them to mobilise around the issues that they do? 
The conventional approach to social movements believes that mobilisation 
happens due to “intolerable circumstances, unbearable deprivations, and intense 
grievances”.59  This has been labelled the “classical approach” to understanding social 
movement formation and it argues that such situations develop due to large scale social-
structural changes.
60
  Such an approach fell out of favour as it was viewed as too 
deterministic and failed to explain the discrepancy between social groups who mobilised 
and successfully affected policy change, and similar social groups who did not mobilise.  
A model based around resource mobilisation emerged to critique this approach with the 
argument that “there is always enough discontent in any society to supply grass-roots 
support for a movement if the movement is effectively organised and has at its disposal 
the power and resources of some established group”.61  The resource mobilisation model 
became the dominant paradigm as in-depth research on specific social movements came 
to the conclusion that what made them successful in terms of their longevity and policy 
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effectiveness was their organisational capacity to manage and effectively utilise the 
resources (both human and financial) at their disposal.   
Seeing a strong degree of commonality between this focus on resources and their 
understanding of the political system, political scientists built on from resource 
mobilisation theory, to develop the political process model.  This model emphasises 
external political opportunities rather than internal resources as central to the resource 
mobilisation approach.  More recently the political process model has come to 
“dominate” the literature on social movement mobilisation.62 The social movement 
opportunities for the political process model are characterised very generally as levels of 
success and levels of repression and facilitation.
63
  More specifically Tarrow describes 
social movement opportunities to access the political process as “consistent – but not 
necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide 
incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for 
success or failure”.64 
Similarly to social movement formation, two theories dominate the literature 
around the issues which social movements mobilise: 1.) the grievance model and 2.) the 
frame alignment model.  The key difference between the two approaches is that the 
grievance model sees social problems as objective facts to which social movements react, 
whereas the frame alignment model emphasises the importance of social movements in 
defining and constructing social problems.  Processes of definition and interpretation 
occupy a central place in the “framing” perspective on protest and social movement 
mobilisation.
65
  This focus on ‘issue framing’ is a key tool of analysis for social 
movement scholars as “grievances or discontents are subject to differential interpretation, 
and the fact that variations in their interpretation across individuals, social movement 
organisations, and time can affect whether and how they are acted upon”.66  The 
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unresolved question in relation to this most important element of social movement 
analysis is “why framing processes succeed in some cases but fail in others?”.67   
Koopmans and Duyvendak have offered a highly practical working solution by 
distilling such problems down to a distinction between “the success of framing efforts 
depend[ing] on the argumentative power of the discourse as such or whether framing 
functions primarily as a mechanism that translates structural conditions, constraints, or 
opportunities into articulated discontent and dispositions toward collective action”.68  The 
authors used public opinion data on nuclear power to measure the effect of issue framing 
by anti-nuclear groups, with the result that in France they failed and in Germany they 
succeeded decisively.  They concluded that “social movements are sometimes victorious 
in their efforts to frame situations as problematic, but only when they operate in a 
political context that offers them the opportunity to do so”69[emphasis added].  Their 
conclusions are highly relevant to this research project in that they focus on an issue that 
is broadly similar across the various case studies, European integration, but that has 
differing outcomes for the incidence of social movement formation and their influence in 
the policy making process.  As such the Koopmans and Duyvendak model informs the 
approach of this research project in seeking to understand social movement formation in 
terms of their success/failure to frame European integration as ‘problematic’ due to the 
political opportunity context in which they operate.    
Political scientists have therefore sought to understand social movements in terms 
of their interaction with the policy making process and their resultant effects on policy 
outcomes.  To achieve this end with regard to EPMs this thesis develops an investigative 
structure based firmly on the literature discussed in this section.  Firstly, from Koopmans 
and Duyvendak
70
 it examines how EPMs use ‘issue framing’; more specifically how 
social movements both see the issue they contest and how they communicate the issue to 
the public in order to gain wider support.  This is a vital consideration as it facilitates the 
discovery of what elements of European integration EPMs contested and why. Secondly, 
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for Kitschelt
71
, Kreisi et. al.
72
 and Tarrow
73
 the use of political opportunity structures by 
social movements is vital to understanding how they affect policy change and in 
influencing what form their mobilisation takes and what actions of contestation they 
pursue.  This thesis will follow on from their lead and investigate the use of political 
opportunity structures by EPMs, so as to understand how it influences EPM formation, 
EPM actions of contestation and any policy outcomes EPMs have affected.   
 
1.5 EPMs across Europe 
Having come to a concrete understanding of how Euroscepticism in civil society 
based protest movements can be analysed, the next stage of the process is to locate what 
cases should be studied.  In order to locate what case studies would be the most suitable 
for the thesis an investigation into the presence of EPMs in all the EU member states, and 
some non-EU states (namely Croatia, Iceland, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, and 
Switzerland) was undertaken.  This analysis took the form of an expert survey of 
specialists in Euroscepticism from the EPERN (European Parties Elections and 
Referendums Network) database at the Sussex European Institute.   
The survey asked: 
1.) “is there the presence or not of Eurosceptic protest movements in (your 
country)?”   
If the answer was positive then it asked for the: 
  1.a) “names and/or prominent members of the EPMs?”  
and for: 
1.b) “a score on a rating of 1-5 (with 5 being high and 1 being no impact) for the 
impact of each movement on the European debate”74.   
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Table 1.2 Results of pan-European expert survey on number of EPMs in each state and 
their effectiveness in national debate in each country 
High/Medium/Low/None Country Number Effectiveness 
High UK 25 4 
 Sweden 7 3 
 Serbia 4 2 
Medium Ireland 3 4 
 Estonia 2 2 
 Austria 2 1 
 
Czech 
Republic 
2 1 
 Finland 2 1 
 Iceland 2 2 
 Slovenia 2 1 
 Switzerland 2 4 
Low Croatia 1 1 
 Denmark 1 2 
 Malta 1 1 
 Netherlands 1 1 
 Norway  1 5 
 Poland 1 1 
 Romania 1 1 
None Belgium 0 0 
 Bulgaria 0 0 
 Cyprus 0 0 
 France 0 0 
 Germany 0 0 
 Greece 0 0 
 Hungary 0 0 
 Italy 0 0 
 Latvia 0 0 
 Lithuania 0 0 
 Luxembourg 0 0 
 Montenegro 0 0 
 Portugal 0 0 
 Slovakia 0 0 
 Spain 0 0 
Source: Expert survey, see Appendix I for more details. 
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The results of this survey are quite stark.  From Table 1.2 a clear pattern emerges 
of EPM formation: high, medium and low.  A group of states consisting of the UK, 
Sweden and Serbia have 25, 7 and 4 EPMs respectively; they represent a high level of 
EPM formation.  Next, a group of states (Ireland, Estonia, Austria, Czech Republic, and 
Finland) have three to two EPMs and thereby represent a medium level of EPM 
formation.  Seven states (Croatia, Denmark, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and 
Romania) have only one EPM and are representative of a low level of EPM formation.  
Fifteen states however, have no identified level of EPM formation.   EPMs, while present 
in many countries, are not a pervasive presence across Europe.  
The social movement literature uses the number of movements mobilized as a 
common measurement for the salience of an issue in civil society.  The logic for this 
approach is that the wider the spread of opposition across multiple movements that 
originate in different sections in society, the more important the issue of mobilization is 
beyond specific local factors.  The most important example of this is McAdam’s analysis 
of the US civil rights movement in the 1950s and 60s.  In his path-defining work, 
McAdam showed that the civil rights movement was more a series of interlinked 
movements united behind a common goal rather than a singular cohesive movement.
75
  
McAdam examined the number and spread of civil rights movement mobilization and 
found that the strength of the US civil rights movement was its resonance with so many 
diverse strands of African-American and white-liberal society.  He concluded that such a 
diverse coalition could not have united behind a single movement and been as successful 
as it was.  Applying this process to the study of EPMs, the assumption is that the greater 
the presence of EPMs in a state, the greater the depth of Euroscepticism across a wider 
spectrum of society in that state.   
The obvious follow on questions from a focus on the number of EPMs is – do a 
higher number of EPMs lead to more influence in policy formation?  Or if that is not the 
case, then do a small number of EPMs with a broad base of support and significant 
human and financial resources have a greater say in policy formulation?  On this 
dichotomy social movement scholars have a lot less to say.  They are more concerned 
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with issues and strategies, rather than policy outcomes.
76
  The thesis, as a bridging point 
between social movement studies and political science, will utilize the social movement 
approach of measuring the number of EPMs as an initial means of categorization for 
EPMs.  As it progresses, the thesis will critically evaluate the policy influence of EPMs 
in each case.  Finally, it will come to a conclusion as to whether the prevailing consensus 
in the social movements literature is correct, that the greater the number of movements 
mobilized the greater the influence, or if Euroscepticism is an example of issue 
mobilization where a single or a handful of movements can have a significant degree of 
influence over the policy making process.   
 Taking the existing social movements approach of using the number of 
movement mobilizations on a specific issue, specific patterns in EPM formation can be 
discerned from the data in Table 1.2.  Firstly, there is strong EPM formation in those 
countries that are not EU member states (Iceland, Norway, Serbia and Switzerland), 
where they are also quite influential in the EU debate in those countries.  Expert 
respondents from these four countries emphasised their importance and, especially in the 
case of Norway and Switzerland, their ownership of the European issue.  This used to be 
the case in Iceland but the economic crisis of 2008 greatly weakened the hand of 
Icelandic Eurosceptics by removing their central argument of the success of economic 
independence from the EU.  Perhaps the most interesting finding from the expert survey 
data is the presence of four separate and distinct EPMs in Serbia.  As Table 1.2 clearly 
shows, Serbian EPMs have had a significant impact on mobilising public opposition to 
EU membership.  Near neighbour Croatia, at a more advanced stage of EU accession 
negotiations and with only one minor EPM, has not seen similar levels of EPM 
formation.  The emergence of EPMs to contest EU membership in Serbia has been made 
possible largely due to the successful framing of the Eurosceptic issue in the context of 
extreme nationalism.  Civil society-based Serbian nationalist groups emerged in the 
1980s, well before the fall of communism in Yugoslavia, and played important roles in 
                                                 
76
 Ibid, p. 17. 
  
26 
 
Serbian politics during the various conflicts over Kosovo in the 1990s and so their 
emergence to contest EU accession is understandable
77
.   
A common feature across all of these countries that exhibit EPM formation is that 
they are either non-original members of the EU or are not members at all.  Not being an 
original member state influences the issue framing context in favour of EPMs as 
participation in European integration had to be opted into at one stage and was not the 
default proposition it was for the original six member states.  Thus, the alternative 
Eurosceptic position of total or partial withdrawal from European integration has the 
benefit of historical precedence in those states.    Membership of the EU and participation 
in European integration in these states has been and in many cases continues to be a 
contested issue.  Chapter Four, on the UK case, shows how, despite accession in 1973 
and a decisive referendum outcome in favour of membership in 1975, EPMs continue to 
form to contest EU membership.  Looking at EPM formation from the perspective of 
issue framing helps to explain why a country with high levels of public support for 
membership, such as Ireland (66%), has EPM formation and a country with a low level of 
support for membership, such as Germany (50%), does not have EPM formation
78
.  
Perhaps the greatest barrier social movements face in sustaining their mobilisation is in 
framing their issue as one which can be contested in the first instance.   All of these states 
with EPM formation (apart from Iceland) have held referendums on European 
integration, showing the openness of the policy making process there in allowing 
Eurosceptics a platform to contest participation in European integration.  Given the 
public debate on participation in European integration that followed these referendums, 
the tremendous obstacle of framing the EU as an issue that should be contested was 
overcome for EPMs, giving them the issue legitimacy, political opportunity and resources 
necessary to form and sustain their movement.   
The EPM formation environment described here clearly resonates with Western 
Europe.  Its relevance to Eastern Europe is less clear cut however.  A clear lack of EPM 
formation is visible in the Eastern and Southern regions of the EU.  Experts in Eastern 
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Europe described the lack of EPM formation as being strongly related to the post-
communist legacy of a weak civil society.  Added to the lack of EPM formation in 
Eastern Europe is also its absence in the Southern or Mediterranean region of the EU: 
specifically Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.  This was explained by the experts 
as being part of the complex EU-State relationship in those countries that combined 
overarching issues of regional autonomy and deeply entrenched left/right political 
cleavages that left no space for civil society based formation to contest European 
integration.  Combined with the relatively high public support for the EU and a long 
history of collective action based on high salience issues such as global justice and 
national political reform, Euroscepticism was channelled through the party system or well 
established civil society protest groups
79
.  These issues are explored in greater detail in 
Section 6.4.2 where the example of Spain is analysed to understand why, given a 
relatively favourable political opportunity issue framing structure, civil society has not 
formed against European integration in Spain.   
Looking at the secondary question of the effectiveness of EPMs further 
interesting variations in the findings are noted.  Here, the UK, Ireland, Norway, 
Switzerland and Sweden are seen to have influential EPMs.  In the cases of Norway and 
Switzerland, EPMs were seen by the experts as the ‘owners’ of the European issue there.  
In Ireland, Sweden and the UK EPMs were influential but had to share ownership of the 
EU issue with Eurosceptic political parties.  The common thread between all of these 
cases of high EPM influence was their success in affecting policy outcome on the EU 
issue.  This took the form, aside from the UK, of playing a key role in the rejection of 
referendums on EU issues.  In Norway and Switzerland EPMs took the lead in 
coordinating campaigns between a range of actors such as political parties, trade unions, 
farmers’ organisations and other civil society groups.  In Ireland and Sweden EPMs were 
not as cohesive but played central roles in creating the issue environment around the EU 
debate and in their campaigning in EU-related referendums.  The influence of UK EPMs 
was high but for the opposite reasons of the other case studies.  In the late 1990s EPMs 
emerged to successfully campaign against the holding of a referendum on EMU 
membership.  More recently successive UK governments have been wary of holding 
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referendums on European integration, in part due to the sheer number of EPMs that exist 
and that would campaign against the EU issue in question.  Overall EPMs were not seen 
as an intrinsic element of national debates on European integration, despite being in 
evidence.  
This brief analysis of EPM formation across Europe has provided some 
fascinating data but this data can only point to the presence and location of EPMs.  Its use 
in understanding EPM formation is far more limited.  To overcome these limitations, but 
to also build on the substantial evidence from the expert survey, this thesis conducts a 
series of in-depth case studies.  Taking a country from each of the three patterns of EPM 
formation from the survey; high – the UK, medium – Ireland and low level – Denmark, 
will allow for a deep understanding of why Euroscepticism emerges as a protest 
movement.  Taking the additional case study of Estonia, an example of medium EPM 
formation, broadens out the scope of the thesis into Eastern Europe whilst also engaging 
with the findings of Table 1.2. In addition to these four case studies being examples of 
different types of EPM formation, they also exhibit variance between each other across a 
range of factors.  More specific detail on why these case studies are relevant for the thesis 
will now be discussed.     
 
1.5.1 The Case Studies 
This research project proceeds on a case study basis using a most similar systems 
comparative design.  As discussed in the previous section the countries vary with regard 
to the focus on this study: EPM formation.  If the arguments of Ragin
80
 and Peters
81
 are 
to be believed, however, this is not enough.  According to their authoritative works on the 
use of comparative analysis in political science, a much more solid theoretical reasoning 
for their inclusion must be made.  The reasoning behind choosing national case studies as 
a method for the investigation of the proposed research question is therefore evident.  But 
why then choose Denmark, Ireland, the UK and Estonia specifically?  The four country 
cases cover the range of relatively old and new member states, a traditionally pro-EU 
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member state, Ireland, more Eurosceptic ones, the UK and Denmark and a post-Soviet 
state, Estonia.   
Structuring the thesis in this manner clearly makes the choice of these four case 
studies rather important, in order to avoid conflicting explanations.  Given that only 
France and the UK have received any kind of scholarly work with regard to the 
phenomena of Eurosceptic mobilisation in civil society, any other country in the EU 
would be both interesting and useful to study.  Hence the choice of Ireland, the UK, 
Denmark and Estonia needs to be justified both on absolute and relative grounds.  In 
Ireland, Denmark and Estonia all of the EPMs the study focuses on are those who were 
active over a relatively sustained period of time.  Although some smaller groups who 
could have been classified as EPMs were not discussed, this was due to their influence 
being determined as negligible, their presence ephemeral or simply not enough data 
available (website, documents, individuals) to provide a substantial analysis of them.  For 
the UK case as will be explained further in Chapter 3, there were simply too many EPMs 
to analyse to a satisfactory level and so two EPMs who are representative of UK EPM 
formation in general will be discussed: Table 1.3 shows the EPMs that are the focus of 
this study in each of the case studies.   
 
Table 1.3 List of EPMs researched in-depth by case study 
 
1.5.2 Ireland 
The Irish case is necessary for inclusion as Irish EPMs were one of the few 
examples to have actually achieved their aims by securing the rejection of a European 
referendum: the Nice Treaty in 2001 and the Lisbon Treaty in 2008.  In an exceptional 
development EPMs took the lead in the campaign and subsumed the efforts of established 
Ireland 
National Platform, Peace and Neutrality Alliance, Cóir, Libertas, Peoples’ 
Movement 
UK 
Business for Sterling, Campaign for a Referendum on the European 
Constitution 
Estonia Research Centre Free Europe, Movement No to the EU 
Denmark People’s Movement No to the EU, June Movement 
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political parties into a politically united Eurosceptic coalition.
82
  The origins of this 
development are interesting to explore, as Euroscepticism was present in the Irish party 
system, yet these political parties believed that EPMs represented the best channel to 
develop a Eurosceptic campaign.  The work of FitzGibbon and Gilland has informed the 
debate as to the fundamentally opportunist nature of Irish party based Euroscepticism
83
.  
Applying their research to this case therefore allowed for an analysis of why 
Euroscepticism moved down the political ‘food chain’, as it were, away from party 
politics towards civil society.   Moreover, the Irish case is an example of EPM formation 
in a country that has consistently been amongst the most supportive of EU membership, 
with support for membership reaching well into 80% in the late 1990s and never 
dropping lower than 65% into the late 2000s.
84
  
As the chapter on Irish EPM formation will show, EPMs emerged to play a 
decisive role in the rejection of European treaties at referendums, as they were able to 
constantly reinvent themselves to represent shifting public opinions toward European 
integration.  At the time of EU accession, the issues around which EPMs formed were 
nationalism and Irish sovereignty (The National Platform, Peace and Neutrality Alliance) 
with the ultimate policy goal of non- participation in European integration.  As Irish EU 
membership became entrenched and public support for the EU remained strong, new 
EPMs (namely Cóir, Libertas and the People’s Movement) emerged to contest European 
integration on specific ‘soft’ Eurosceptic issues, such as neutrality, worker’s rights, 
traditional Catholic values and domestic taxation policy.  Withdrawal from the EU was 
no longer the policy goal of the majority of Eurosceptics, as it was deemed to be too 
unrealistic.  Instead, Eurosceptics mobilised to contest Irish participation in specific 
policies.   
The examination of Irish EPMs will show the extent to which Euroscepticism is a 
dynamic phenomenon, and how studying Euroscepticism can track the development of 
national debates on Europe.  Moreover, Ireland represents an example of Euroscepticism 
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in a pro-European country.  Investigating the development of Euroscepticism in Ireland 
will therefore show how it can emerge and have effects on policy, in the rejection of 
European treaties, despite high levels of public support for European integration and the 
dominance of pro–EU sentiment amongst Irish political parties.   
 
 
1.5.3 The United Kingdom 
The UK case is exceptional simply for the sheer number of EPMs
85
.  An in-depth 
analysis of each was clearly unfeasible so this research project focused on two: Business 
for Sterling and Campaign for a Referendum on the European Constitution.  Moreover, 
EPMs in the UK differed from EPMs in the other cases studies due to their close 
relationship with established political parties.  This was because their membership was 
made up of members of political parties as compared to other EPMs who were often 
formed due to distrust of the political party system
86
.  The work of Usherwood has 
highlighted the prevalence of EPMs in the UK and their importance to the European 
debate there.  But Bale, amongst others, has detailed that, despite the European issue 
arousing strong emotions in both the Conservative and Labour parties, it has been 
consigned to the political margins
87
.  Not only will the study of EPMs in the UK build on 
Usherwood’s work to provide a further insight into the UK’s relationship with the EU but 
it will also chart the outsourcing of contestation on Europe by the UK’s two largest 
parties to civil society.  In the other cases referendums have taken place and EPMs have 
played decisive roles.  With no European referendum in the UK since 1975, EPMs there 
have had to engage different strategies to those EPMs of the other case studies not just to 
contest the EU issue, but to keep it salient in the first instance.   
Examining UK EPMs reveals how and why collective action still occurs even 
when the issue of formation is present in the party system and covered in the national 
media.  The relationship between the UK and the EU is one that has seen the UK labelled 
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as deviant from the EU norm, as a “Eurosceptic state”88.  George makes this statement as 
he believes that every facet of the UK state is inherently hostile to European integration 
from political parties, public opinion, the media to the institutions of the UK state itself.  
This study will analyse the veracity of his argument and with the aid of comparison to the 
other case studies contextualise UK Euroscepticism to evaluate if its Euroscepticism is 
exceptional or part of a wider pattern.   
 
1.5.4 Denmark 
The first Danish EPM, the People’s Movement No to the EU, was formed to 
contest the EU accession Treaty in 1973.  It was reformed in opposition to the established 
political parties’ positions on Danish membership of the EU and contested these positions 
by competing in the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979.  This 
change in direction represented an interesting shift in the political opportunity structure of 
protest movements in that they changed from an anti-political elite position to engaging 
repeatedly and at times with great success in the political system
89
.  This thesis will 
investigate the proposition that it was the Danish party system’s handling of Danish-EU 
relations that caused EPM formation or if hitherto unknown factors were the main cause.  
Here the nuances of the Danish political system and of Danish public opinion towards the 
EU will be crucial factors.  Extensive research has been conducted on the apparent 
exceptionalism of Danish opposition to European integration.  In particular Franklin, 
Sitter, Anderson and Worre have come to the conclusion (albeit through vastly differing 
means) that the Danish public held differing positions compared to their positions on 
domestic politics
90
.  But as yet there is little in the way of analysis of Danish EPMs.
91
 
Exploring the Danish political system with the aid of the extensive body of 
research discussed provides an illustrative example of what factors propelled Eurosceptic 
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formation from civil society into the European party system, and how People’s 
Movement No to the EU and its subsequent rival, the June Movement, were able to 
maintain their original social movement support base.  Looking at Euroscepticism in 
Denmark will reveal how two party systems can emerge where the electorate votes in a 
substantially different manner between national and European elections.  “Scandinavian 
exceptionalism” as a particular form of opposition to European integration has been put 
forward to explain why the Scandinavian states are reluctant EU participants, more 
focused on a few key policy areas, such as the environment.
92
  This thesis will look at 
Denmark from the comparative position of non-Scandinavian states and conclude as to 
whether Euroscepticism in Denmark as a Scandinavian state is indeed exceptional. 
 
1.5.5 Estonia 
There was no Eurosceptic representation in the Estonian national parliament.  The 
majority of mainstream political parties flirted with Euroscepticism but upon entering 
government quickly became forceful proponents of Estonian membership.  Campaigns 
through the office of the Presidency and the judiciary were thwarted by parliament and so 
the only open channel available to challenge the government policy of EU membership 
was an EPM-led No campaign in the accession referendum.
93
  The open development of 
civil society in the Central and Eastern European Countries was prevented until the 
collapse of communism.  Thus when EPMs emerged in Estonia (namely the Research 
Centre Free Europe and Movement No to the EU) there were no institutionalized non-
party based pro-European elements to challenge them.  Looking at EPMs in Estonia will 
therefore show if they were able to influence national debates on Europe to a degree 
comparable to those in the other case studies or if the weakness of civil society there 
made them ineffectual.   
The Estonian case will be illustrative to a degree of the particular character of the 
relationship between the former communist states and European integration.  This will 
allow for conclusions to be drawn as to whether Kopécky and Mudde are right in their 
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distinction between Euroscepticism in Western and Eastern member states or if looking 
beyond party politics shows distinct similarities that they overlooked.
94
  Low public 
support for membership of the EU prior to the accession referendum saw Estonia 
portrayed as being one of the most Eurosceptic of the accession states.
95
  Chapter four on 
Estonia will look at the dynamics of Euroscepticism in an Eastern European state, why it 
emerged and why it then failed to be acted upon in the accession referendum.   
 
 
1.6 The Explanatory Factors 
The focus of this study is: Eurosceptic Protest Movement formation.  This in turn 
is measured by the number of EPMs formed in each case study.  The case studies are 
characterised according to the number of instances of EPM formation: with the UK being 
high, Ireland being medium, and Denmark and Estonia being low.  
This approach is taken on the basis of the assumption that the more favourable an 
environment was for EPM formation, the more EPMs that were formed, and so the actual 
number of EPMs could be used to measure the favourability of a country for EPM 
formation.  A similar approach has been adopted in the wider body of research into social 
movements.  Here a consensus (though by no means a universal one) has emerged that 
sees the number of social movements forming around an issue as both a measure of the 
depth of feeling on that issue and a measure of the openness of the national policy 
process on that issue.
96
  Coming to a conclusion based on the number of EPMs in each 
case study will lead to an analysis of the depth of Euroscepticism and the openness of 
national policy making on the EU in each of the case studies.   
In seeking to understand EPM formation five explanatory factors (EFs) that could 
contribute toward EPM formation are drawn from an analysis of the existing literature on 
both Euroscepticism and protest movement formation, and inductively from a 
preliminary analysis by the author of the various case studies.  The areas found to be 
most common and relevant to the study are: the influence of media; the degree of 
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prevalence of Euroscepticsm in the party system; the frequency of European 
referendums; the nature of the policy process; and the resources available to EPMs.  
Distilling these into a coherent set of propositions gives this thesis a framework around 
which to investigate the causal factors in EPM formation:  
 
EF1: The more pro-European the media are, the more likely that EPMs will form.   
EF2: The lower the level of Euroscepticism in the party system, the more likely 
that EPMs will form.   
EF3: The more referendums on European issues, the more likely that EPMs 
will form.   
EF4: The more open the policy process (including institutional factors such as the 
electoral system), the more likely that EPMs will form. 
EF5: The more available are state and/or private resources, the more likely that 
EPMs will form.   
 
Role of the Media: 
EF1: The more pro-European the media are, the more likely that EPMs will form.   
 
While many studies have provided substantive evidence as to the importance of 
the media in public attitudes towards European integration, few have sought to integrate 
this work into an analysis of European integration related political phenomena.
97
  This is 
a curious omission as from the outlines of the case studies discussed above, it is clear that 
the media are viewed as an important player in the national European debate by EPMs.   
The importance of the media in national debates on Europe has been identified by 
Koopmans and others in their desire to understand public attitudes toward European 
integration.
98
  The print media in particular, are the focus of scholarly attention, as 
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analysing the print media facilitates the tracing of long term trends in discourse on 
European integration at both the national and European level.
99
  This confirms very 
strongly to the social movements literature where the media are seen as a key battle 
ground in terms of issue framing.
100
  An analysis of the influence of the media in EPM 
formation therefore dovetails very well with the literature on both analysis of European 
integration and social movements.   
For EPMs a pro-EU media must be challenged, as the social movement literature 
describes the media as a parallel “arena of contestation” to the political opportunity 
structures in that it allows access to the issue discourse (be that at the local, national, 
international level) as a relatively low cost, but potentially highly influential, means by 
which to get their arguments across.
101
  Should the media be viewed by the public as 
being pro-European, then this must obviously act as a mobilising factor for EPM 
formation as Eurosceptic arguments are not being put forward in the public domain and 
receiving an opportunity to influence public attitudes towards European integration.  
Likewise, should the media be viewed as Eurosceptic, then this should inhibit EPM 
formation as the public is being exposed to Eurosceptic arguments and European 
integration is being challenged.  On the contrary however, this same presence of 
Euroscepticism in the media could encourage EPM formation by creating the issue 
environment necessary to support sustained protest against European integration.  Further 
analysis of the wider consequences of media interaction with the EU will add a much 
needed new dimension of EU-media studies.   
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Level of Euroscepticism in the Party System: 
EF2: The lower the level of Euroscepticism in the party system, the more likely 
that EPMs will form.   
 
 The extensive Eurosceptic literature discussed throughout this chapter emphasises 
the importance of political parties in understanding the nature of Euroscepticism at the 
national level.  The obvious conclusion is that there must be a significant relationship 
between the political party sphere and EPMs given this level of importance.  The 
question that this study engages with throughout the case studies is where does the 
balance of this relationship lie?  This leads to obvious follow on questions such as: does a 
high degree of Euroscepticism in the party system promulgate Eurosceptic positions into 
civil society prompting individual citizens to form EPMs to further pursue these 
positions?; or does a lack of party based Euroscepticism cause EPM formation so that 
anti-European positions could be articulated at a national level?  As Mair and Thomassen 
have clearly articulated the burden of the relationship between citizens and the EU is 
placed almost wholly on national political parties.
102
   
 But as FitzGibbon
103
, Hobolt
104
 and O’Mahoney105 have pointed out; there has 
been a degree of “elite withdrawal” on the EU issue by political parties.  Apart from 
minority or extremist parties the EU has become an uncontested, non-salient issue for 
parties even for those parties who are not wholly supportive of European integration.  
This explanatory factor explores the validity of these emerging arguments in relation to 
EPM formation.  Should Euroscepticism not be articulated in the party political system 
then opposition to European integration is likely to find expression in other forms; 
principally in EPMs.  Likewise should Euroscepticism be an influential force in the party 
system then this should reduce the need for EPMs to form, given that Euroscepticism is 
already being articulated in the national political discourse.   
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Number of European referendums: 
EF3: The more referendums on European issues, the more likely that EPMs will 
form.   
 
 The literature on referendums has provided a focus for researching Eurosceptic 
activity.  Hobolt argues that they act as an excellent mobilisation opportunity for the 
dissemination of Eurosceptic positions in the crowded political marketplace.
106
  Most 
importantly, however, they provide a chance of affecting change in national policy 
towards the EU for those outside of the mainstream political system.  Pro-European 
majorities in parliament, the opaqueness of decision making in the European Council, and 
the limitations placed on the European Parliament act as restraints on any outside 
influence in the enacting of European Treaties; but as Taggart and Szczerbiak’s study of 
European referendums found, referendums heightened public awareness of European 
issues and promoted extensive discourse on the subject.
107
  This thesis investigates 
whether the relationship between Eurosceptic activity and European referendums they 
identified at this level was replicated in civil society.  This will indicate the similarity of 
Eurosceptic causation at the party political and civil society levels.   
Moreover, if EPMs mobilise around referendums, than they will confirm to the 
political opportunities model from the social movements literature.  Referendums are 
listed as a political opportunity by Kitschelt
108
 but they are not given significant attention 
by them for the simple fact that referendums, let alone repeated referendums, have rarely 
been held on issues that are of interest to social movements.
109
  Investigating the 
importance of referendums in EPM formation ties this thesis closely towards the 
dominant social movement mobilisation theory. 
 
 
 
                                                 
106
 Hobolt, Choosing Europe, p. 15.   
107
 Szczerbiak, Aleks and Taggart, Paul (2004). ‘Conclusion: Towards a Model of (European) 
Referendums’, West European Politics, 27:4, pp. 767-8.  
108
 Kitschelt, ‘Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest’, p. 68. 
109
 The post 2000 vast increase in the number of referendums and plebiscites in the US on issues such as 
gay marriage have surprisingly not received much academic attention from social movement scholars. 
  
39 
 
Open Policy Process: 
EF4: The more open the policy process (including institutional factors such as the 
electoral system), the more likely that EPMs will form. 
 
As discussed earlier, the political science literature that investigates social 
movements generally uses the political opportunity structures approach to encompass the 
many political and institutional factors that social movements encounter in their quest to 
affect policy change.  The basic premise of political opportunity structures is that 
“exogenous factors enhance or inhibit prospects for mobilization, for particular sorts of 
claims to be advanced rather than others, for particular strategies of influence to be 
exercised, and for movements to affect mainstream institutional politics and policy”.110  
Kitschelt concluded that anti-nuclear groups were not nearly as numerous in Sweden as 
the policy-making process took into account their opinions and substantially acted upon 
them.  In France he found that similar groups were ignored at all levels of the policy 
process and so they were forced to swell their membership ranks and protest on the street 
as it was the only recourse available to them to get their policy positions across.
111
  An 
open policy process is taken from Kitschelt to mean “the capacity of political systems to 
convert demands into public policy”, with the output phase offering “points of access and 
inclusion in policy making”.112  Kitschelt cites four key areas that contribute to an open 
policy process from the input side:  
 
1.) the number of political parties, factions and groups that effectively articulate 
different demands in electoral politics;  
2.) the capacity of legislatures to control and develop policies independent of the 
executive; 
3.) pluralist and fluid patterns of intermediation between interest groups and the 
executive branch, that facilitate the access of new interests to the centres of 
political decision making; 
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4.)  mechanisms by which demands can be aggregated to build effective policy 
coalitions.   
 
 Similarly he lists three operational dimensions that increase the capacity of 
political systems on the output policy side: 
1.) a centralised state apparatus makes national policies easier to implement; 
2.) Government control over market participants, in that the greater the 
government control over economic resources and decision centres for the 
economy as a whole through political institutions, the more limited are the 
resources available with which to challenge policies;   
3.) The relative independence and authority the judiciary enjoys in the resolution 
of political conflict.  
 
The case studies of this research project have a mixture of open policy process 
systems (Denmark, Ireland) and closed (the UK, Estonia), as Table 1.4 illustrates, and 
thus an analysis of the influence of these systems on EPM formation is compatible with 
the most influential form of analysis of social movement interaction with the policy-
making process.  Kitschelt expressly focuses on the extent of the open or closed nature of 
the policy making process specifically and not on the basic strength or weakness of the 
state, as the policy making process is far more influential in the activities of social 
movements.
113
  This is because the study of social movements is generally concerned 
with how social movements affect policy change or how states respond to them, and not 
so much the capacity of the state to produce policy output in the first place.  Examining 
how civil society can interact with the EU policy-making process at the national level 
contributes to the study of the supposed democratic deficit in the EU and specifically to 
the new debate on accessibility of the European institutions for grass-roots social 
movements.
114
  It will show to what extent the national EU policy-making process can 
accommodate the views of civil society and grassroots movements on European 
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integration or indeed if it actively prevents them from participation in the policy-making 
process. 
 
Table 1.4 Political Opportunity Structures in Ireland, the UK, Estonia and  
Denmark 
 
 
  Political Input Structures  
  Open Closed 
Political Output 
Structures 
Strong 
 
Denmark Estonia 
 Weak Ireland UK 
 
Availability of Resources: 
EF5: The more available are state and/or private resources, the more likely that 
EPMs will form.   
 
 The relationship between the largesse distributed by wealthy Eurosceptics and the 
proliferation of UK EPMs has already been well established.
115
  From the social 
movement literature, McCarthy
116
 emphasises that understanding the availability and 
exploitation of resources by social movements is intrinsic to understanding how they 
form in the first place.  The social movement literature articulates the need for a 
combination of “moral, cultural, socio-organisational, human, and material resources” for 
social movement formation.
117
  The key however, is the equality of access to these 
resources between institutional and non-institutional actors such as social movements.  
The availability of such resources and access to them “are seen to enhance the likelihood 
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of effective collective action”118 but such access to resources is reflective of broader 
social and economic inequalities.  This explanatory factor is therefore important in 
evaluating if EPMs are formed in “privileged constituencies” with access to resources.  If 
this turns out not to be the case and EPMs can access state and/or private resources 
despite being economically, politically or socially marginalised, then they will contradict 
“consistent patterns of differential mobilisation [...] in Western democracies” and the 
supposed democratic deficit between the EU and civil society will be smaller than some 
believe.
119
   
In the wider social movements literature the practical understanding of resources 
is not just raw human manpower but more specifically the managerial capabilities to be 
able to harness the power of mass protest.  McAdam in particular has strongly 
emphasized the primacy of human management skills as perhaps the key use of resources 
by social movements.
120
  Financial resources are rarely discussed in the literature and 
when they are they are framed in terms of their use on organizational and human 
resources.  In specific examples, most notably the UK, financial resources play an 
important role in EPM mobilization.  As will be shown in the thesis the presence of 
financial resources in EPM mobilization is a rarity and in this regard, and from the social 
movement literature, the thesis takes resources to mean primarily human and managerial 
skills. 
 
1.7 Data and Methodology  
There were three key sources of data that were used for this research. 
 
Firstly, semi-structured interviews with both current and former EPM activists were 
conducted to obtain data regarding: 
 
 Attitudes towards the party system, given their decision to operate outside of it. 
 The influence and use of media in campaigns and actions against European 
integration. 
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 The resources, both media and financial, that EPMs had available to them. 
 Their perception of the opportunity structure of the political system in which they 
operated and how it influenced their actions. 
 The dimensions that their campaigns took, whom they sought to influence and 
their perceived successes/failures. 
 
Interviews in the UK and Ireland presented few problems given the ease of access 
of the location and the lack of language barriers.  To surmount the difficulties of access to 
data posed by the Danish and Estonian cases, the connections of the Sussex European 
Institute-based international European Parties, Elections and Referendums Network 
(EPERN), were used to establish a number of contacts, notably with political scientists 
working on Euroscepticism at the University of Aarhus in Denmark and the University of 
Tartu in Estonia.  The assistance of individuals and departments at these Universities 
helped greatly in identifying English-speaking interviewees and the translation of key 
documents and resources.   
In addition to interviewing the main protagonists in the EPMs, as a ‘control’ for 
each country a number of ‘third parties’, leading journalists and political scientists with 
expertise in that country’s debate on European integration and members of pro-European 
movements in the case studies, were interviewed.
121
  These national experts aided the 
study by helping to test the validity of preliminary findings developed through interviews 
with EPM members and leaders, as well as offering new insights, information and 
contacts.   
Secondly the primary documentation of EPMs
122
 was used to answer these key 
questions: 
 
 How EPMs’ strategies differed from referendum to referendum, with changing 
issues at European level. 
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 Information on the group leadership, funding, membership, organizational 
structure and long term goals. 
 Their contacts with members from EPMs in other member states.  
 How the presentation of similar issues differed across the case studies.  
 
These documents were reviewed in order to develop a qualitative understanding 
of the reasons for, foundation of, and strategies employed by the EPMs.  While the 
language used and reasons listed in these documents had obviously been ‘adapted’ to suit 
a more ‘Eurosceptic’ audience, they provided basic data on each group and a subjective 
account of the key features of the group’s strategy when taken in conjunction with the 
interviews with their leaders and ‘third parties’.  In Denmark a majority of the material of 
the June Movement and People’s Movement was available in English as well as Danish, 
due to the linguistic requirements of their funding from their respective European 
Parliamentary groups.  Additional translation was provided by Prof. Drude Dahlerup of 
the June Movement and Lave Broch of the People’s Movement, which was corroborated 
by Danish graduate students at the University of Sussex and University of Tartu.  
Language problems were not an issue in Estonia where one of the EPMs studied 
published its materials in English for reasons that will be discussed in Chapter Four.  
During a visiting scholarship held by the author at the Department of Politics and 
International Relations at the University of Tartu in Estonia, members of faculty and 
doctoral students translated any other materials and newspaper articles that were required 
for the thesis. 
Thirdly, in addition for the comparison of the different POS of each state, this 
research analysed the secondary academic literature on the four cases in question.  There 
was an abundance of information relating to public opinion on Europe, referendums and 
Euroscepticism in political party systems across each of the case studies. 
At this point it is important to locate what data each source brought to the thesis.  
The sources used must have been of a sufficient quality to allow for the gathering of data 
that is measurable across the diverse range of case studies under consideration.  Firstly, in 
relation to EPM formation, the use of primary sources of data, and in particular the semi-
structured interview, allowed the corroboration that the movement was in fact a 
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movement and secondly that it was Eurosceptic.  This may seem an elementary procedure 
but if the analysis were to rely solely on secondary literature and documentary research 
then there was a heightened risk of serious classification mistakes in applying the 
nuanced labels of Eurosceptic and movement.  A documentary analysis performed the 
function of confirming the verbal assertions of the respondents.  With reference to the 
social science method of triangulation, data (such as European Parliamentary election 
results, EU referendum votes, newspaper articles) and primary sources (EPM 
publications) were used  to corroborated the findings of each other and hence to enhance 
the quality of that data.   
Another important element of documentary analysis was that it allowed for a 
chronological evaluation of EPM formation.  An example of this was the People’s 
Movement of Denmark which originated as a protest movement but quickly evolved into 
a political party.  They placed a continuous emphasis on the fact that their organisation 
was a movement and therefore fundamentally different from political parties despite their 
successful contestation of European Parliamentary elections.  This sort of data 
acknowledged the dynamic element of the EPM formation whilst also allowing for easy 
comparison across cases.   
Primary sources were vital with regard to the evaluation of the propositions.  For 
the validity of the propositions to be established then their assertions needed to be 
measured against the responses of the interviewees.  Of course this label only applied 
once proper considerations were made with regard to the organisation of interviews and 
their findings were confirmed by secondary sources of data.  The data collected was 
checked for further relevance against the secondary literature which has focused largely 
on political parties.  The extent to which the secondary sources followed a similar pattern 
of relevance to this literature and threw up some distinct elements of a pattern that was 
evident only in the case of EPMs, will be discussed in the comparative chapter and final 
concluding chapter.   
 
1.8 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis proceeds on a case by case basis in the order of Ireland (Chapter Two), 
the UK (Chapter Three), Estonia (Chapter Four) and Denmark (Chapter Five).  Each case 
  
46 
 
study chapter is divided into three sections that follow a broadly similar pattern.  The first 
section provides an overview of each country’s political system with specific attention to 
EU relations with focus on national party systems, public opinion towards the EU and 
referendums on European issues; the second section examines EPM formation in the 
country with a basic typology seeking to further categorize EPMs in that country; and 
finally the third section concludes on the relevancy of the explanatory factors in 
describing EPM formation in the country.  Taking this structural approach to the thesis 
provided a coherent ‘spine’ to the thesis but also allowed for substantial flexibility to 
examine the nuances of each case study.  To fully explore the specificities of each 
country’s relationship with European integration and in what manner EPM formation has 
emerged different topics were covered in each of the case studies, though within the same 
overarching three fold structure.   
For the Irish case extra emphasis was given to referendums in the first section due 
to their importance in EPM formation and more widely in that they have come to define 
in a manner the Irish–EU relationship.  In the section on EPMs the Lisbon treaty 
referendum of 2008 and the role of EPMs in its defeat was studied in-depth as it 
represented a clear example of EPMs achieving specific policy goals.  For the UK case 
the European issue and political parties were given an extensive analysis due to their 
centrality to EPM formation and the overall narrative of UK relations with the EU.  An 
additional section on the UK media and Europe was added as the high profile 
engagement of the print media in particular with the European issue is relatively 
exceptional and has had important effects on both EPM formation and the wider UK–EU 
relationship.  The first section of the Estonian chapter sought to contextualise how 
Estonia’s history as a former constituent part of the Soviet Union made the EU debate 
there substantially different from those of the other case studies.  A focus was provided 
on the geo-political and security issues that informed the debate there.  Additionally the 
dominance of a liberal economic critique of European integration and the failure of an 
ethnic Russian EPM to emerge are discussed as they are representative of the specificities 
of the Estonian case.  Finally in the Danish chapter as in the Irish chapter significant 
coverage is given over to the six referendums on European integration there.  Similarly to 
the UK chapter additional space is spent discussing the relationship between parties and 
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the EU, though in the Danish case the influence of EPMs in elections to the European 
Parliament is the subject of in-depth analysis.     
The thesis then proceeds to draw together this evidence from the preceding 
chapters to examine whether the explanatory factors identified were indeed crucial in 
channelling Euroscepticism into EPM formation (Chapter Six).  In further developing the 
explanatory factors an ideal type of case for EPM formation based on these findings and 
on alternative factors that were located individually in the case studies is created.  
Additionally the example of a non-occurrence case, Spain, is analysed and conclusions 
drawn as to why EPM formation was not in evidence there.  Finally, a conclusion is 
drawn on the wider implications of the findings of the thesis, where they fit into the 
overall literature on Euroscepticism and social movements, and avenues for future 
research are suggested.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
48 
 
Chapter 2: The Irish Case 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In comparison to the other case studies, contestation of European integration in 
Ireland became a major and pressing national issue twice, with the rejections of the Nice 
Treaty in 2001 and the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 at referendums, spring-boarding the issue 
of Europe to the top of the national political agenda.  The No vote came as a tremendous 
shock to both the Irish political establishment and governments across the EU.  That one 
of the most pro-European electorates of a state that had received many billions in EU 
structural funds had rejected two out of the last three EU treaties at referendums 
provoked much exasperation at the EU level.  This was all the more so as the pro-
European political establishment had supposedly already engaged with the public on the 
EU issue after the rejection of the Nice Treaty in 2001 to secure its passing in a second 
referendum on Nice in 2003.  Politicians and commentators alike examined the headline 
figures for Irish support of EU integration and the measures taken in the post-Nice 
rejection period, but could not understand what drove the two decisive No votes to the 
EU.  What this chapter will show is that while the Irish electorate has always been pro-
EU there have been groups in Irish society that have continually actively contested Irish 
EU membership.  With deeper integration these groups have been joined by those who 
have come to perceive themselves as being negatively affected by European integration.  
Added to the constitutional provision for referendums on the EU these disparate groups 
in civil society have been able to mobilise themselves to form EPMs to effectively 
contest Irish participation in European integration.   
As will be discussed, these groups have had a profound influence on the Irish-EU 
relationship, and an analysis of them greatly aids in the understanding of why a pro-
European electorate has rejected EU treaties.  Their presence, while noted by other 
academic studies, has been the subject of only a handful of academic enquiries.
123
  The 
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conclusions of this chapter show that the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty did not 
emerge spontaneously but was the culmination of lengthy civil society based opposition 
to European integration in Ireland.  While there are many similarities between the Irish 
case study and the others discussed in this study, Irish EPMs emerge as both numerous in 
number and as the most effective EPMs out of all those analysed for this research.   
 
First Section: Overview of Irish Politics and EU Relations 
 
 
2.2 The Irish Party System and Europe 
Despite the rejection of the Nice and Lisbon treaties by the Irish electorate, 
Ireland has been characterised as one of the most pro-European member states.  Indeed 
from the onset of negotiations in the early 1960’s the two largest parties in Irish politics 
who have led each government since independence in 1922, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael
124
, 
have been deeply committed to the policy of membership.   
Irish politics has been characterised as being based on ‘clientalism’ in that the 
political system is based on rigid networks of political patronage and voter identification, 
rather than ideology, that have proven to be highly effective in retaining votes
125
.  This 
pattern of party competition in Ireland stems from the political split that emerged from 
the War of Independence with the precursors of Fine Gael supporting the Treaty with the 
UK that followed and Fianna Fáil being against it.  Through the clientalist system this 
effective two party system has been perpetuated with Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael being 
either the sole party or largest party in each post-war government.  With the UK 
remaining Ireland’s largest economic trading partner and the political situation in 
Northern Ireland meaning that Ireland had an intimate interest in political developments 
in the UK, Ireland followed the first move by the UK to participate in European 
integration in the early 1960s.  Membership of the then Common Market fitted in well 
with then Taoiseach
126
 LeMass’s wider policy of economic liberalisation and he became 
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a strong proponent of Irish membership.  The stark economic and political necessity of 
Irish participation in European integration was not lost on Fine Gael and the wider social 
and economic elite, and support for membership became a key government priority
127
.  
Opposition to membership was based around the socialist critique of the third largest 
party, Labour, and the hard nationalism of the much smaller Sinn Féin.  Both campaigned 
strongly against membership and ensured that supporters of accession had to organise an 
effective campaign as a Yes vote was not guaranteed despite the evidence of public 
opinion.  The “fleshpots of Brussels” in the form of agricultural subsidies were too much 
of an allure for the large rural vote however
128
, while strong party loyalty to Fianna Fáil 
and Fine Gael ensured that mainstream voters followed their cues.  The result was an 
overwhelming 83.1% Yes vote in favour of membership in 1972 (see Table 2.1). 
Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael have continued to be supportive of European 
integration.  In Fine Gael’s case they put themselves forward as the most pro-European of 
all Irish political parties, by highlighting their involvement with the largest group in the 
European Parliament, the European People’s Party.129  The Fianna Fáil leadership at 
different times struggled to prevent their republican and right-wing elements from 
criticising EU policies, but it never threatened to spill over into a Thatcherite-like party 
rebellion or a split within the party ranks.  With their domination of political office, pro-
European policies became the norm in Irish government.
130
  In recent years, however, 
senior ministers openly criticised EU policy and institutions, and even admitted to voting 
No in European referendums.
131
  This can be seen as an example of the growing 
discrepancy between the ostensibly pro-EU position espoused by government parties and 
their vocal opposition to specific EU policies and institutions.   
                                                 
127
 Reidy, Theresa (2010). ‘Blissful Union?  Fine Gael and the European Union’, Katy Hayward and Mary 
C. Murphy (eds.) The Europeanisation of Party Politics in Ireland, North and South, Abingdon: Routledge, 
pp. 96-8. 
128
 Lee, Joe (1986). Ireland State and Society: 1912-1985, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 487. 
129
 Gallagher, Michael and Marsh, Michael (2002). Days of Blue Loyalty: The Politics of the Membership 
of Fine Gael, Dublin: PSAI Press, pp. 158-161. 
130
 Paul Sharp, (1990) Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community, Aldershot: Dartmouth, p. 170. 
131
 Former Finance Minister McCreevey, and future EU Commissioner, had a much published clash with 
the European Commission over Irish exchequer deficits, Minister O’Cuiv admitted he voted No to Nice I 
and argued that the Irish people were right to reject Nice in 2001. For more information on this see 
O’Brennan, ‘Ireland says No (again)’. 
  
51 
 
As mentioned the Labour party originally campaigned against entry into the 
Common Market in the 1972 referendum as the party came under the influence of its 
militant trade union wing.  In the Dáil
132
 several Labour deputies vigorously challenged 
the government on the terms of the accession agreement.  Labour’s role in coalition 
government with Fine Gael in 1973-77 and 1982-86, however, cooled the party 
leadership’s opposition to Europe somewhat.  By the time of the Single European Act 
(SEA) referendum in 1987 the party leadership had moved towards a pro-European 
position, against the obvious sentiment of the party membership.  The leadership felt that 
the party could no longer take an opposing position on an issue that was not salient with 
the electorate.
133
  This chequered history of relations with Europe has seen tension within 
the party on the EU issue, with the party leadership advocating a Yes vote on all 
European referendums post-SEA,
134
 while ordinary members and certain backbench TD’s 
have come out strongly against EU Treaties
135
 including Lisbon.
136
   
 The leaders of these three largest parties, who up to the 2011 general election held 
148 of the 166 seats in parliament, were pro-European.  Given the domination of Irish 
electoral politics and government by these parties from independence in 1922 on, pro-
Europeanism became the default policy position of mainstream Irish politics.
137
  The EU 
became “depoliticised” in Irish mainstream politics, in that the large, centrist parties 
accepted Irish participation in the European project without question.   
Of course opposition to the EU existed in Irish politics, but only on the margins.  
Taggart identified the Green Party, Sinn Féin, the Workers’ Party and the Socialist Party 
as “protest based parties [within the Irish party system] who have taken an anti-EU 
position as an adjunct to their general opposition to the functioning political systems”.138  
All of these parties, with the exception of the Green Party, have campaigned against 
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every European Treaty, largely on the basis of their negative impact on workers’ rights 
and Irish sovereignty.
139
  With the Green Party’s accession to government after the 
general election in 2007, the Party held a special convention where a two-thirds majority 
of Party members was almost achieved to approve of the Lisbon Treaty.  As a 
compromise to full party support for the Treaty, the Party leadership was allowed to 
campaign according to their conscience on the referendum
140
.  As a result of this 
convention vote, the Party moved from a Eurosceptic position to a more ‘Eurocautious’ 
position in favour of the current trajectory of European integration, which was taking 
“decisive action on climate change”.141  With the continued electoral decline of the 
Workers’ Party and the loss of the Socialist Party’s sole TD142 in 2007, Sinn Féin was left 
as the only parliamentary Eurosceptic party up to the 2011 general election.  By 2010 
only 4 out of 166 TDs belonged to a Eurosceptic party.  Quite clearly the Irish party 
system up to that point could be classified as having a very low level of 
Euroscepticism.
143
 
 
2.3 Irish Public Opinion and European Integration 
 Parallel to the party system, it would appear that the Irish electorate has been 
broadly positive towards European integration (See Figure 2.1); however, O’Brennan in 
his analysis of Irish European referendums argues that Yes votes were based largely on 
the utilitarian impact of the economic benefits of membership in the shape of CAP 
payments and structural funds.  Such economic benefits encouraged voters to support 
referendums on Europe to “keep the money coming from Brussels”.144  His argument was 
that the increasingly visible impact of EU funds on Irish infrastructure and incomes was 
the main driver behind this trend.  Sinnott et. al. (See Figure 2.1) found that despite high 
levels of support for the EU in Ireland, general enthusiasm for membership (“feeling 
sorry” should the EU be scrapped) has always lagged significantly behind support for 
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membership (by some 20-30%).  Moreover, despite the eight referendums on European 
integration and the salience of the EU issue that such regular events bring, levels of 
knowledge of the EU amongst the Irish electorate has either been below or about the EU 
average (see Figure 2.2).
145
   
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Trends in support for European integration – Belief that Irish EU 
membership has been a good thing, belief that Irish EU membership has been a bad thing 
and expression of very sorry sentiment over dissolution of EU 1973 – 2008 
 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer No. 1 – No. 74. 
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Figure 2.2: % Agree that “I understand how the EU works” 
 
 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer No. 62 – No. 74. 
 
 
 
European media coverage of the Irish Lisbon referendum rejection pointed out the 
contradiction of Ireland having high support for EU membership and the benefits of EU 
structural funds, with a No vote to the latest EU Treaty.
146
  Looking at the level of 
support for Irish membership in the EU, however, does not reveal the full picture of Irish 
support for the EU.  O’Brennan147 and Gilland148 both highlight the linking by successive 
Irish governments of Irish involvement with Europe to “money from Brussels”.  At a 
wider level this meant that a solidly pro-European identification had not been created 
within the Irish electorate, as the low levels of enthusiasm for the EU show.  Moreover, 
Figure 2.1 shows that Ireland did not emerge as strongly pro-EU immediately upon 
membership.  Irish support for European integration only began to increase some ten 
years after membership.  The reasons for this initial negative reaction to membership 
have been located in the pain of readjusting the economy to catch up with the far more 
economically developed Western Europe.
149
  It was with the infusion of vast sums of EU 
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structural funds in the mid to late 1980s and their supplement by extra funding in 1992 
that Irish public opinion moved decisively in favour of European integration.  
 It can be seen how a more nuanced analysis of Irish public opinion towards the 
EU shows that the rejection of the Nice and Lisbon treaties did not emerge out of thin air.  
The level of attachment of the Irish public towards the EU never rose above 50%, while 
the Irish retained a higher than EU average of ‘national only’ feeling.  Once the utilitarian 
aspect of European integration had passed by the early 2000s and Ireland moved towards 
becoming a net contributor to the EU budget as the second richest member state in GDP 
terms, the lack of attachment towards the EU became a key indicator of true Irish public 
sentiment towards the EU.  The failure of mainstream parties to engage with the public 
on the future of Irish-EU relations in the EU referendums that took place at this time of 
flux in the electorate’s position on the EU was exploited by the EPMs.  As will be 
explored in the next section, years of experience allowed EPM activists to gain an insight 
as to what dimensions of European integration they could campaign on despite strong 
public support for EU membership.   
 
 
2.4 Irish Referendums on Europe 
Ireland has held eight referendums on European integration, more than any other 
member state.  This was due to a constitutional provision that stipulates the holding of a 
referendum in the event of national sovereignty in the area of foreign affairs being given 
up to a supranational authority.
150
  This constitutional requirement followed the Crotty 
Supreme Court judgement in 1987.  From this ruling it became established as the 
convention that each successive European Treaty was to be put before the Irish people 
regardless of its compatibility with the original Supreme Court ruling.  Following the 
signing of the Lisbon Treaty, and with reference to the French and Dutch No votes, 
several prominent pro-European media commentators made a case for mounting a legal 
challenge to the Crotty ruling and allowing for parliamentary ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty.  Such a challenge was determined to be politically untenable by the then Minister 
for European Affairs, Dick Roche, and by opposition party leaders and so Ireland 
proceeded as the lone state with a Lisbon referendum. 
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  What is almost wholly ignored however, is that Crotty himself was a member of 
the Irish Sovereignty Movement EPM (which will be discussed in greater detail later in its 
most recent incarnation as the National Platform) and an active campaigner against Irish 
membership of the EU.  He took the case as the Irish Sovereignty Movement believed that 
the Irish people had to be consulted on any further advances in European integration.
151
  
If the case had not been taken then the convention in both law and politics that 
referendums must be held to ratify EU treaties in Ireland would not have been 
established.  Had a similar constitutional challenge been taken to an EU Treaty after the 
ratification of the SEA then the government would have justifiably been able to claim 
that if a Treaty with such wide ranging impacts on national sovereignty as the SEA had 
been passed by the Oireachtas
152
, then other treaties did not require a referendum either.  
Ireland therefore has held referendums on the EU ever since the accession referendum 
because of the actions of EPM activists.  The strict interpretation of the constitution in 
regard to the negative impact of European integration played a significant role in 
allowing the National Platform EPM access to the policy making process.
153
  Indeed 
EPM activists repeatedly used the Irish courts to challenge the government on its EU 
policy on the basis of the Irish constitution.  In the other case studies the court system has 
not been used extensively by EPM activists as there was a widespread belief that after 
unsuccessful attempts in each example to challenge government EU policy that their 
rulings would fall on the side of the government.  These rulings concluded that the 
respective governments could pursue their EU policy as it was not contradictory with the 
national constitution.
154
  Following on from the Crotty judgement however, Irish EPM 
activists repeatedly used the court system both successfully and unsuccessfully.   
 The Green MEP Patricia McKenna took a case against the government in 1995 
over the allocation of government funding to one side during a referendum on divorce.  
Due to her successful challenge, the McKenna judgement, the media has been legally 
obliged to devote half of its coverage of a referendum campaign to both Yes and No 
sides, and the government to promote both sides of the argument in a referendum equally 
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without favour.
155
  McKenna, who would later lose her MEP seat, left the Green party 
and become involved in the Peoples’ Movement EPM (which will be discussed in greater 
detail later).  Other EPM activists-most notably Cóir (which will also be discussed in 
greater detail later)-challenged the government’s decision to hold re-runs of the Nice and 
Lisbon treaties.  While the courts found that the government could hold as many 
referendums as it required on any issue it chose, the success of the Crotty and McKenna 
judgements ensured that the government was keenly aware of the threat of legal 
challenges to its EU policy by EPM activists, specifically in relation to the holding of 
referendums on Europe.   
 When considering referendums on the EU in Ireland, the role of EPMs is 
fundamental to understanding why they are held in the first place and more recently 
under what structures.  This shows that the political opportunity structure of Ireland was 
quite open for EPMs as they were firstly formed to contest accession at a referendum and 
were able to use the court system to contest further European integration and force the 
policy process open by compelling the use of referendums. As can be seen from Table 
2.1 however, EPMs did not have any perceptible effect in then contesting the 
referendums themselves as they were passed relatively comfortably until the 2001 Nice 
referendum.  Why Irish voters, after three decades of increasing public support of EU 
membership and electoral passing of EU referendums, voted down Nice will now be 
analysed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
155
 O’Mahony, ‘Ireland’s EU Referendum Experience’, p. 19. 
  
58 
 
Table 2.1: Irish EU referendum votes and results 
Referendum Turnout % Yes % No % Result 
Accession 
(1972) 
1,264,278 70.9 1,041,890 83.1 211,891 16.9 Yes 
Single 
European 
Act (1985) 
1,085,304 44.1 755,423 69.9 324,977 30.1 Yes 
Maastricht 
(1992) 
1,457,219 57.3 1,001,076 69.1 448,655 30.9 Yes 
Amsterdam 
(1998) 
1,543,930 56.2 932,632 61.7 578,070 38.3 Yes 
Nice I 
(2001) 
997,826 34.8 453,461 46.1 529,478 53.9 No 
Nice II 
(2003) 
1,446,588 49.5 906,317 62.9 534,887 37.1 Yes 
Lisbon 
(2008) 
1,621,037 53.1 752,451 46.6 862,415 53.4 No 
Lisbon II 
(2009) 
1,816,098 58 1,214,268 67.1 594,606 32.9 Yes 
 
Source: ‘The European Parliament Election in Ireland, 5 June 2009’. European Parties Elections and 
Referendums Network European Parliament Election Briefing No 35 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/no_35_epernep2009ireland.pdf; and 
http://www.rte.ie/news/features/lisbontreaty/index.html - National Broadcaster 
 
 
2.4.1 The 1972 Referendum on Accession, 1986 Single European Act (SEA) 
Referendum, 1992 Maastricht Referendum, and 1998 Amsterdam Referendum 
 
These first four referendums proceeded with such a minimum of controversy that 
overviews of Irish referendums on Europe have described them as being... 
“comfortably carried, helping to copper-fasten Ireland’s reputation as a 
constructive and communautaire EU member state.  The supportive attitude of 
the electorate in referendums on accession, the SEA, Maastricht and Amsterdam 
treaties was mirrored by public opinion polls on the EU: a healthy majority of 
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those surveyed declared themselves in favour of membership and appreciated the 
perceived benefits that membership brought to Ireland”.156   
 
As with the previous sections on the political system and public opinion, the Yes 
side was dominant because of a cross party appeal as to the necessity of a Yes vote to 
“keep the money coming from Brussels”.  As will be discussed in the following section 
on EPMs, the arguments of the No side changed slightly at each referendum but they 
were on the whole ineffectual and have been largely ignored in analysis of the 
campaigns.  The one thing to note from these referendums is that at each one the number 
of No votes increased.  This increasing voter rejection of European integration was put 
down to a dismissal of the pro-EU side’s “donor/recipient narrative”, as a growing 
proportion of the Irish electorate voted No because they did not understand what they 
were voting for.
157
  The number one reasons cited by No voters to Maastricht and 
Amsterdam was a perceived lack of information.   Growing voter frustration at the failure 
of EU treaties to be ‘sold’ to them by Yes campaigners came to the political surface at the 
first Nice referendum where a combination of political party elite withdrawal and 
successful EPM campaign resulted in the Treaty being voted down.    
 
2.4.2 The 2001 and 2002 Nice Referendums 
Anti-Nice campaigners themselves did not believe that the Treaty would be 
defeated.
158
  The rejection of the Nice Treaty was largely the result of two factors; firstly 
the very poor Yes campaign, and secondly the energetic and well organised No 
campaign.  This combination had the effect of discouraging normally pro-EU voters from 
turning out, while mobilizing No voters to come out to vote.  Table 2.3 illustrates this 
with the number of Yes voters for the first Nice Treaty collapsing by nearly 500,000 from 
the Amsterdam referendum.  The importance of Nice for EPMs cannot be over-
emphasised.  It showed that ‘fringe’ parties and civil society groups could not only 
successfully challenge the government and pro-EU elite on referendums but that they 
could also effect a degree of policy change.  In response to the No vote the government 
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made a declaration at the Seville European Council in June 2002.  The substance of the 
declaration related to the ‘triple lock’ of Irish involvement in EU military missions.  This 
referred to the fact that for Ireland to participate in such a mission it had to be approved 
by a UN mandate, the Irish parliament and the Irish cabinet.
159
  The declaration on 
neutrality and the EU Council’s declaration respecting each member states approach to 
participation or not in ESDP
160
, while not an explicit change of policy, ensured that any 
attempt by the government to develop Irish involvement in ESDP could not be done 
surreptitiously and would need a referendum vote to prevent a public backlash against the 
breaking of an explicit political promise.  This success inspired No campaigners for the 
first Lisbon referendum.  It made them realise that if Irish neutrality could be guaranteed 
by achieving a No vote, then other issues impacted by EU policy could be addressed by 
securing a No to Lisbon.
161
 
  For the Nice referendum rerun a solid and focused cross-party campaign 
advocated a Yes vote on European grounds; the main reasons being to allow for 
enlargement to proceed and keep Ireland at the centre of Europe.  With the 500,000 
voters who disappeared from the Yes side the first time around returning to support the 
Treaty, it was comfortably passed.  Analysis following the second Nice vote showed that 
a unified, non-partisan campaign using European arguments was the strongest indicator 
of securing support for a Yes vote and therefore key to the passing of any future EU 
referendums in Ireland.
162
  The lessons of the first Nice referendum defeat were 
apparently learned as the pro-EU political elite had mobilised to successfully engage with 
the EU related issues raised by EPMs and convince the electorate to support further Irish 
participation in European integration.   
 
2.4.3 The 2008 and 2009 Lisbon Referendums 
The lessons from the Nice referendums were ignored by the pro-Lisbon political 
parties.  Similarly to the first Nice referendum they simply did not produce an effective 
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campaign.  Instead the parties focused on promoting candidates for European and local 
elections the following year.  What was decisive about the first Lisbon referendum was 
not just that the Yes vote declined by 200,000 but more that the No vote jumped by 
330,000 from the second Nice referendum.  A more vibrant and wider No campaign with 
EPMs that appealed to left, centre and right wing voters can partially explain this.  The 
Nice No outcome was attributed to an extremely low turnout, 34.8%, but Lisbon 
represented an unprecedented shift in voting patterns with a large number of former Yes 
voters turning against European integration.  As EPMs dominated the No side their 
decisive role in securing a No vote represented the pinnacle of achievement in the 
contestation of European integration by Irish EPMs. 
Immediately after the outcome, the Irish government stated that it would engage 
in an “extended period of consultation” with the Irish people as to the reasons for the No 
vote
163
. This took the form of a Department of Foreign Affairs commissioned report by 
the market research company Millward Brown IMS to conduct an in-depth survey of 
voter behaviour in the referendum and then of Sinnott et. al. to analyse the data and locate 
the main factors that had led voters to reject Lisbon
164
.  These reports highlighted that 
low levels of knowledge of Lisbon, concerns over the effect of Lisbon on Irish taxation 
policy, workers rights, Irish abortion laws and the loss of Irish influence in the 
Commission with the ending of a guaranteed Commissioner, were the main contributing 
factors to the No vote.  These were the issues first raised by the EPMs.  The government 
sought to use the findings of the Lisbon reports as a basis for negotiating concessions on 
the Treaty from the other member states.  These concessions could then be used to 
legitimise the re-running of Lisbon to the Irish electorate.   
This strategy came to fruition at the EU summit meeting in June 2009 when the 
government announced a series of “legally binding guarantees” that it had secured after 
lengthy negotiation with other member states. These guarantees were separated into 
three: one guaranteeing a commissioner; another in relation to Irish competency over tax 
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rates, abortion, and neutrality; and finally an agreement on workers’ rights165. While 
these were not voted on in the referendum, the government put forward the argument that 
it had listened to the Irish people and had convinced the responsive EU member states to 
address their concerns of the Irish over Lisbon with these legally binding guarantees.  
Whereas anti-Nice EPMs received a declaration on their issue, anti-Lisbon EPMs forced 
the government to effectively re-negotiate with the European Council, this was especially 
true with the guaranteed commissioner for each member state where Ireland was 
supported by the Scandinavian states on this issue.  Though the language was stronger 
and rooted in the EU’s legal framework they were not to be incorporated into EU law as 
protocols until the next EU treaty, which at the time was believed to be the Croatian 
accession Treaty
166
.  The impact of EPMs on the Lisbon referendum was not the result of 
specific Lisbon-centric factors but can be traced back to the lengthy and continuous 
presence of civil society based Euroscepticism in Ireland, which the following section 
analysis as a coherent narrative for the first time in an academic context.   
 
2.4.4 Referendums as vital to EPM mobilisation 
 Due to the strength of the Irish constitution, as regards foreign policy, Irish EPMs 
have had several crucial successes in forcing the government to hold referendums on the 
EU and on what terms.  This shows the importance of the court system and the 
constitution in Irish EPM mobilisation.  Knowing that they could challenge the 
government based on specific provisions in the Irish Constitution and that the courts had 
ruled in their favour provided a further area around which EPM activists could form. 
Since the National Platform helped to establish the requirement of referendums on EU 
issues they have proven to be of intrinsic importance in the formation of Irish EPMs.  As 
the Irish party system moved toward a broad pro-EU consensus, referendums offered the 
only means for Eurosceptics to challenge Irish participation in EU integration.  While 
Irish public opinion did not favour them, as the public was not going to vote against 
receiving billions of EU funds that were helping to modernise the country, they did build 
up valuable experience in campaigning and in the development of networks of 
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Eurosceptic activists.  Despite decisive Yes votes to accession, the SEA, Maastricht and 
Amsterdam the number of No votes increased with each referendum.  At a time of strong 
public support for Irish EU membership (see Figure 2.1), with only small minor parties 
such as Sinn Féin, the Greens and the Socialist Party advocating a No vote, these large 
numbers of No votes were finding representation in the arguments of EPMs.  This 
expression of Euroscepticism came to its conclusion with the first Lisbon Treaty 
referendum when a new set of EPMs based around a different set of arguments emerged 
to again defeat the government and the pro-EU political establishment, thereby forcing 
the government to take action at an EU level to resolve their issues.   
This is perhaps the most interesting element to emerge from the analysis of EPM 
activity in Ireland’s eight referendums on Europe.  Energized by the rejection of the Nice 
Treaty, new EPMs emerged.  These new EPMs put forward radically different arguments 
against ratification from those EPMs that had existed before.  Such a shift was 
symptomatic of the wider change in Ireland’s relationship with the EU, as the country 
had changed radically between 1972 and 2008.  For the accession, SEA and Maastricht 
referendums EPMs rallied around arguments of national sovereignty and economic 
nationalism; for Amsterdam and the two Nice referendums EPMs used neutrality, anti-
abortion and anti-elitism arguments; for Lisbon lack of a commissioner, workers’ rights, 
and social values were used.  Examining the formation of Irish EPMs by looking at their 
membership and their issues of contestation therefore will help to understand why an 
electorate generally supportive of European integration formed social movements to 
actively contest the EU.   
 
 
 
Second Section: EPMs in Ireland 
 
 2.5 The Importance of EPMs in the Irish-EU relationship 
 
 Despite the Irish political system being strongly pro-EU the Irish electorate 
ignored their cues to vote No to the Nice and Lisbon treaty referendums
167
.  This 
occurred because mainstream Irish political parties withdrew from contesting the EU 
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issue, allowing EPMs the political space to successfully campaign against EU treaties at 
referendums.  EPMs were aided in this by the Irish electorate for whom the utilitarian 
basis of their relationship with the EU was undermined by Irish economic success in the 
2000s.
168
  This exposed a lack of base support for European integration which the EPMs 
exploited.  How and why EPMs emerged to play such an important role in the Irish-EU 
relationship is the focus of this section.   
 As discussed in the previous section, there has been a distinct pattern in EPM 
formation in contestation against EU referendums.  This section will break down Irish 
EPMs into two groups: the ‘old timers’; and the ‘young guns’.  This has been done as 
there is a clear distinction in issues of contestation and campaign tactics between those 
groups formed pre and post Nice.  At the time of Nice the observation was that when 
“discussing the EU in Ireland, neutrality is always central, it is the ‘touchstone’ of the 
Irish debate on Europe”.169  After Nice Irish neutrality ceased being a major issue of 
Eurosceptic contestation.  Other issues dominated, despite the fact that Irish participation 
in EU battlegroups greatly increased post Nice.
170
  Discussing these two distinct groups 
the pre and post ‘Nicers’ show how EPMs have come to represent shifting patterns in the 
issues surrounding EU debates.   
 
 
 
2.6 The First Wave of Protest: The National Platform and the Peace and Neutrality 
Alliance 
 The National Platform was the EPM that was involved the longest in the Irish-EU 
debate, though in various incarnations.  Its founder and Chairman Anthony Coughlan was 
present from the first organised civil society opposition to membership in the 1960s when 
Taoiseach Lemass first submitted an official application for membership, with the Wolfe 
Tone Group.
171
  These activities embody the republican and nationalist critique of 
European integration that defined early Irish opposition to European integration.  
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Believing in the inevitability of Irish membership and that this would have to be put to a 
referendum, with other nationalists he and other Eurosceptic activists set up the Common 
Market Defence Campaign in 1969.  The main argument of this group was that joining 
the ‘Common Market’ (EU) would destroy Irish industry as it was so uncompetitive 
against Western Europe (in this it was very similar to the criticisms of the Labour party 
mentioned above but from a nationalist not socialist perspective).
172
  Describing the 
accession referendum as a “New Act of Union” the EPM acted as an information source 
for other Eurosceptic activists and political parties, Sinn Féin, the Communist Party of 
Ireland; who did the majority of the campaigning.  The Common Market Defence 
Campaign did most of its campaigning as invited speakers to public debates and in 
opinion pieces and letter writing to the national newspapers.  In this respect we can see 
strong similarities to the Research Centre Free Europe EPM in Estonia.  Both were led 
by academics (Coughlan was a Professor of Sociology at Trinity College Dublin); both 
were founded to criticise the negotiation strategy of the government in relation to EU 
membership; and campaigned by publishing detailed research papers and articles in 
broadsheet newspapers.  The EPM continued its existence in name only, when for the 
SEA referendum it changed its name to the Irish Sovereignty Movement as the Common 
Market Defence Campaign name had become irrelevant due to the evolution of the 
Common Market to the European Community.
173
 
It was an individual within the Irish Sovereignty Movement, Raymond Crotty, 
whose court case against the Irish government in 1986 led to the judicial review that 
forced Ireland to hold referendums to ratify EU treaties.  As for the SEA referendum the 
Irish Sovereignty Movement left the majority of the campaigning to the anti-SEA political 
parties.
174
  With the leadership of the Labour party and senior trade unionists moving 
towards a pro-EU position, the Irish Sovereignty Movement received support from 
Labour party members and trade union activists due to its anti-single market stance.   
 For Maastricht the Irish Sovereignty Movement changed its name to its most 
recent incarnation, the National Platform.  At this time Coughlan and the EPM began to 
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develop strong links with Danish EPMs, the People’s Movement and June Movement 
discussed in Chapter Five, and engaged in information swapping and ideational support.  
This relationship increased greatly at the time of Maastricht as both Danish EPMs used 
the support of the National Platform to show that their criticisms of the Treaty were 
shared in other member states.
175
 The debate was heavily centralised around economics 
as Ireland had been undergoing painful economic reforms in the late 1980s and early 
1990s that had led to a high unemployment rate in the early 1990s.  The campaign was 
lost when then Taoiseach Albert Reynolds returned from a European Council meeting in 
Brussels with £8 billion in Irish punts of structural and regional funds.
176
  Coughlan noted 
the beginnings of change in the nature of the EU debate at this time in Ireland, with anti-
war/neutrality activists becoming increasingly visible in Eurosceptic circles.   
 The Peace and Neutrality Alliance (PANA) was formed by Roger Cole in 1996 as 
an alternative EU referendum campaign movement to the National Platform which he 
and other left-wing activists viewed as being too socially right wing.  PANA sought to 
organise Ireland’s multitude of anti-war, anti-nuclear and global justice groups under a 
single umbrella to contest Irish participation in ESDP.  Cole himself had been a long term 
member of Irish CND and the Labour party
177
, and his and PANA’s criticism of the EU 
was based on the perception that the EU was dominated by nuclear powers (France and 
Germany) and the nuclear weapon armed NATO military alliance.  The perceived nuclear 
and military dimensions to the EU, PANA argued, were incompatible with a neutral and 
nuclear-free Ireland.  The EPM unsuccessfully contested the Amsterdam Treaty 
referendum, but an analysis of their failure led Cole to understand that an alliance would 
have to be made with the Eurosceptic political parties.  This strategy was adopted as the 
financial and manpower resources of the parties were needed to counter the resources of 
the pro-treaty side.
178
  As a strong commitment to neutrality was a common cause 
between all the sides involved PANA could position itself as a leader of such an alliance 
as the perceived civil society ‘owner’ of the neutrality issue.   The anti-Nice political 
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parties were in agreement as they understood that a civil society-led alliance would lend 
significant public legitimacy to their arguments, in that they were motivated by genuine 
ideological Euroscepticism and not merely for electoral gain.
179
  The No to Nice group 
was the umbrella organisation for the No side during the first Nice referendum in Ireland.  
PANA took a similar form to the No to the EU group in Norway in joining civil society 
groups and political parties together.  Membership included anti-war groups, NGOs, 
ecological groups, anti-nuclear groups, the Socialist Party, Green Party, and Sinn Féin.  
The group had a simple and effective slogan, “No to NATO: No to Nice”, and organised 
mass meetings where all the groups and parties shared the same platform.   
The impression remained that the Greens and Sinn Fein were using the No to Nice 
group to legitimise their anti-Nice campaign by aligning themselves with civil society.  
This impression was given further credence when for the second Nice referendum 
campaign, the No to Nice group was not supported by the Greens and Sinn Féin.  Instead 
both parties launched their own separate anti-Nice campaigns for the referendum rerun 
following their significant electoral success in the general election that took place 
between the two Nice votes.
180
  This is not to say that the political parties were not 
motivated by genuine ideological opposition to the EU but that they used these civil 
society groups to push forward their own electoral policy.  The No to Nice group was 
happy for political parties to do this as parties possessed the resources, experience and 
organisation to effectively challenge Nice in the media and in the political arena.  In 
many ways PANA was used by the political parties for their own electoral gain as Sinn 
Féin and the Greens went on to make significant electoral breakthroughs in the general 
election in the following year.  PANA were accepting of this as they saw the rejection of 
Nice and the gaining of explicit legal guarantee on Irish neutrality as a great success.
181
  
After Nice and the Lisbon referendum campaigns both PANA and the National Platform 
continued to campaign against European integration, however they did not achieve the 
same high profile or level of influence they achieved at the time of Nice.  When the 
Lisbon Treaty referendum became an issue of national importance a new set of EPMs had 
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emerged that did not need the court system or political parties to successfully contest the 
EU in Ireland.    
What makes the post-Nice EPMs different from the examples of PANA and the 
National Platform is that they took centre stage in the Lisbon Treaty referendum 
campaigns from political parties.  Not only were they dominant over Eurosceptic political 
parties but they successfully challenged pro-EU parties as well.  With the defeat of the 
Lisbon referendum EPMs emerged as the effective leader of opposition to the EU in 
Ireland.  The pre-Nice EPMs were effective campaigners but were always overshadowed 
by the anti-EU political parties.  From the 1960s to the mid 80s this was the Labour party, 
and from then on the smaller left wing parties Sinn Féin, the Greens, the Socialist Party 
and the Workers’ Party were the focus of opposition to European integration.  This focus 
on political parties has underestimated the role of EPMs.  The Crotty judgement 
enshrined the role of referendums in the ratification of EU treaties in Ireland.  For Nice I 
EPMs were used as a highly effective umbrella for anti-Nice political parties to shelter 
from criticisms of self-interest and use the credibility of civil society campaigners to 
create a positive public image for their campaigns.   
Despite the presence of Eurosceptic political parties, EPMs still formed in Ireland 
to contest membership and each subsequent Treaty.  For the founders of the National 
Platform an argument against membership based on republican principles was not being 
made and so they formed to put those arguments across to the public
182
.  Similarly PANA 
was formed to contest the EU as they believed that European integration would inevitably 
lead to Irish membership of NATO and ultimately Irish participation in an EU army.  
They perceived that Eurosceptic political parties were not doing enough to raise 
awareness of this issue.  The level of Euroscepticism in the party system was an 
important factor in the formation of these EPMs but more precisely it was due to the lack 
of effectiveness and ideological compatibility of that party-based Euroscepticism.  The 
relevance of issue framing in combination with the openness of the political opportunity 
structure along the lines outlined by Koopmans and Duyvendak is clearly evident in the 
case of the National Platform and PANA. 
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2.7 The Second Wave of Protest: Libertas, Cóir and the People’s Movement 
For the first Irish Lisbon vote, despite the presence of the anti-Lisbon Sinn Féin, 
civil society groups dominated the No campaign.  This is in contrast to the examples of 
the National Platform and PANA where ultimately their campaigns were subservient to 
those of the Eurosceptic political parties.   
Table 2.2 lists those No campaign groups that received the most coverage in the 
Lisbon Treaty from a study of the three main daily broadsheets and two broadsheet 
Sunday newspapers.  What is evident from this table is that civil society groups 
outnumbered political parties in the No campaign.  Additionally, there was no 
overarching No alliance or single all-encompassing No movement, as was present in the 
first Nice vote à la No to Nice.  Each political party and group operated independently.  
What Table 2.2 does not show however, is the extent to which the EPMs dominated the 
campaign itself through their early, extensive, and expansive strategy.  Despite Sinn Féin 
and the Socialist Party receiving plentiful media coverage due to each having a high 
profile spokesperson on the Treaty, the issues of the campaign were set firmly by the civil 
society groups.   
 
Table 2.2: Breakdown of Main Campaigners on No Side, Irish Lisbon I Referendum 
Name Pol. Party/EPM Issues of Contestation Focus of 
Contestation 
Sinn Féin Political Party Sovereignty/Workers 
Rights 
Commission, Council 
Socialist Party Political Party Workers Rights Commission, 
Council, ECJ 
Libertas EPM Sovereignty/Tax Commission, Council 
Cóir EPM Sovereignty/ Abortion/ 
Catholic Values 
Commission/ECJ 
People’s 
Movement 
EPM Sovereignty/Workers 
Rights 
Commission/ECJ 
 
Calculated by counting the number of references to each group/party in articles relating to the Lisbon 
referendum in The Irish Times, Irish Independent, Irish Examiner, Sunday Business Post, and Sunday 
Tribune. 
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It was the Libertas EPM that emerged as the ‘story’ of Lisbon as it started its 
referendum campaign before the government had even announced a date for the 
referendum to be held in the first place.  From the start, Libertas highlighted a series of 
arguments for rejecting Lisbon that would come to dominate the agenda of the entire 
debate and be specifically addressed by the government in their strategy for getting 
Lisbon passed after the rejection.   
Libertas’ first argument was that passing Lisbon would force Ireland to abandon 
its low tax policy, thus encouraging the many multinational companies that have bases in 
Ireland to avail of the low taxes to leave, taking hundreds of thousands of jobs with them.  
The success of their campaign was evidenced by the belief of 43% of voters that Lisbon 
meant the loss of Ireland’s low corporate tax rate (12.5%), despite the assurances of all of 
the country’s main business groups that it did not.183  Secondly, Libertas argued that the 
proposed reduction in size of the EU Commission would lead to the loss of Irish 
influence in the EU, to the benefit of the big states over the small states.  The securing of 
a guaranteed Commissioner for every member state became the cornerstone of the Irish 
government’s plan for securing a Yes vote in the Lisbon II referendum.  Libertas put the 
issue on the agenda as an example of what the group believed was Lisbon’s role in the 
“relentless erosion of Irish national sovereignty by an unelected and unaccountable 
Brussels bureaucracy”184, that sought to undermine the independence of small states in 
the EU in favour of “Franco-German domination”.185  In addition to their billboard 
campaign, Libertas engaged in media launches, handed out leaflets, organised meetings, 
and toured the country in a campaign bus.  The media focus intensified on Libertas and 
its leader, multi-millionaire businessman Declan Ganley, as its emergence became 
perceived as the ‘story’ of the campaign.  The result of this attention was the elevation of 
Ganley to unofficial leader of the No campaign by the media.
186
   
The origin of Libertas was Ganley himself.  His opposition to Lisbon originated 
in the proposed harmonisation of taxes by EU Commissioner Kovacs which clashed with 
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his interests as an entrepreneur and his belief in the importance of an independent 
taxation policy for Irish economic success.  Ganley saw proposals for tax harmonisation 
across the EU as an attempt by the European Commission to impose bureaucratic control 
over business in Europe.  Moreover this was compounded by his belief that the EU was 
actively challenging Europe’s Christian heritage and trying to replace it with a secular 
society.  He points to the failure of the scrapped European Constitution to either mention 
God or acknowledge the Christian heritage of Europe as the most obvious example of 
this.  Given the scale of his resources Ganley was able to found and develop a protest 
group, Libertas, specifically to campaign against Lisbon and what he perceived to be its 
impact on his interests.
187
 
A crucial role played by Libertas, was in providing mainstream voters who 
opposed the treaty but were uncomfortable with falling on the side of supporters of the 
terrorist Irish Republican Army (IRA), radical-left policies, and traditional Catholic 
values, with an ‘acceptable’ form of Euroscepticism.   Libertas appealed to their concerns 
about the direction Lisbon was taking the EU whilst also crucially coming without 
domestic political baggage.  From the Nice Treaty referendums onwards, high profile 
individuals within the three largest parties expressed concern about the EU project but 
party loyalty always prevented any widespread party revolt on Europe.
188
  Libertas 
emerged as a non-party political flag of acceptable dissent on Europe for disgruntled Fine 
Gael and Fianna Fáil voters to rally around.  Ganley was keenly aware of this latent No 
vote and he targeted it specifically, but he admitted that Libertas had underestimated the 
sheer numbers of mainstream voters who were ready to come out and vote No.   They 
focused on Ireland’s relationship with Europe and not on domestic issues to attract these 
voters.
189
  Libertas did this by specifically raising the corporation tax issue, hitting a 
nerve with the Irish middle class who relied on multinational corporations for 
employment and who had benefitted greatly from a low taxation regime more 
generally.
190
   The success of Libertas’ campaign based on mainstream policy arguments 
can be traced to the lack of opposition to the EU amongst mainstream Irish parties.  In 
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Norway or the UK such mainstream arguments would be articulated by the Centre or 
Conservative parties respectively.  In Ireland a civil society group was required to put 
such arguments before the public.   
In contrast to the high media profile campaigning and expensive billboards of 
Libertas, were the more grassroots based and direct campaigns of Cóir and the People’s 
Movement.
191
  Although each group represented opposite ends of Irish society, radical 
right and left respectively, they were both linked in their opposition to further European 
integration specifically to the increasing authority of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
to make decisions that impact at a national level.
192
   
For Cóir, whose main purpose was to oppose the introduction of abortion into 
Ireland and to defend “traditional Catholic values”, the fear was that the Irish pro-choice 
lobby would take a case against the Irish state to the ECJ, who in turn would use the 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights as a basis for legalising abortion in Ireland.
193
  
For the People’s Movement their fears had already been realised with the ECJ ruling in 
the Laval case which they believed fundamentally undermined workers rights and would 
lead to a “race to the bottom” as regards the importation of cheaper Eastern European 
labour to the detriment of Irish workers.
194
  Both groups relied on an extensive network 
of volunteers to conduct their campaign strategy which relied on three main outlets; 
public information meetings, pamphlet drops on households and the most widespread 
strategy of posters.   
Cóir had extensive experience of campaigning against EU referendums in its 
previous incarnation as Youth Defence.
195
  In its reincarnation, Cóir broadened out its 
membership to include individuals not previously associated with Youth Defence, 
becoming an umbrella group of anti-abortion and fundamentalist Catholic activists 
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numbering some 2,000 members.
196
  Its members broke with the Catholic Church in that 
they favoured direct action against both individuals and institutions that would allow the 
legalisation of abortion and gay marriage in Ireland. Their actions centred mostly on 
holding protest rallies outside family planning clinics and protesting against individual 
politicians who advocated liberalising laws on abortion and gay marriage.
197
  As Youth 
Defence, the group was ostracised by other anti-EU treaty campaigners for its perceived 
extreme position on abortion and alleged links to neo-Nazi organisations in Italy.
198
  
Conscious of the damage these links had on its previous campaign against the Nice rerun, 
the group changed its name to Cóir and avoided direct references to abortion and instead 
focused specifically on the issue of sovereignty and the loss of Ireland’s guaranteed 
commissioner: “The New EU Won’t Hear You, See You or Speak for You” was a typical 
example of their campaign rhetoric.
199
  Here Cóir emerges as an interesting example of a 
civil society group forming an EPM to contest European integration as its original 
‘brand’ was perceived as being too extreme.  From the No to Nice and Danish People’s 
Movement examples it was shown that political parties used EPMs as umbrella 
organisations to legitimise their Eurosceptic activities with the supposedly non-partisan 
label of civil society, due to negative public sentiment towards political parties.  It 
appears that civil society groups also have to react to negative public sentiment against 
them as well by using EPMs.   
The People’s Movement, which began campaigning against the EU at the time of 
Maastricht, experienced an increase in membership as Labour and Green Party members 
disaffected at their respective party leaderships’ pro-Lisbon stance volunteered to 
campaign against Lisbon.
200
  The group’s leadership noticed a substantial difference 
between the Lisbon campaign and previous EU referendum campaigns, due to the 
numbers of young people volunteering to help the group’s activities.  The leadership 
believed this was down to a widely held belief amongst those young people that the type 
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of Europe that Lisbon was creating was “not the Europe that they had grown up with”.201  
Their perception was of an inherent neoliberal bias in the policies of the Commission and 
rulings of ECJ that was at odds with a supposed “social Europe” that existed before.  The 
origins of their campaign against Lisbon, which propelled them to the forefront of 
Euroscepticism in Ireland, began with a large protest in Dublin in April 2006, when over 
30,000 people took to the streets to protest against Irish Ferries firing some 300 Irish 
workers in favour of cheaper Eastern European labour
202
.  This action, they believed, was 
sanctioned under EU law.  From then on the People’s Movement sought to campaign 
against any future EU treaty on the grounds of protecting workers rights and preventing a 
“race to the bottom” in terms of working conditions that an expansion of the Single 
Market or of new EU legislation might bring.  The leadership of the People’s Movement 
believed that job losses such as those at Irish Ferries were allowed to happen because 
Ireland had adopted wholesale neo-liberal “EU economic law” and that the “political 
class [had] given up the ability [of the Dáil] to challenge such laws” and protect the rights 
of Irish workers.
203
 
Cóir and the People’s Movement were formed, because they made the connection 
between the real or imagined threat to their specific issues of interest by the EU 
institutions and the extension of that threat with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.  
While the issues that were the founding causes of both groups were specific to the Irish 
case, it was events at an EU level, the ECJ ruling on the Laval case and the linking of the 
ECJ to decisions made by the European Court of Human Rights, which caused them to 
campaign against EU treaties and not just Lisbon.  Successive Irish governments used EU 
law and directives as a highly effective means of bringing in contested legislation, 
particularly with regard to social and economic liberalisation, without the need to face 
down entrenched interests at a domestic level.
204
  Those groups that saw themselves as 
‘losers’ of this implementation of EU laws and their enforcement by the ECJ, 
fundamentalist Catholics and trade unionists, organised themselves into protest 
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movements outside of their institutionalised ‘parent’ groups to campaign against what 
they perceived as the source of the attack on their interests, the EU itself.   
While the Irish Catholic Church (hereafter referred to as ‘the Church’) and the 
trade union umbrella group, the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, were both in favour of 
Lisbon, prominent members of both were openly sceptical of the trajectory of European 
integration that Lisbon represented.
205
  Open criticism of Lisbon would have earned a 
severe reprimand to the Church and the Irish trade union movement from the 
Government as a rejection of the Social Partnership process.   Both were members of this 
process which has been used by the Government to formulate wider economic policy 
with strong input from both the Church and trade unions.  Rejection of this Social 
Partnership process would have weakened their political hand in full participation of this 
process which has been extremely beneficial to both.  Thus the leadership of the Church 
and the trade unions could not act on their members’ anger at the impact of participation 
in European integration on their interests.  Active members of the Church and trade 
unions were left with no other option but to take their campaign into civil society-based 
protest movements, where both sides received tacit support from their respective 
established organisations. The general removal of the EU as a contested issue from the 
party system became apparent at the elite level of Irish civil society, in the leadership of 
TUs and the Church with the result that ordinary members of both groups formed EPMs 
to contest European integration.   
The coalition organised to secure the ratification of Lisbon, the Alliance for 
Europe, was portrayed as a broad coalition of Church, trade union, business and political 
parties.
206
  However this broad coalition appeared to have operated almost exclusively at 
the elite level of these bodies beyond their ordinary members.  The successful actions of 
Cóir and the People’s Movement are representative of a long history of rejection of elite-
level cues by interest group members on EU referendums in Ireland.  It was the massive 
influx of Eastern European workers and the perception that they were taking Irish jobs 
from 2004 on that led to a strongly negative working class sentiment towards European 
integration in Ireland.  With the competencies of the EU moving increasingly into new 
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areas, the linking of the Lisbon Treaty to the supposedly secular European Convention on 
Human Rights and the dropping of references to God and Christianity from the European 
Constitutional Treaty, Ireland’s Catholics were mobilised by their fringe elements to 
reject Lisbon.   
What the most recent wave of Irish EPM formation shows is that certain sections 
in Irish civil society held the perception that it was the EU institutions that impacted 
negatively on their interests and not simply the Irish government.  While both Cóir and 
the People’s Movement formed to bypass their institutionalised representative interest 
groups and the Government in their Lisbon campaign, Libertas sought to challenge the 
Government’s leadership on the EU in Ireland.  Libertas acted as a direct challenge to the 
mainstream political approach to Europe, that of full participation in the current trajectory 
of European integration, and sought to convince the Irish electorate that “another Europe 
is possible”.207  This in itself is a fascinating example of civil society rejecting both 
political party and social elite cues.  Perhaps even more interesting is the focus on 
national level contestation despite the European-level nature of the issue.  This 
contradicts directly Imig and Tarrow’s argument that groups in civil society from 
different countries would mobilise together and contest European integration on a 
specific issue relevant to all of them at the European level.
208
  The failure of European 
level mobilisation to develop would appear to be explained by the openness of the 
political opportunity structure at the national level, in the Irish case referendums, and 
secondly the sheer organisational difficulty and expense of organising pan-European 
contestation.  As the Irish case illustrates, these two factors push civil society contestation 
of the EU to the national level.  
 
2.8 Why EPMs Emerged to ‘Win’ Lisbon  
The question remains: how did Irish EPMs emerge to become so effective in 
comparison to those in the other case studies?  Tarrow has long sought to explain why 
protest movements emerge and take divergent actions across different countries, and his 
work provides a template by which to examine why Irish EPMs emerged in the form they 
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did and helps to answer as to why they became so effective.  Tarrow explains that most 
“opportunities [for protest movements] are situational” and “compensate […] for 
weaknesses in cultural, ideological, and organisational resources”.209  Thus it can be seen 
that not only did EPMs have the repeated “structural opportunity” of a referendum to 
mobilise around they were also presented with the “situational opportunity” of a 
disorganised pro-Lisbon side.
210
 
The main figures in the National Platform, PANA, Cóir, the People’s Movement 
and other groups had been actively campaigning against European referendums since the 
Maastricht Treaty, and in relation to a few individuals, since the accession Treaty.  This 
high level of specific experience with European referendums allowed the leadership of 
the No groups to firstly recognise the structural and situational opportunities that were 
available to them; and secondly to provide them with the organisational capacity to act 
decisively on these opportunities.  
This experience came to fruition in the first Lisbon Treaty referendum campaign.  
While the change of Taoiseach was dominating Irish politics in early 2008, No groups 
were actively campaigning in opposition to the Treaty.  The referendum campaign began 
in December 2007, not when the Taoiseach announced the date of the referendum but 
when the civil society group Libertas began a poster campaign outlining the points on 
which they believed the Irish public should reject the Lisbon Treaty.
211
  Other No groups 
moved forward with their campaigns to take advantage of the prominence being given to 
No arguments in the media as well as to prevent Libertas from dominating the No side.
212
  
Soon after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty these groups knew that a referendum was 
inevitable and began to organise themselves for a campaign.  Both the Catholic Cóir and 
the left wing People’s Movement began to organise volunteers to drop leaflets, print and 
place posters, and hold discussion meetings by February 2008.  They engaged in these 
tactics specifically as they recognised the effectiveness of direct campaigning on the 
electorate from the success of No to Nice in the first Nice referendum campaign.  In 
contrast to the actions of these No groups, the main Yes campaign, Alliance for Europe, 
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was not formed until late April 2008,
213
 by which time civil society groups had taken 
advantage of this situational opportunity and set the agenda of the Lisbon campaign.   
Garry et. al. have shown that an early, energetic campaign with a clear message 
was vital in encouraging mainstream voters to come out and vote Yes after they absented 
themselves for the first Nice vote.
214
  For the first Nice referendum No voters obviously 
needed something similar to encourage them to vote No.  This was provided by the No to 
Nice group and their simple and coordinated message of Nice being detrimental to Irish 
neutrality.  The issue of neutrality has been described as the “touchstone” issue for the 
Irish electorate and by using neutrality-based EPMs, anti-Nice political parties were able 
to tap into this issue with Irish voters and challenge the pro-Nice parties on it.  For the 
first Lisbon referendum the People’s Movement and Cóir not only motivated their 
respective sections of Irish society but through their rigorous campaigns ensured that 
voters were exposed to their arguments for voting No to Lisbon.  Added to the strategy of 
Libertas to allow voters of mainstream pro-European parties to feel comfortable in voting 
No, then the impact of these civil society based anti-Lisbon campaigners can be viewed 
as very important to the outcome. 
While no definitive causal link between the Nice and Lisbon No votes and the 
activities of No to Nice, Libertas, Cóir and the People’s Movement can be conclusively 
proven, their relevance to each campaign as a whole is without question.  The Nice 
referendum campaign was dominated by the neutrality issue and the government was 
forced to negotiate an explicit legal guarantee on Irish neutrality from the European 
Council.  The arguments of No to Nice were given credence by the preponderance of anti-
war and anti-nuclear groups in the campaign, with the political parties involved arguing 
that they were merely representing the arguments of the civil society groups in the 
campaign.  The issues first articulated by Libertas in the first Lisbon referendum 
campaign formed the basis of the government’s strategy for the next vote on Lisbon.215  
The poster campaigns of the People’s Movement and Cóir were the focus of extensive 
criticism by the mainstream political parties as their effectiveness became apparent.
216
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While the  Alliance for Europe and Government figures were quick to dismiss Sinn Féin 
and Socialist Party arguments against Lisbon as purely “political opportunism”, they 
found it much more difficult to refute the claims of civil society based anti-Lisbon 
campaigners and thus much more difficult to convince the electorate to vote Yes to 
Lisbon.
217
  The civil society No campaign presented itself as free from political influence 
and instead focused specifically on the issues they thought important about Lisbon.  
Unable to accuse them of political opportunism, the Yes side found it difficult to deal 
with their diverse range of issues.   
With the first Lisbon referendum campaign, Irish civil society dominated the No 
side, pushed anti-Lisbon parties to the side and challenged mainstream political parties 
leadership on the EU issue in Ireland.  They were able to achieve this by utilising 
campaign tactics honed from the experience of the failures of previous EU referendum 
campaigns and the success of the No to Nice campaign in 2001.  The repeated structural 
opportunity of referendums provided Irish Eurosceptic groups not only with the 
opportunity to defeat European treaties but also with the opportunity to build experience 
in both campaigning and organising against European treaties.  The situational 
opportunity of a weak and divided Yes campaign allowed civil society groups unhappy 
with the impact of European integration on their interests, to take full advantage of the 
structural opportunity of a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty and to campaign successfully 
for its rejection.  In essence Irish EPMs did not ‘emerge’ to ‘win’ Lisbon they were in 
hibernation from their previous incarnations in the first and second Nice referendum 
campaigns.  As emphasised in this section, the knowledge that a referendum on the next 
EU treaty was guaranteed to be held meant that individuals could close down their EPM 
after Nice and re-form it before the next referendum with a specific name and focus to 
oppose that new treaty.  The continued use of referendums to ratify Irish participation in 
European integration allowed individuals to build up skills and expertise in campaigning 
and of their knowledge of the EU in general.  Those opportunities allowed for both 
repeated EPM formation and the creation of highly effective anti-Treaty referendum 
campaigns.   
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Irish EPMs successfully contested Irish EU policy outside the strict confines of 
the political system.  This is different from the Danish Maastricht example, where it was 
anti-Maastricht political parties that negotiated the opt-outs and not EPMs.  The 
arguments of Irish EPMs were used by the government in the immediate post-Nice I and 
post-Lisbon I periods to resolve the effects of each No vote.  While the extent of the 
actual policy changes affected by the Irish EPMs was debatable, their actions 
nevertheless forced the government into policy straitjackets on a number of key issues 
such as neutrality and social issues.
218
 
 
 
Third Section: Evaluation of the Explanatory Factors 
 
EF1: The more pro-European the media are, the more likely that EPMs will form.   
 For Irish EPMs gaining access to the media was not a problem.  Coverage was 
given to their press launches and they had occasional articles published in the main 
newspapers.  They all believed, however, that the media editorialised against them and 
were strongly biased in favour of the pro-EU/treaty side.  There were strong similarities 
with the Danish case where ostensibly the media gave coverage to EPM campaigners but 
EPMs were of the strong opinion that editorials urged Yes votes or pro-EU support, 
implicitly dismissed Eurosceptic arguments and gave far more coverage to pro-EU 
advocates.   
 A perception of pervasive pro-EU coverage in the media by individuals involved 
in EPMs did indeed play a role in the formation of Irish EPMs.  In a similar manner to 
UK EPMs they felt that the real facts of the impact of European integration in Ireland – 
workers’ rights, ECJ rulings, the reduction of Irish neutrality, Franco-German dominance 
of the EU – were not reported in the Irish media and that they had a duty to inform the 
Irish people of what they saw as the negative reality of Irish EU membership. 
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EF2: The lower the level of Euroscepticism in the party system, the more likely that 
EPMs will form.   
 EPMs mobilised to contest accession in 1973 were formed despite the presence of 
anti-accession political parties such as Labour and Sinn Féin.  Irish EPMs clearly 
emerged despite the presence of Euroscepticism in the party system.  As the level of 
Euroscepticism in the party system declined EPMs became increasingly influential, to 
such an extent that smaller Eurosceptic political parties associated themselves with 
EPMs, such as No to Nice.  As the number of Eurosceptic parties in parliament continued 
to decline, with the Greens no longer advocating a No vote, the number of EPMs 
increased even further.  Those members and voters who perceived themselves to be 
negatively affected by European integration became involved in Eurosceptic circles 
providing increasing levels of resources, both financial and human, that made EPM 
formation more feasible and their campaigns more successful.   
Irish EPMs were formed due to the ideological incompatibility of party-based 
Euroscepticism with civil society-based Eursoceptics who formed social movements to 
avoid association with domestic politics.  EPM formation also allowed members of 
formerly Eurosceptic parties to contest the EU.  The level of Euroscepticism in the party 
system was clearly important to the formation of Irish EPMs.   
 
EF3: The more referendums on European issues, the more likely that EPMs will 
form.   
 The history of Irish-EU relations is dominated by the eight referendums on the 
EU.  Their importance in the formation of EPMs is obvious.  EPMs were first mobilised 
to contest the onset of negotiations between Ireland and the EU, and then to contest the 
accession referendum.  When it became apparent that the then government was going to 
pass the SEA without holding a referendum, an EPM was formed to challenge the 
government and force the holding of a referendum.  Since then, EPMs have repeatedly 
formed to contest specific referendums and disband after the vote, only for the same 
individuals to come together for the following referendum and form a new EPM to 
contest European integration.    
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EF4: The more open the policy process (including institutional factors such as the 
electoral system), the more likely that EPMs will form. 
 The most successful engagement of Irish EPMs in the Irish policy process was 
their use of the court system.  The courts found in EPM activists’ favour in two very 
important decisions that levelled the playing field distinctly to their advantage.  This 
made contesting EU policy much easier for EPMs.  Firstly, it forced the government to 
hold referendums.  Secondly, it ensured that the government could not spend the full 
resources of the state solely on a Yes vote, and would in fact have to give equal coverage 
to No arguments in the public media and official government documents on EU 
referendums.  Both of these factors proved extremely valuable in providing EPMs with a 
national platform from which to articulate their arguments.   
 While the Irish electoral system has the potential to be favourable to individuals 
and non-established parties,
219
 electoral politics has been dominated by the three 
mainstream pro-EU parties.  Those few Eurosceptic individuals and parties that made it 
through the electoral system were faced by executive dominance in the Dáil of the 
strictest Westminster sort, where any form of meaningful contestation of European 
integration is prevented.  The contrast between the closed nature of the Dáil and the 
openness of the referendum system in accommodating dissenting views on the EU means 
that Eurosceptic activity was channelled into contesting referendums rather than the party 
system.  EPM formation was greatly aided by the openness of the judiciary and their 
interpretation of the Irish constitution.  The closed nature of the Irish parliament, 
however, also played a role in EPM formation.  This interaction of EPMs with the Irish 
policy-making process provides an important example of the potential influence of 
constitutions’ on the openness of the policy-making process.  Indeed, the Irish system has 
been characterised as very similar to the UK policy making process with the important 
exception of a written constitution.
220
  While ostensibly lacking the electoral system 
constraints of the UK, the ineffectiveness of the Irish parliament relevant to executive 
dominance is similar to that of the UK.  The Irish codified constitution, with specific 
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provisions for the use of referendums and references to limitations on the foreign policy-
making power of the government, proved to be a vital component of the policy-making 
process.  Irish EPMs were able to exploit this access point to the policy-making process 
to full effect by forcing the government to hold referendums and open up the policy 
process further.  The openness of the Irish policy process therefore did indeed encourage 
EPM formation but within the specific context of the Irish constitution.  The closed 
nature of the political policy process was also an important factor in EPM formation.   
 
EF5: The more available are state and/or private resources, the more likely that 
EPMs will form. 
 For the most part resources were not a factor in EPM formation.   The early EPMs 
relied mostly on the intellectual power of their members as academics, economists and 
barristers as their main resource.  As the Eurosceptic movement in Ireland matured and 
more individuals became involved, the main resource became the number of ordinary 
members.  The People’s Movement and in particular Cóir were able to use their large 
numbers of volunteers to steal a significant march on pro-Lisbon campaigners to pursue a 
very successful campaign.  The presence of a potential membership willing and able to 
campaign did play a role in the formation of certain EPMs.  This was particularly the case 
with the People’s Movement, for whom the level of inquiry from TU officials and Labour 
party members about campaigning against the EU ensured that the movement would be 
founded to contest the next EU referendum held.  The grassroots nature of both 
movements allowed them to exploit these human resources and have a wide geographic 
base in relation to their organisational strength.  In this regard, the role of resources in 
EPM formation is typical of the movements represented in the wider literature on social 
movements.  Irish EPMs relied on human and organizational resources to mobilize and 
contest European integration.  The Irish case does also have the relatively isolated 
example of Libertas which relied wholesale on the resources of millionaire Declan 
Ganley.  Libertas is a clear example of an EPM relying almost solely on financial 
resources for its formation.  In the social movement literature such examples are rare, and 
indeed Libertas were an outlier with their financial resources in the Irish case.   
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2.9 Main Conclusions from the Irish Case 
The Irish case emerges as something of an ideal type for EPMs to form, with all 
of the propositions in evidence to a fairly significant degree.  The level of Euroscepticism 
in the Irish party system declined with each passing decade and the number of EPMs 
increased as anti-EU sentiment removed itself from the Dáil.  With the Irish political 
system dominated by three parties, who from the late 1980s on held the same general 
position as regards European integration, the level of Euroscepticism in the party system 
would inevitably play a role in EPM formation.  With the added presence of multiple 
referendums, EPM formation in Ireland was largely driven by the two powerful factors of 
a low level of Euroscepticism in the party system and the presence of multiple 
referendums.  What this chapter has found is that Irish EPMs were able to take full 
advantage of the relative openness of the political opportunity structure to firstly form 
and secondly to contest European integration.  Resource mobilisation was not an 
explicitly important factor but more subtle resources such as experience of campaigning 
and human resources also played a role in EPM formation.    
Perhaps the most interesting element of this chapter on EPMs is how the vast 
majority of EPMs accepted Irish membership of the EU.  Only extreme hard left groups, 
associated with political parties, notably the Socialist Party and the Workers’ Party, 
opposed Irish membership
221
.  By the time of the Nice Treaty in 2001 amongst EPMs 
there was a wider acceptance of membership.  This was driven by an appreciation that 
there was overwhelming public support for Irish membership of the EU and that a 
withdrawalist platform was at odds with this reality.  Once accession had been decisively 
passed at referendum and positive public opinion toward the EU increased by the mid-
1980s, advocating an anti-membership position was not viable for EPMs.  Instead, new 
EPMs were formed that changed the focus of the contestation toward specific issues that 
they believed negatively affected their constituency, be that trade unionists, Catholics or 
global justice activists.  In many respects this has led to them being the most successful 
example discussed in this thesis.  Instead of advocating withdrawal or a dramatically 
changed relationship with the EU as in the other case studies, from Amsterdam on they 
began articulating specific critiques of the EU Treaty in question.  When treaties were 
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rejected at referendums this put them in an incredibly strong position, as the onus was not 
on the government to secure a complete renegotiation of the Treaty but to secure explicit 
guarantees or legally binding agreements on very specific issues.  For Nice this was 
related to neutrality, and although PANA and others still opposed the second Nice Treaty, 
they loudly trumpeted their success in getting these concessions in the first place.  
Similarly, after the first Lisbon referendum the opt-outs negotiated by the government 
were the mains points first articulated by the three main EPMs.  This shows the 
difference between successful and unsuccessful issue framing.  Despite similar members 
and similar reasons for forming campaigns, pre-Nice EPMs were not effective, as they 
framed their issues of contestation in terms of withdrawing from European integration.  
As they shifted their issue framing significantly to adapt to the specific concerns of the 
public, they were able to put forward arguments that strongly resonated with the Irish 
public and forced the pro-EU parties to engage directly on these arguments.  They 
succeeded where other small EU member states failed by securing a guaranteed 
commissioner for each member state.   
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Chapter 3: The UK Case
222
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Euroscepticism is synonymous with the UK to such an extent that leading 
scholars hold the default position that any comparative study of Euroscepticism that 
includes the UK will find that the depth and pervasiveness of opposition to European 
integration is of the greatest magnitude in the UK.
223
  In the context of this study this 
assumption is no different, as the UK case emerges as having the greatest number of 
EPMs espousing the hardest degree of Euroscepticism, that of complete withdrawal from 
the EU.  
The academic literature on UK Euroscepticism has almost wholly ignored EPMs, 
focusing heavily instead on the UK party system and public opinion.  The two party 
system and the electoral system,
224
 international relations
225
 and socio-cultural
226
 factors 
have been highlighted as a means of explaining high levels of UK opposition to European 
integration.  On the surface these approaches appear sensible as the UK had a major 
openly Eurosceptic party, no referendums on Europe since 1975 and media that was seen 
to be hostile to European integration.  Despite these three factors that ought to negate the 
presence of EPMs, the UK emerges as an example of widespread EPM formation.  
Usherwood located twenty-four in the period 1985-2000;
227
 similarly Gray located 
twenty-four in the period 1999-2002.
228
  Comparing this to the two in Estonia and 
Denmark and the seven in Ireland in a relatively similar time period, it can be seen that 
there were specific factors related to the UK that led to a far higher degree of EPM 
formation.  
                                                 
222
 The focus of this chapter is the national electoral system base in Westminster and not the devolved 
assemblies.  It is also interesting to note that no regional based EPMs (Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland) 
have been located.   
223
 Aspinwall, Mark (2004). Rethinking Britain and Europe: plurality elections, party management and 
British policy on European  integration, Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
224
 Ibid. 
225Wallace, William (2005). ‘The Collapse of British Foreign Policy’, International Affairs, 81: 1, pp. 53-
68. 
226
 George. ‘Britain’, pp. 15-33. 
227
 Usherwood, Beyond Party Politics, p. 92. 
228
 Gray, ‘Waiting for the Starting Signal’, p. 14. 
  
87 
 
The electorally successful Eurosceptic parties, the United Kingdom Independence 
Party (UKIP) and the Conservative Party (Conservatives), held both hard and soft 
Eurosceptic positions
229
 respectively.
230
  There should be little motivation for EPMs to 
form, given the diverse range of Eurosceptic discourse that was present in the UK 
political system, and where soft Euroscepticism has, to all intents and purposes, become a 
mainstream position.  Despite this, the overwhelming presence of Euroscepticism in the 
UK party system appears not to have discouraged EPMs to form but, as will be shown, 
actively played a significant role in causing them to form.  What the UK case shows is 
that the presence of Euroscepticism in the mainstream party system did not prevent the 
formation of Euroscepticism in civil society groups.  This contradicts one of the 
propositions outlined in the first chapter and the findings from the other case studies.  
This chapter will highlight the causal factors that underlie these differences between the 
UK and the other case studies.   
There must be factors beyond the immediate Euroscepticism in the UK party 
system that cause such high levels of EPM formation.  Examining UK public opinion 
towards the EU will give an insight into how Eurosceptic UK political parties do not 
represent the attitudes of the public at large.  There is a significant gap between the two 
and this space allowed EPMs to emerge and be successful.  The UK on average is the 
least enthusiastic member state when it came to perceptions of EU membership ‘as a 
good thing’ since joining in 1973 (see Figure 4.2 below).  The UK public is more 
receptive towards leaving the EU than any other electorate, least identified with the EU 
and has the least trust in the EU.  Given this level of public opposition to European 
integration it can be argued that far from the party system being Eurosceptic, it is in fact 
failing to represent the levels of public opposition to European integration.  Hence the 
wider support for the emergence of EPMs can be understood.   
With only one referendum on the EU in 1975, UK political parties were able to 
avoid facing this Eurosceptic public opinion in a direct vote on the EU issue for a 
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substantial period of time, unlike the other case studies.  Ireland, Denmark and Estonia 
have shown that referendums not only become the focus of EPM formation and activity 
but also force each respective national party system to engage the public directly on the 
EU.  The lack of referendums on Europe in the UK did not prevent EPM formation.  
Rather it resulted in the formation of EPMs to campaign for a referendum on the EU to 
be held in the first place.  In the UK the holding or not holding of referendums has 
became a focus of mobilisation for EPMs.  Moreover, examining the UK’s experience of 
held and ‘un-held’ EU referendums shows that the referendums themselves became 
contested as much as national participation in European integration is.   
This cumulative level of opposition towards European integration led George to 
label the UK as a “Eurosceptic State”, as he saw the ingrained nature of hostility to the 
EU across the UK party system, civil service, media, history and ultimately its people.
231
  
Despite this apparent pervasiveness of Euroscepticism, EPMs still emerged from civil 
society to contest the EU.  This chapter will ultimately conclude as to why EPMs 
emerged in such large numbers despite the UK being a “Eurosceptic state”.   
 
First Section: Overview of UK Politics and EU Relations 
 
 
3.2 The UK Party System and Europe 
In the immediate post-war period, as European leaders engaged in negotiations 
that were the beginning of European integration, the UK was a disengaged observer.  
Alongside these developments at the European level, opposition to European integration 
emerged in the UK.  While classical left- and right-wing critiques were used to dismiss 
the prospect of UK membership, the central anti-membership narrative from leading 
figures on both the left and right was one of opposition on historical and cultural grounds.  
Former leader of the Labour party Hugh Gaitskill rejected participation as throwing away 
“a thousand years of history”,232 while leader of the Conservatives Winston Churchill 
argued that Britain’s future lay with the US and the British Empire, not with Europe.233   
                                                 
231
 George, ‘Britain: Anatomy of a Eurosceptic State’, p. 13 
232
 Gowland and Turner, Reluctant Europeans, p. 132. 
233
 Ibid, p.79. 
  
89 
 
Non-participation in the beginning of European integration by both Conservative- 
and Labour-led governments was based on the post-war UK policy of alignment with the 
US and a focus on the British Empire.  There was a common belief among the UK 
political elite that the shattered states of Western Europe needed to form an organisation 
but that the UK did not need to be involved, given its relationships with the US and the 
British Empire, relationships informed by the twin bonds of culture and history.  
Churchill was strongly supportive of initial European cooperation, with his government 
hosting many international conferences on the issue, but he was equally steadfast in his 
opposition to UK involvement in it.
234
  From the beginning of European integration the 
UK stood apart from it, regarding it as an organization for the defeated European states 
while the UK chose to focus on its own foreign policy priorities.  Ten years later in the 
1950s, however, the UK economy was stagnant while Europe experienced a post-war 
‘Wirtschaftswünder’ of rapid post-war economic expansion.  By this time a pro-EU 
membership argument began to emerge, based on the necessity for UK participation in 
European integration for the survival of the UK economy.
235
   
This argument eventually formed the basis for the UK’s first formal application to 
join in 1961.  At the time party discipline prevented any widespread opposition to the 
process of applying for membership.  Both the Labour and the Conservative leaderships 
were agreed on the economic necessity of membership of the Common Market as the EU 
averaged annual growth of 4.7% between 1950 and 1971 compared to the average 1.4% 
annual UK economic growth at this time.
236
  As the Empire began to rapidly break up and 
the US focused on competition with the Soviet Union, participation in European 
integration became an imperative for the UK political elite.
237
  In opposition to the 
growing elite consensus in favour of EU membership, a handful of prominent members 
of each party, such as Enoch Powell and Tony Benn were public in their criticism of 
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membership – though their positions were more in line with party membership thinking 
than that of the party leadership.
238
   
 After a decade of French vetoing of UK membership, the UK joined in 1973.  
This divide between political elite support for membership and wider ordinary party 
membership rejection of the EU deepened during this time.  This was compounded by 
public support being 2:1 against membership from the late 1960s to 1975.  To resolve this 
conflict the Labour party included an election manifesto promise to hold a referendum on 
continued British membership of the Common Market, which they held less than a year 
after the October 1974 election on June 5
th
 1975.  The referendum campaign saw the 
pitting together of left-wing trade unionists and senior Labour MPs (Foot, Benn); and 
right-wing Conservative MPs (Powell, Joseph) together against the referendum.  Prime 
Minister (PM) Wilson suspended collective cabinet responsibility and allowed senior 
Labour party members and officials to campaign as they saw fit.  This was almost wholly 
due to the majority of ordinary Labour members being against membership and Wilson’s 
wish to prevent party members explicitly voting against the leadership’s position, thereby 
creating a split in the party.  The Conservatives meanwhile were largely in favour of 
joining at both the leadership and party membership level.  There were opponents to the 
party line on the hard right, led by Powell, who opposed largely over sovereignty issues, 
but the splitting of Labour over the issue convinced the majority of Conservative party 
officials and members to support the party line.
239
   
The pro-membership argument was fundamentally one of economics, as 
continued Common Market membership was seen as vital to supporting the then 
struggling UK economy.  Questions over the threat to national sovereignty and damage to 
UK industry were the basis of the anti-membership side’s argument.  The debate hinged 
on the benefits or drawbacks of common market membership for the UK economy, and 
only to a far lesser extent on the ceding of national sovereignty to ‘Europe’.240  The 
question was put as: “Do you think the UK should stay in the European Community 
(Common Market)?”  The electorate said Yes by a majority of over 2:1 (67% to 33%).  
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This result was a reversal of opinion polls which showed a 2:1 majority against further 
UK participation in European integration.
241
 
 Through the late 1970s and early 1980s the dominant Conservative party was 
relatively positively disposed towards European integration.  This was largely due to the 
success of the SEA and its drive to create a true single market that removed all barriers to 
trade between member states, which even PM Margaret Thatcher acknowledged as a 
positive for the UK economy.  On the other ideological side the development of the 
Single Market was anathema to Labour, which held a hard socialist position.  This 
staunch Labour opposition to European integration also contributed towards the positive 
European policy of the Conservatives at this time.  Labour opposition to membership 
reached its zenith in its 1983 election manifesto, which called for unequivocal UK 
withdrawal from the EU
242
.  The basis of this policy was a socialist critique of the single 
market.  Specifically that as a capitalist project it damaged workers rights and 
undermined British industry.  UK participation in European integration was contradictory 
to the socialist policies of the Labour party at the time and withdrawal was considered a 
necessity to achieve these policies outside of the liberalising influence of the EU.
243
  
 The EU policy positions of both parties slowly reversed, however, a change that 
was symbolised by the reaction of each party to two speeches made by two individuals 
who came to characterise the European debate in Britain from the late 1980s on.  Firstly, 
Margaret Thatcher made a speech at the College of Europe in Bruges in 1988 in which 
she outlined her opposition to the path that she believed European integration was 
proceeding.  While praising European integration for removing barriers to trade she 
singled out the dangers of increasing federalism and regulation by the European 
institutions as a threat to the sovereignty of member states.  The speech was followed by 
the launch of several EPMs and anti-EU think tanks, most importantly the eponymous 
Bruges Group.
244
  These groups will be discussed in more detail but it is important to 
note this time period as the starting point and intellectual basis of concerted and 
organised right-wing critiques of European integration.  Secondly, European Commission 
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President Jacques Delors made a speech to the Trade Union Council (TUC) a few months 
after Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges speech, in 1988 in Bournemouth.  In this speech he 
argued that the development of a single market would also be accompanied by a pan-
European charter of workers’ rights to be enforced at the supranational European level.  
Faced with a free market, anti-union Conservative government and Labour seemingly 
incapable of winning national elections, the Delors proposals were strongly endorsed by 
the TUC as a means of achieving trade union policy goals in the UK through by-passing 
the national government.  This change in position by the trade unions in favour of 
European integration quickly came to be represented in changed Labour party policy 
towards the EU.
245
  
The Conservatives, who had since MacMillan been seen as the party of Europe, 
moved gradually to a Eurosceptic stance as party policy followed Thatcher’s Bruges 
speech which accepted pro-market reforms but strenuously objected to proposals 
identified as moves towards European federalism.  Labour which had historically been 
the most divided and opposed to the removal of barriers to European trade, moved 
towards a pro-EU policy position.  Delors’ provisions for a social Europe with a strong 
emphasis on workers’ rights came up against growing Conservative criticism of Europe, 
which encouraged Labour to strategically, but no less ideologically, move to a more pro-
EU position.
246
 
Following on from Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges speech, the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty was a crucial mobilising factor for Euroscepticism in the UK
247
.  The 
creeping federalisation that Thatcher warned about in her Bruges speech was believed to 
have become incarnate in the new ‘European Union’ that was launched with the 
Maastricht Treaty.  The creation of a ‘Union’, single currency and social Europe, negated 
the benefits of a single market in the minds of Conservatives and formed the basis of 
Conservative opposition to various EU policies.
248
  With this creation of “Delors’ social 
Europe”, Labour Party members and Eurosceptics on the left began to soften in their 
opposition and indeed became active pro-Europeans, due to a realisation that progressive 
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social and workplace legislation could be brought into the UK through the EU level.  
Since then opposition to the EU amongst the left has significantly weakened compared to 
the 1975 campaign and became concentrated amongst the hard left, such as former 
minister Tony Benn and the RMT Union.
249
  These developments meant that the left and 
right switched positions as the left came to hold a broadly pro-EU position and the right 
became associated with a more Eurosceptic position.
250
  As each party became more 
clearly associated with each position, it became reinforcing, due to party identification as 
much as a genuine ideological shift in each party’s position.  Such a development fits in 
neatly with the Hooghe-Marks model of a shift in patterns of Euroscepticism from left to 
right as European integration evolves beyond the single market and into more social 
policies.
251
  But as Hooghe et. al. put forward, the long-term effects of this shift are not 
known.  The UK offers an example of how political parties react to shifting patterns in 
competition on European integration by gradually reducing the salience of the issue. 
 The convulsions in the Conservative party, due to disagreements over the change 
to a more Eurosceptical policy have been well documented.
252
  Notwithstanding their 
leading to the ousting of Margaret Thatcher as PM in 1990, they continued to plague the 
Major government from 1990-97 as the party became fractured over Major’s Maastricht 
Treaty policy.  The Maastricht Treaty became the point at which opposition to Europe 
became effectively mobilised at the political, EPM and public opinion level.  More 
relevant for the party system, and to explain how Euroscepticism evolves beyond the 
Hooghe-Marks model, is that Bale and Bulmer both point to Maastricht as a motivator for 
Labour’s desire to “reduce the electoral salience of Europe”253 a policy which was 
belatedly followed by the Conservatives after the 2005 election.
254
  Despite Labour 
coming to power with a promise to “give Britain leadership in Europe”,255 analysis of the 
Blair government’s EU policy has shown that this was true at the supranational level but 
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not at the national political level or in the UK public sphere.
256
  In this regard the Labour 
government pursued the party’s and the national interest in a ‘normal’ member state 
fashion at the supranational level
257
 but actively suppressed internal party debate and 
avoided public engagement on Europe.
258
  The Conservatives, on the other hand, pursued 
a strongly anti-EU line for the 2001 election, where the party made a reversal of the 
government’s policy on the Euro one of their key election priorities; the week before 
polling day they held a large media launch to announce that Britain had ‘seven days to 
save the pound’.259  For the 2005 election they avoided Europe but similarly focused on 
immigration and asylum as issues they perceived they were stronger on rather than on 
“bread and butter issues”.260  But for the 2010 election Europe was almost wholly 
missing from the election campaign as concerns over the economy and the growing 
budget deficit took precedence.  Just as rapidly as the EU became one of the central 
issues in UK politics in the early 1990s up to the early 2000s, it disappeared again by the 
end of the 2000s.  While ostensibly Labour appeared pro-European and the Conservatives 
Eurosceptic, at the elite party level a new consensus emerged to avoid discussions on 
Europe as much as possible.
261
  This approach appears to have had a profound effect on 
public opinion in the UK towards Europe, with the issue dropping into statistical 
insignificance amongst the public by 2010 (see: Figure 3.2).   
Public opinion on political leadership of the EU issue (see: Figure 3.1) supported 
the parties’ position of avoiding the issue altogether.  This was because it appeared to be 
closely linked to the electoral fortunes of each party.  The tremendous 16% increase in 
support for Labour’s European policy in 1997, and 4% increase in 2001 over the 
Conservatives were obviously linked to the elections of both years.  As the next section 
will show, public opinion in favour of membership at this time was declining and ought 
to have favoured the Conservative’s Eurosceptic EU policy more.  This dissonance 
between voters’ preference on the EU and their preference for each party’s EU policy 
convinced parties that the internal party factionalism caused by the EU was not 
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commensurate with votes received or not received on the basis of their EU policy.  Both 
the Conservatives and Labour had a policy of avoiding the EU issue, as they were 
confused about what EU policy voters wanted and were not willing to pay the price of 
internal party discord to find out.  Beyond electoral politics and examining what the UK 
case shows about the Hooghe-Marks model is that once the shift from left- to right-wing 
based Euroscepticism is complete, the next shift in party positions towards the EU is to 
ignore the issue altogether.   
 
Figure 3.1: % of UK Public identifying party with best policies on the Europe 
issue  
 
Source: Ipsos MORI (2010), Issues Facing Britain Index April 2010. 
 
 This section has shown that the UK’s relationship with European integration was 
closely related to that of its party system with the EU.  In contrast to Ireland and Estonia 
where party positions on the EU were almost wholly similar, there were dramatic 
differences in EU positions between both of the main parties.  At the beginning of 
European integration both the Conservatives and Labour were equally opposed to 
membership.  As the economic necessity of membership became more apparent, the 
Conservatives pushed strongly for participation and became the default party of Europe 
as opposed to a divided and largely Eurosceptic Labour party.  With the advent of a 
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social Europe in the late 1980s, Labour became more pro-EU and the Conservatives 
began to move toward a more strongly critical stance.  These positions reached their 
zenith in the early 2000s with Labour advocating Euro membership and the 
Conservatives advocating withdrawal from many EU policies.  Following this period of 
competition on the EU issue both parties did their best to avoid public discussion of the 
EU.   
 
3.3 The UK and Referendums on Europe 
The UK held one referendum on Europe, in 1975.  The referendum was held by 
Labour PM Wilson as part of an election promise to assuage Labour Eurosceptics after 
their opposition to the UK joining the EU in 1973 without holding a referendum.  Wilson 
and the majority of senior members of the cabinet were in favour of membership but 
ordinary party membership was strongly against.
262
  Holding a free referendum vote was 
the political escape route for the Labour party leadership to avoid a damaging split over 
Europe.  The first and only referendum on Europe in the UK was not the pre-accession 
public endorsement of political-elite negotiated EU membership that has been held in 
each of the non-original six accession states (apart from Bulgaria and Romania).  It was 
more a party-political settlement to deal with internal party elite/member divisions over 
Europe.  Here, there are some similarities with the Danish case, as the referendum served 
as a ‘release valve’ for internal party pressure.  The negative impact of the 1975 
referendum on Labour unity was profound.  Elite Labour cues were decisively ignored, 
with the Cabinet’s Yes recommendation being rejected at the 1975 party conference by 
3.74 million to 1.99 million votes
263
.  Though a clear 67% majority of the electorate 
voted Yes to continued membership, internal Labour opposition to European integration 
remained.  The implication was that a referendum had not sufficed to quell party 
divisions over Europe, and so, given the non-constitutional need for one, there was no 
point in holding another.   
This situation changed following Labour’s electoral breakthrough in 1997, PM 
Blair sought to change the previous cautious Conservative policy towards Europe to a 
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more positive position.  This included open acceptance of joining European Monetary 
Union (EMU).
264
  Given the strength of the Labour electoral victory and both party and 
personal approval ratings Blair put forward the policy of holding a referendum on 
membership of the Euro:
265
 as Figure 3.1, shows the public endorsed this policy in the 
immediate post-1997 election period.  This was a factor of formation for the Business for 
Sterling EPM, as it launched with the goal of turning public opinion against Euro 
membership so as to encourage the government not to hold a referendum.
266
  This is an 
overlooked element of the UK’s relationship with Europe – that the holding of 
referendums on Europe became as much a contested issue as the subject of the 
referendums themselves.  The failure of successive Labour governments to hold an EU 
referendum by the mid-2000s was to emerge as a central cause of formation for EPMs, 
alongside that of opposition to European integration. 
Following on from EMU, the Constitutional Treaty (that re-emerged as the Lisbon 
Treaty) became the focus of Eurosceptic opposition.  The main issue of contestation was 
not the content of either Treaty but rather that the British public did not get an 
opportunity to vote on either.  Both the Conservative and Labour parties promised to hold 
a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty.  But once that was replaced by the Lisbon 
treaty PM Brown refused to hold a referendum on it and instead it was passed by a vote 
in parliament.  Had such a referendum been rejected, it would have not just simply 
endangered the passing of the Lisbon Treaty but would also have damaged the UK–EU 
relationship itself.
267
  One group of Eurosceptic campaigners sought not merely to 
campaign against British membership of the EU and specific policies but also for a 
referendum on EU treaties as they believed it would serve as a proxy for a referendum on 
British membership of the EU.
268
  The other group of Eurosceptic campaigners sought a 
referendum not for the UK to leave the EU but to secure a No vote that would serve as 
the basis to secure opt-outs on a range of EU policies (the pre-Maastricht position).
269
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 Referendums were a central component of the UK’s relationship with the EU.  
The presence of the Referendum Party in the 1997 general election and the role they 
played in the policy debate on the EU in the 1990s is evidence of this.  The party was 
formed in 1994 as a non-political single issue party, on the basis that the UK public had 
been cut out of the EU policy decision making process.  Its presence forced the two main 
political parties to take a position on the holding of a referendum on further UK 
membership of the EU.
270
  The Conservatives and Labour avoided a direct referendum on 
membership and instead both promised a referendum on the specific issue of EMU 
membership.  Initially the party was successful in attracting a wide base of support 
beyond its Conservative Peer founder, Lord Goldsmith, to the left and also to some pro-
Europeans.  This was due to the original argument of addressing the lack of democracy in 
the EU policy process, which appealed to some pro-Europeans who wanted a direct 
mandate for continued UK participation in European integration.  Closer to the election 
date the party adopted a hard Eurosceptic stance based on nationalist arguments and 
focused less on the democratic element of their platform.  This alienated left wing 
supporters and concentrated its support on the right.
271
  Though the electoral impact of 
the Referendum Party was negated by the Labour landslide, its ultimate legacy was to 
reinforce the link between European integration and referendums in the policy of the 
Conservatives and Labour.  Its greatest impact was on the Conservatives, where the 
migration of backbench and benefactor support to the Referendum Party meant that the 
Conservative leadership was left in no doubt as to the dangers of a pro-EU policy or a 
lack of commitment to hold an EU referendum on party discipline.  From this point on, a 
policy of holding a referendum on involvement in specific EU policies (EMU being chief 
amongst them) was adopted by the party.  This was in contrast to both Thatcher and 
Major (before 1997) who rejected such a position as detrimental to the party leadership 
structure.
272
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3.4 UK Public Opinion and European Integration 
With such significant political energy expended on avoiding a referendum, UK 
public opinion was obviously important in understanding why the political parties were 
reluctant to hold them.  Investigating UK public opinion on European integration requires 
a high degree of nuance with the question of EU support being not one of “pro and anti, 
but rather [one of] widespread indifference or uncertainty”.273  As can be seen from 
Figure 3.2 the EU was no longer thought of as a relevant issue by the UK public.  
Though the level of importance assigned to the European issue by the UK public was at 
times highly volatile, the overall trend in support has been resolutely downwards since 
early 2000.  In 2001 Europe was amongst the top five issues of importance of the day, but 
by late 2005 Europe was not even listed as amongst the top eleven issues of most 
importance facing Britain.  This decline continued, so that by the start of 2010 1% of the 
UK public listed Europe as an important issue, well within the statistical margin of 
error.
274
   
 
Figure 3.2: % of UK public identifying Europe as an important issue facing the 
country 
 
Source: IPSOS Mori, Issues facing Britain index: April 2010  
 
From Figure 3.2 extreme peaks of interest in Europe, such as late 1999, early 
2004, and mid 2005 are clearly noticeable.  These peaks occur at times of critical activity 
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at the EU level.  Potential UK membership of the Euro in late 1999, the accession of the 
Central and East European Countries in 2004, the French and Dutch rejection of the 
Constitutional Treaty in 2005, each led to a spike in public awareness of the EU; though 
they were just as quickly followed by declines.  This suggests that events at the European 
level were once noticed by UK voters and their importance to the UK appreciated but by 
the end of the 2000s this was no longer the case.  The Conservatives and UKIP both 
attempted to make the failure to hold a referendum on Lisbon a major political issue 
during 2007 but it hardly registered by the UK electorate: an example of how the 
European issue had collapsed in salience by the late 2000s.  
 
Figure 3.3: UK public opinion % agreeing that UK membership of EU is a ‘good 
thing’ and % disagree that UK membership of the EU is a ‘good thing’. 
 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer No. 1 – No. 74. 
 
 
It can be clearly seen that the European issue came to be ignored by the vast 
majority of the UK public.  What made the low salience of the EU issue in the UK 
different to that in other member states was that it was compounded by a lower overall 
level of support for membership of the EU, as Figure 3.3 shows, in comparison to the EU 
average.  This failure appears to have fed into a negative perception of Europe.  Again 
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from Figure 3.3, positivity towards the EU was highly volatile at times, with variances 
closely related to trends in public opinion across the EU.  This can be seen in the increase 
in support at the time of the completion of the Single Market in the late 1980s, and the 
various drops in support at the time of the Maastricht Treaty, proposed Euro membership 
and accession of the CEECs.  Academic work on public opinion has tended to focus on 
the headline figures of support for a country’s membership of the EU, contrasting it to 
other member states and extrapolating from the difference between the two whether a 
country is Eurosceptic or not.
275
  Contrasting the Eurobarometer Autumn 2009 79% 
support from the Irish public for membership to the 30% UK figure appears to show the 
UK electorate as hostile towards European integration.  While this hostility is 
incontestable, what needs to be emphasised is that over the long term UK public opinion 
has been stable.  Over the full period of membership from 1972 to 2010 the average of 
UK positivity towards the EU was 37%, the average of negativity was 32%, showing that 
the UK was broadly supportive of European integration throughout its period of 
membership.  Both of these figures were quite low, showing that the high rate of neutrals 
on the issue was perhaps the greatest effect of the lack of salience of the EU.  When the 
UK-EU relationship made it to the top of the political agenda (such as the completion of 
the single market in the late 1980s, the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, and proposed EMU 
membership in the late 1990s) there have been impacts on public opinion.  With the 
removal of the EU from the political agenda in the late 2000s the UK public largely 
ignored the issue, as Figure 3.2 shows conclusively.  Since then, events at the EU level, 
such as the Lisbon Treaty, did not impact on public opinion and consequently a 
significant proportion of the UK public remained neutral on it.   
Various studies have noted that a supposed decline in UK support for EU 
membership can first be spotted at the time of the Maastricht Treaty.
276
  The ratification 
of Maastricht was followed by the collapse of the pound sterling as the UK fell out of the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), an event known as Black Wednesday, and 
a recession followed.  This economic humiliation, due to the perceived failure of 
European level economic management, did significant damage the UK public’s positive 
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disposition towards the economic benefits of European integration.  Since ‘Black 
Wednesday’ the UK public became sceptical of the economic benefits of EU 
membership, even more so due to the long economic boom which followed after the 
recession once the UK was fully removed from ERM.
277
  This fed into public opposition 
to the Euro which in the UK remained dramatically below that of the EU average and 
even that of other non-EMU members such as Denmark (See Figure 3.4).  This assertion 
of a post-Maastricht collapse in UK public support for European integration appears 
slightly misguided when approached from the long term view.  Looking at Figure 3.3 
again it can be seen that the late 1980s and early 1990s public support for EU 
membership moved significantly above its historical average – some 20% at its peak in 
autumn 1991.  The post-Maastricht ‘collapse’ can instead be seen as a return to the 
average level of public support for EU membership.  The wider perspective of the UK as 
a reluctant, almost forced, participant in European integration shows the surge in pro-EU 
sentiment in the late 1980s as deviant and not the post-1992 decline back to average 
levels of support.  Opposition to economic integration was hardly surprising, not only for 
the legacy of ERM but also for the post-2000 superior GDP growth rate of the UK to the 
Eurozone – a point which successive governments were not shy about repeating.278  
Figure 3.4: UK and Danish public support for a ‘European Monetary Union with 
one single currency, the Euro’ 
 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer No. 54 – No. 72. 
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There are two key points from the Eurobarometer data presented above.  The 
continuously high level of opposition to the EU amongst the UK public was without 
question, as Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 show.  What makes this data interesting was that 
this low salience fed into higher levels of opposition and neutrality towards membership.  
In other member states there was little to suggest that the low salience of the EU issue 
resulted in lower, or indeed higher, levels of support for national membership of the EU.  
The conclusion was that opposition towards EU membership was the default position of a 
clear majority of the UK public.   Referring back to the history of UK–EU relations, the 
original position of the UK was one of non-involvement at the beginning of European 
integration and a focus on other foreign policy priorities.  Only later, largely through 
reasons of economic necessity, did the UK seek EU membership.  The wider trend of 
Figure 3.3 reflects this conflict at the beginning of UK membership of the EU.  Despite 
numerous periods of shifts in favour of, and against, membership, most notably centred 
on the period of the Maastricht Treaty, support for and against membership was in the 
same range in 2009 as it was at the beginning of membership in 1972: between 30% and 
40%.  This reveals UK public opinion towards the EU to be quite stable when taken over 
the entire period of membership.  The long term average in support of membership of 
37% and against of 32% shows that it is simply not relevant to compare UK public 
support for membership to that of other states given that it has always been low.  Only for 
a brief period in the late 1980s did it meet the EU average.   
The previous section on UK-EU relations highlighted the distancing of the UK 
from European integration at its inception due to the socio-cultural influence of US and 
imperial relations.
279
  This appears to be the most relevant long-term factor in explaining 
this long-term trend.  Euroscepticism has always been the original position of both the 
UK public and party system.  When this status quo has been challenged by events at the 
EU level that are supported by a majority of the public and party system (such as 
enlargement and the single market) it has changed into a more pro-EU position.  When 
there are no events at the EU level that resonate with the public or are ignored by the 
party system, public opinion goes back to its historic Eurosceptic position. 
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3.5 The UK Media and Europe 
In terms of understanding the complex relationship between the UK electorate 
and the party system over the EU issue the role of the media is vitally important.  As with 
almost all elements of the UK and Europe, the domestic media’s treatment of the EU 
issue is characterised as being of entrenched hostility.  This has not always been the case, 
however.  Indeed, it was only with changes to UK media ownership that this pervasive 
negative bias towards the EU emerged.  While the Daily Mail newspaper was long 
sceptical of EU membership, the change of ownership of the Daily Telegraph, Times and 
the Sun newspapers to the ownership of Conrad Black (with the Daily Telegraph) and 
Rupert Murdoch (Times and Sun) in the 1980s meant that the three main right-wing 
newspapers and largest tabloid all held strongly Eurosceptical editorial positions.
280
  It 
was this bloc of media owners who editorialised a Eurosceptic position that pro-EU 
activists identified as being the largest impediment towards deeper UK participation in 
European integration.
281
  The Eurosceptic media was concentrated in the print media.  
Broadcast media, dominated by the BBC, was identified as being strongly pro-EU by 
Eurosceptic activists.
282
  Coverage of the EU in the UK media was seen as a preserve of 
the print media with the right-wing newspapers listed above believed to have been 
pushing the anti-EU agenda, whether their readership liked it or not: analyses of the 1997 
general election campaign showed that Europe was the issue that received the most print 
media coverage but was only the eighth most relevant issue to voters.
283
  The strength of 
this argument is debatable but it does show the extent to which the level of opposition to 
the EU in the UK media is out of proportion with other policy positions.  This depth of 
opposition is not matched on the other side of the debate where the left-wing papers, the 
Independent and the Guardian hold neutral positions on the EU with only the Financial 
Times coming out in support of UK membership of the Euro and deeper UK participation 
in the EU in general.   
 The Business for Sterling EPM had few problems in getting its arguments across 
in the print media as the right-wing media were most receptive to their arguments 
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regardless of their relevance; it was helped by its “friends in the media”.284  This shows 
that EPMs could be confident of getting coverage of their activities to a media 
sympathetic to its cause: though one EPM, the Campaign for a Referendum, argued that 
the right-wing media in the UK were in fact quite pro-European as they refused “to put 
forward withdrawal from the EU as a legitimate option for the UK".
285
  Business for 
Sterling activists were cautious however, as they sought to put forward a professional 
looking campaign in the media, as they were wary of being branded amateurs and their 
arguments ignored.  Pro-EU groups, on the other hand, believed that they had to be 
extremely proficient and dedicated to receive media coverage for their arguments and 
events.
286
   
Stringent and pervasive opposition to the EU in the media did aid EPMs in their 
formation and activities.  It allowed access to the national debate on the EU but only to 
those EPMs that conformed to their editorial line.  The UK media contradicted the other 
case studies for its anti-EU bias and the related easier path of access for EPMs to media 
outlets; though this was for EPMs whose members and sponsors had connections with the 
editorial staff and owners of the media.  Indeed it appears that it was precisely the 
ownership of the UK media since the 1980s that drove this strongly anti-EU editorial 
line, often against public opinion, as the evidence of the 1997 election shows.  Certain 
EPMs took advantage of this and used it to access major national media outlets.  For 
other EPMs, however, the UK media was seen to have a pro-EU bias, as despite criticism 
of certain EU policies and treaties outright withdrawal was not put forward thereby 
encouraging them to form to inform the public of their arguments for ending UK 
membership of the EU.  
The hostility of much of the print media in the UK to anything Brussels-related 
partly explains why the two main political parties withdrew from the EU issue by the end 
of the 2000s, as they sought to avoid any unnecessary negative media confrontation over 
a non-salient issue.  In relation to the formation of EPMs, however, such a media 
environment contradicted the assumption that a Eurosceptic media will inhibit EPM 
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formation.  EPMs were still formed in the UK despite the print media culture of 
Euroscepticism, as for some EPMs they were not Eurosceptic enough.  These EPMs 
wanted to educate the public on the dangers of continued UK membership of the EU and 
for them the media was not doing its job as it failed to advocate withdrawal from the EU 
and just criticised various EU policies.  This depth of Euroscepticism amongst UK EPMs 
and where it came from will be discussed in the next section.   
 
 
 
 
Second Section: EPMs in the UK 
 
 
3.6 Two types of EPMs 
Between them Gray and Usherwood located twenty-four EPMs active in the UK 
in the late 1990s to early 2000s.  The common argument between them was that this was 
due to a strong reaction against events at the European level.
287
  Gray proposed the 
typology outlined in Table 3.1 below, but this chapter proposes a different typology.  
This has been done largely due to the overlap between the different typologies that Gray 
suggested.  All of these groups campaigned: the key difference was in, a) who the target 
of their campaigning was, and b) what EU issues they focused on.  Gray failed to 
appreciate just how many of these groups were in fact closely linked to political parties, 
and therefore identifying just one group as originating due to party factionalism in the 
Conservative party was simply not correct.  Her wholesale dismissal of Usherwood’s 
argument that UK EPMs are an extension of party politics was a kneejerk reaction to the 
appearance of a series of ostensibly non-party aligned EPMs.   
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Table 3.1: Groups campaigning against the euro in Britain, 1999-2002 
Type Right Wing Left Wing 
Political Party 
 
All-Party Alliance Against 
Brussels 
 
 UK Independence Party [UKIP]  
 The Democratic Party  
Business organisation Business for Sterling  
Labour organisation  
Trade Unions Against The Single 
Currency [TUASC] 
Party Faction 
Conservatives Against a Federal 
Europe 
Labour Euro-Safeguards 
Campaign 
  Labour Against The Euro 
Research organisation New Europe  
 Global Britain  
 European Research Group  
 European Foundation  
Campaign Organisation 
(Coalition/Alliance) 
No Campaign 
 
 
 Anti-Maastricht Alliance [AMA]  
 Congress for Democracy  
 
The European Alliance of EU-
Critical Movements [TEAM] 
 
 
Campaign Alliance for 
Referendums in Parishes 
 
Campaign Organisation Democracy Movement  
 
Campaign for an Independent 
Britain [CIB] 
 
 Anti-Common Market League  
 British Democracy Campaign  
 Youth For A Free Europe  
 New Alliance  
 Freedom Association  
 
Campaign Against Euro-
Federalism 
 
 The Bruges Group  
Source: Gray (2003) ‘Waiting for the Starting Signal: the UK’s pro and anti-Euro 
campaigns’, p. 14 
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This section will show that both Gray and Usherwood were correct in pointing to 
the ability to access the policy arena and the constraints of the party system respectively 
as important factors behind EPM formation.  Neither of the two theses were, however, 
correct in saying that they each exclusively describe the origins of EPMs in the UK.  
Combining both sets of research together with the data and analysis presented in this 
section produced a more adequate explanation.  This chapter shows that the two-party 
UK political system led to the formation of two distinctive types of EPM:   
 
1. One type that focused on influencing the elite level of political party and 
business leadership  
2. Another type that focused on direct action at the grass roots level.   
 
Some of these EPMs were closely tied to political parties and others were not.  
The argument of this study is that the presence of large and successful Eurosceptic 
political parties caused EPMs to be formed both as an extension and as an opposition to 
them.  While events at the European level, public opinion, media and the availability of 
resources all played a role in UK EPM formation, it was this elite/grass roots EPM 
dichotomy that provides a concrete explanation for the form of mobilisation they took.   
The two types of UK EPM elite-level and grass roots-level are similar in that both 
remained closely affiliated with the organisation/political party that they formed around.  
Where they differed was in the focus of their activities.  Elite level EPMs targeted senior 
decision-makers and other influential persons within the organisation/political party.  
Grass roots-level EPMs were more focused on direct action to raise public awareness of 
their arguments and to take action against what they perceived to be pro-EU activities by 
local and national government.   
This approach for analyzing UK EPMs appears as an alternative typology to that 
proposed in the first chapter.  A more accurate description of this elite-level/grass roots 
level dichotomy would be as a further subdivision of the existing EPM typology based on 
the specificities of the UK case.  Looking at the UK case with this further typology 
provides an analysis of a rarely encountered social movement; one that is focused on the 
elite-level in society.  The overwhelming body of the literature on social movements is 
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focused on those groups that operate distinctly at the grass roots-level.  There they seek 
to contest their issue by mobilizing ordinary citizens through various means.  Social 
movements that operate at the elite-level are all too rare.  This is because it is assumed 
that they exert such influence over the policy making process that they do not need to 
mobilize.
288
  Understanding why Business for Sterling was formed is of significance 
because it reveals why the UK’s policy making process on Europe changed to such an 
extent that even supposed members of the elite had to mobilize a protest movement to 
gain access to it.  Such a distinction is important for understanding the relevance of 
Business for Sterling for wider studies of social movements and of Euroscepticism in the 
UK.  Campaign for a Referendum is of interest because of a combination of factors.  
Firstly, it was typical of the small, regionally based EPMs listed in Table 3.2 below.  
Secondly, examining it addresses one of the principal conundrums of EPM formation in 
the UK – why would civil society mobilize to protest against Europe given the high level 
of Euroscepticism in the UK party system?  This is because many of their members were 
present and former members of either UKIP or the Conservatives.  Understanding their 
motivations for mobilizing Campaign for a Referendum will explain, in part, why EPM 
mobilization occurred, apparently unnecessarily, in such an apparently Eurosceptic 
environment.  Finally, their focus on the holding of a referendum will bring further detail 
as to why referendums are intrinsic to the UK – EU relationship.   
Taking the further typology of elite-level/grass roots-level for UK EPMs 
emphasises the difference of the UK from the other case studies.  In acknowledging that 
the UK is the “Eurosceptic State” of George’s assertion,289 and the glaring outlier in 
Ray’s mainstream party Euroscepticism study,290 then the evidence of a further deviation 
as regards the study of social movements on Europe in comparison to other European 
states should come as no surprise. 
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Table 3.2 Groups campaigning against European integration in Britain, 1999-2010 
Elite Level Grass roots Level 
Business for Sterling 
The European Alliance of EU-
Critical Movements [TEAM] 
 
Trade Unions Against The 
Single Currency [TUASC] 
Campaign Alliance for 
Referendums in Parishes 
Labour Euro-Safeguards 
Campaign 
 
Democracy Movement 
 
Conservatives Against a 
Federal Europe 
 
Campaign for an Independent 
Britain [CIB] 
Labour Against The Euro 
Campaign for a Referendum on 
the European Constitution 
New Europe 
 
Youth For A Free Europe 
Global Britain 
 
New Alliance 
European Research Group 
 
British Democracy Campaign 
European Foundation 
Campaign Against Euro-
Federalism 
No Campaign 
 
 
Anti-Maastricht Alliance 
[AMA] 
 
 
Congress for Democracy 
 
 
Anti-Common Market League  
Freedom Association  
Democracy Movement  
I Want a Referendum  
 
As Table 3.2 shows, there were numerous EPMs which fell into the typology.  
Using this typology emphasises the specific differences that preclude these EPMs from 
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being grouped together as the same.  Firstly elite level EPMs had low public mobilisation 
and no desire to be a mass movement.  Secondly they were founded, led and resourced by 
individuals who operated at the elite level of politics, media, business and therefore 
enjoyed easier access to the political decision-making structure, that typically social 
movements had difficulty in accessing.  This meant that their campaigning was almost 
exclusively based around forming intellectual arguments through research and 
disseminating them to the decision-making elite.  They differed from think tanks in that 
they had clear specific goals and ended once they achieved or failed to achieve these 
goals.  These three points, membership, resources/access to decision-making structure, 
campaign tactics are reversed for grass roots level EPMs.  They desired as many 
members as possible to provide subscription fees and to participate in their direct action 
campaigns.  As ordinary current or former members in either the Conservatives or UKIP, 
they had little access to the political decision-making structure and so they had to engage 
in direct action campaigning to get their arguments into the decision-making process.  
Rather than provide a small narrative on each of the EPMs listed in Table 3.2, two 
in particular will be focused on so the particular characteristics of the elite-level and grass 
roots-level EPMs can be analysed in depth.  These are the elite-level Business for 
Sterling; and the grass-roots level Campaign for a Referendum on the European 
Constitution (Campaign for a Referendum).  Both EPMs exhibited the characteristics of 
social movements in that they were non-office seeking, campaign focused, and civil 
society based groups staffed by activists.  Where they differed was between their focus 
on the party system and on public opinion.   
Clearly different types of individuals mobilised different EPMs, Business for 
Sterling was founded by multi-millionaire businessmen, senior Conservative activists and 
professional campaigners.  Given their background they focused on the area which they 
knew well, the Conservatives and the influential business lobby group the Confederation 
of Business Industry (CBI).  Additionally they were much more focused on policy 
outcome and achieving stated goals, as opposed to engaging with the public and raising 
awareness of the EU issue more generally.
291
  For the Campaign for a Referendum, as 
members of the public or ordinary members of the Conservatives and UKIP, an EPM-
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based campaign to influence the major UK policy makers was not feasible.  Instead, they 
focused their activities on raising public awareness of the EU issue by holding marches, 
conducting postcard campaigns, and letter writing to local newspapers.  Additionally they 
favoured more forms of direct action such as dismantling metric signage and taking court 
cases against local authorities to raise awareness of the illegality of “Brussels imposed” 
metric signage and measurements in the UK.
292
  Grass roots-level EPMs operated 
distinctly outside of the political system.  They were strong critics of the government 
both at local and national level.  They did not seek to change government European 
policy through the means espoused by the elite-level EPMs.  Instead, they sought to 
change it through the only means they saw as legitimate: the will of the British people by 
means of a referendum.  Their policy goal was therefore to force the government to hold 
a referendum on the latest EU treaty.  While both UKIP and the Conservatives put 
forward this same policy, these EPMs did not trust political parties to follow through on 
these promises.  They cited the failures to hold referendums for the 1973 European 
accession, and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty as evidence of this.
293
 
Both types of EPM diverged from their respective political parties due to their 
failure to take perceived adequate action against European integration.  By adequate 
action they meant policies putting forward withdrawal from certain EU policies (or from 
the EU itself) or to hold the Labour government more to account for failing to hold an 
EU-related referendum.  For the leadership of both types of EPM the EU was wholly 
salient and they were more than willing to attack their party over Europe.
294
  They were 
not, however, willing to change their links to the party, because they were aware that the 
EU issue was not salient with the electorate at large.  Removing these links would lead to 
their exit from the public policy arena for elite level EPMs, whilst denying access to 
resources and a wide organisation of members for gass roots level EPMs.  There appears 
to have been a fundamental contradiction in the formation of UK EPMs, in that their 
founders were opposed to the European policies of their parent group and so founded an 
EPM to rectify this, and indeed formally challenge them on this, yet they remained firmly 
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committed to their parent group.  For EPM activists this was no contradiction.  They were 
of the opinion that the party had been led away from its true Eurosceptic position and that 
the pro-EU elements within the party had marginalised them.  An EPM that successfully 
mobilised Eurosceptic elements within the party, they believed, would put pressure on the 
party to take a harder stance on the EU and return to its true Eurosceptic roots.
295
   
 
 
3.7 EPMs at the elite-level: Business for Sterling
296
 
Business for Sterling was founded not just out of disgruntlement with the 
European position of the Conservatives but also with the EU position of the CBI.
297
  
There was a crossover in membership between several supporters and members of the 
Conservative party and the CBI, the most high profile of which was Lord Kalms, CEO of 
retailer DGSi.
298
  In the late 1990s the CBI moved close to the Blair Labour government, 
as it had become sidelined under previous Conservative governments.  The then leader of 
the CBI, Adair Turner (and after him in 2001 Digby Jones) was close to Blair and agreed 
with his policy of bringing the UK into the Euro.
299
  This pro-Euro position was at odds 
with a significant proportion of ordinary members of the CBI, ranging from 40% to 75% 
from 1997-2002, and so a hard core of concerned members decided to form Business for 
Sterling to oppose the CBI’s position on joining the Euro.300  Those individual 
Conservative supporters and members sought to use their influence as members of the 
CBI to convince the business group to lobby government to change its policy on the 
Euro.  However, Turner as chairman was “seen as far too close to both the Labour party 
and the pro-Europeans” and chose to ignore the “protestations of his members” on UK 
membership of the Euro.
301
  With the extra restriction of the Conservative party in 
opposition, those individual Conservative party supporters and members who opposed 
the Euro in Britain were forced to form their own EPM.  Indeed, Business for Sterling 
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officials described the situation as “heated and urgent”, as prominent businessmen 
decided to act and begin an immediate campaign against UK membership of the Euro.
302
 
After the loss of 179 seats in the 1997 general election and their failure to resolve 
divisions over the party’s European policy from the early 1990s the Conservatives were 
an ineffective base from which to prevent UK membership of the Euro.
303
  
With one party in a two-party system holding a Eurosceptic position an anti-EU 
policy was always going to be clearly articulated at the national political level.  It did not 
guarantee however, that this would have any effect on the policy outcome.  The party had 
been engaged in a rebuilding process since the 1997 election.  Expecting it to launch a 
unified, aggressive and successful national campaign against Euro membership was not 
realistic.  The founders of Business for Sterling came to the conclusion that should the 
question of Euro membership be held in a referendum, they were very likely to lose, as it 
would more than likely boil down to a straight choice between the deeply unpopular 
Conservatives and the still popular Labour party and Blair.  Faced with such an 
impossible scenario, their strategic goal was to prevent Euro membership coming to a 
referendum in the first place.  This meant a campaign on two fronts, firstly convincing 
elites within the business, media and political community of the negative consequences 
of UK participation in EMU; and secondly of spreading this opposition towards the Euro 
amongst the general public as well.
304
   
 Going back to the first section, Figure 3.2 shows that 35% of the UK public was 
aware of the importance of the EU issue in the late 1990s.  Figure 3.3 shows that support 
for the EU was at its lowest point of 20% around this same time when Business for 
Sterling was founded.  Targeting public opinion was an obvious strategy for the EPM as 
the issue was salient and the public were at their most negative towards the EU.  But 
despite these figures, the EPM’s worst outcome was the holding of a referendum.  Even 
under conditions of negative public sentiment, Business for Sterling believed that Labour 
could swing a referendum to the pro-EMU side.  This highlights the fragility of UK 
public opinion towards the EU.  Even with historically favourable data, Eurosceptic 
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campaigners were very wary it could be shifted to a pro-EU position by a Labour 
referendum campaign.  Figure 3.1 shows how correct they were in this strategy as the 
Labour pro-Euro policy was decisively favoured by voters in the late 1990s.  Their 
ultimate goal to get a referendum on EMU off the political agenda was based as much on 
the changeable nature of UK public opinion on the EU as it was on the fear of an 
electorally dominant Labour Party winning such a referendum in the same manner as the 
1997 general election. 
From the other case studies it can be seen that EPMs were founded to specifically 
contest European referendums.  This makes Business for Sterling an important case study 
in that it was founded to prevent a referendum in the first place.  EPMs in Ireland and 
Denmark required the presence of referendums for access to the national political 
decision making process, in addition to the mobilising effect of a referendum on 
resources and activists.  Business for Sterling, as an elite EPM whose members were 
extremely well resourced and with access to influential decision-makers in politics and 
business, did not need a referendum to access the national political opportunity structure. 
 Instead they focused on a campaign strategy to win over media, political and 
business elites, and ultimately they hoped public opinion, to the anti-Euro side before any 
referendum was announced.
305
  Their ultimate goal was to create an anti-Euro sentiment 
across the business elites and wider UK public opinion that would discourage the 
government from holding a referendum.  For despite their resources and access to the 
decision-making process, they were a handful of individuals facing the prospect of a 
referendum with an electorate that had voted overwhelming in favour of an ostensibly 
pro-European party.
306
  In this they were successful, as despite an election promise to 
hold a referendum on the Euro before 2000, the Labour government introduced ‘Five 
economic tests’ that needed to be passed for potential membership of the Euro and the 
issue was parked and not dealt with.
307
  Business for Sterling emerged as an example of 
an EPM with large-scale resources and access to elites but without public mobilisation 
that formed successfully to achieve its stated aims.  It shows that abundant resources and 
                                                 
305
 Gray, ‘Waiting for the Starting Signal’, p. 13. 
306
 Interview with Nick Herbert MP, former chief executive of Business for Sterling, 18
th
 May 2008. 
307
 Gray, ‘Waiting for the Starting Signal’, p. 13. 
  
116 
 
access to the elites in the media and party system can negate the need for mass public 
support that a referendum can generate.   
The availability of resources allowed Business for Sterling to exercise 
significantly different tactics from those of other EPMs.  Their tactic was to use technical 
economic and financial reports to back up their arguments of the dangers of Euro 
membership to the UK’s economy and business.   They advertised these arguments in 
newspapers (Daily Telegraph, Financial Times) read by financial, business and 
government workers, in addition to targeted billboard campaigns in specific areas where 
these same groups lived and worked.
308
  Their strategy was that should the public and 
those potentially directly affected by Euro membership be aware of the government’s 
Euro policy and its perceived negative effects, then they would demand an end to it.  To 
achieve these goals they commissioned various economists and finance specialists to 
write reports on the potential damage that membership of the Euro would have on the 
UK’s economy and business.309  They contested public opinion on Europe largely 
through the policy arena and a sympathetic media more than through direct 
campaigning.
310
   
 The leadership of Business for Sterling hired experienced staff from previous 
campaigns related to Conservative issues, the Countryside Alliance and anti-Maastricht 
campaigns, to organise the group.  Where these staff members believe the campaign was 
most successful was in the battle of arguments by economic and finance experts.  The use 
of detailed arguments backed up by respected figures with finance and economics 
backgrounds was meant to show that Business for Sterling was not “amateurish and 
extremist due to the credibility of its contributors”.  Such an approach meant that 
“friendly” newspapers such as the Daily Telegraph, Times and Daily Mail were even 
more receptive to their arguments.
311
  When engaging in debates on radio or television, 
their detailed knowledge of the impact of EMU membership on the finance industry in 
the UK meant that they were taken seriously by the BBC and other media outlets.  This 
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allowed them access to debates with pro-European groups and government ministers in 
national media outlets.   
The staff members persuaded the group’s leadership that the aim of the group 
should not be to directly oppose membership of the EU and rule out any eventual 
membership of the Euro but to cast doubt on the economic and financial benefits of 
membership.  This denied the government and the CBI the opportunity to cast them as 
“Eurosceptic nutters” on a par with UKIP and the Referendum Party.  In turn the pro-
Euro side was forced to debate purely on the economic and financial issues related to the 
EMU in which Business for Sterling was well versed.
312
  The goal for the group was not 
to secure a total and absolute withdrawal of government policy for joining the Euro but to 
“muddy the waters on the benefits of membership” in the minds of city financiers, 
leading economists and business leaders.
313
  With a history of uncertainty towards 
European integration, there needed to be a strong shift in opinion across all aspects of UK 
society towards being wholly in favour of the benefits of EMU before it would join.  The 
prospect of the government forcing the end of Sterling without the unequivocal support 
of business interests and the City, would have made many of their backbenchers wary 
and the media question the policy, leaving open the possibility of a major public 
backlash.
314
  Once the case for the Euro became less clear cut after a period of continuous 
and vocal campaigning in media outlets and amongst business leaders, the government 
pushed the Euro off the agenda, as then Chancellor Brown announced that certain criteria 
would have to be met before the UK would consider joining the Euro.
315
  Business for 
Sterling considered this to be a victory, as EMU membership was off the government 
agenda.   
 The example of Business for Sterling shows how UK elite-level EPMs were 
mobilised by a combination of factors.  While Gray believes that the EPM was purely a 
business lobby group, this fails to take into account the motivation of the founders, who 
were reacting to the inability of the Conservatives to adequately contest the Euro issue, 
and the CBI’s move to a pro-Euro position.  Had the Conservatives been in a position to 
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challenge the government’s and the CBI’s Euro policy, then the founders of Business for 
Sterling would have utilised their close links to the party, as members and donors, to have 
their anti-Euro interests represented effectively at the national political level.  Instead it 
fell to Business for Sterling to campaign against UK membership of the Euro.  The 
specific access point to the policy making process most often used by the founders of 
Business for Sterling was closed off to them, when the Conservatives became wholly 
ineffective after the 1997 election.  This forced those behind Business for Sterling to 
mobilise in civil society to seek a new means to contest the government’s EMU policy.   
Such a development is perfectly logical.  For instance, labour and gender equality social 
movements became absorbed into political parties as social democratic parties rose to 
electoral success. Business for Sterling shows the reverse is also true: when political 
parties’ electoral fortunes decline, social movements emerge from them to contest issues 
through civil society unencumbered by a toxic political brand.  The causal factor of 
formation was the failure of Euroscepticism in the party system to successfully express 
itself to the satisfaction of certain business elites.  Additional factors were the availability 
of extensive resources which allowed for the formation of an EPM with such an 
expansive strategy.  Had those resources not been available, the challenge of competing 
with an organisation of the size, funding and expertise of the CBI, as well as a popular 
new government, would have appeared insurmountable and the EPM might not have 
mobilised in the first place.  Finally, the openness of the UK media to criticism of 
European integration meant that the founders of Business for Sterling knew that 
influential newspapers such as the Times, Daily Telegraph and Daily Mail would cover 
their press releases and arguments.    
 
 
3.8 EPMs at the grass roots level: Campaign for a Referendum on the European 
Constitution 
 If Business for Sterling was an elite-level EPM then the Campaign for a 
Referendum was most certainly a grass roots-level EPM.  Campaign for a Referendum 
was highly typical of the multitude of fragmented regionalised EPMs referred to by 
Usherwood,
316
 Gray
317
 and Howarth
318
.  What is missing from these academic analyses of 
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such groups is that they did not operate as stand-alone groups.  The members of the 
Campaign for a Referendum interviewed were active in the Conservative party and 
UKIP.  Again this challenges the assumption of this study that high levels of 
Euroscepticism in the party system will negate the need for mobilisation of EPMs.  With 
both hard and soft Euroscepticism represented in the party system there was therefore 
little incentive for EPMs to be formed, given the articulation of Euroscepticism at the 
national political level.  Yet the most striking feature of Table 3.2 was the sheer number 
of local level EPMs.  From studying Campaign for a Referendum, interviews with 
various activists and analysing Eurosceptic magazines and other publications a general 
pattern emerged of involvement in EPMs coexisting with membership of either UKIP or 
the Conservatives.  From the Business for Sterling example it was shown that perceived 
failings in the ability of the Conservatives to challenge a pro-Euro government mobilised 
the EPM.  As will be shown, it was the desire to engage in social movement based 
Eurosceptic actions and a distrustful attitude toward the political system that drove party 
members to form Campaign for a Referendum.  The EPM followed along a more 
classical line of social movement mobilisation, as articulated by Tarrow, in that it was a 
grass-roots movement and used protest techniques like marches and letter-writing 
campaigns.
319
  Their issue of formation moved from direct contestation on Europe to the 
holding of a referendum on the Constitutional/Lisbon Treaty.  As with the Referendum 
Party, it sought to channel their Eurosceptic activities into a democratic campaign to 
broaden their support and success in achieving a tangible goal: a referendum on the 
EU.
320
 
Members of the Conservative Party and UKIP saw no contradiction between their 
involvement in Campaign for a Referendum and their political party work.  This was 
because they saw the two operating at different levels through different means for the 
same goal.  The division for these activists is between a Eurosceptic political party that 
campaigns at the elite political level and an EPM that uses direct campaigning at the local 
grass roots political level.  As much as these EPMs mobilised Eurosceptic opposition and 
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campaigned against European integration, they also acted as a faction for the membership 
of their local UKIP/Conservative organisation.  As part of a pattern seen throughout this 
study, the passing of the Treaty of Maastricht acted as an important mobilising agent.  
Successive treaties led the members who went on to found the Campaign for a 
Referendum to join UKIP in the late 1990s.
321
  These individuals placed a high salience 
on the European issue and UKIP was an obvious political outlet for their opinions on the 
EU.  Other members who were active Conservatives became involved in wider 
Eurosceptic circles after the passing of Maastricht.
322
  The schism in the Conservative 
Party created by Maastricht was obvious in the parliamentary party, it was no great 
surprise then that this division would also have consequences at the grass-roots party 
level.  Given that a Conservative government had passed the Treaty that established a 
European Union, they believed that it could not be trusted on the European issue again.  
Links were still maintained to UKIP and the Conservatives as they were of the belief that 
they could be turned to their side of the argument, due to a feeling of strong attachment to 
the party on issues such as immigration and economic policy.  Given the European 
issue’s lack of salience amongst the public, complete withdrawal from a political party 
would have prevented Campaign for a Referendum members from involvement in the 
political system on other policies important to them; notably immigration, social welfare 
reform, taxation and government spending.  Retaining membership and activity in UKIP 
and the Conservatives allowed access to basic resources but, more importantly, 
ideologically minded activists from whom support for their organisation could be drawn 
to lobby for a more Eurosceptic position within the party.
323
 
Della Porta
324
 and Tarrow
325
, amongst many others, have shown that protest 
groups emerge from civil society at times of distrust of the political system.  When such 
distrust is at its height public sentiment that typically finds its expression in the policies 
of opposition parties is diverted to organically formed groups.  What the example of 
Campaign for a Referendum shows is that such distrust can form around a particular 
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issue, in this case Europe.  The failure of political parties to follow through on promises 
to hold a referendum on Europe, coupled with the gradual removal of Europe from the 
political discussion, was the focus of this distrust between individual members of the 
public and the political system.  This breakdown of trust, not just over the EU issue but 
more the failure to hold a referendum, led to the mobilisation of the social movement.   
Campaign for a Referendum engaged in classical grass roots protest movement 
contestation.  They wrote letters to local newspapers as they believed they had a better 
chance of receiving coverage there than in the national media.  After the Lisbon Treaty 
was passed in parliament, they held a fake funeral procession to Harlow, Essex, town hall 
to symbolise the ‘death’ of the UK constitution.326  They did collaborate at a national 
level, however, with the I Want a Referendum EPM.  This EPM used the activists of 
local-level EPMs such as Campaign for a Referendum, to organise regional campaigns on 
its main issue of demanding a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, or the revised 
Constitutional treaty as they referred to it, before culminating in high-profile national 
media covered protests in Westminster and Brussels.
327
  The prospect of participation in a 
professionally run national campaign with high media exposure towards a common non-
ideological goal was most welcome to them and they lent their support to the 
campaign.
328
 
As the name suggests, the raison d’être of Campaign for a Referendum was to 
force the government to hold a referendum on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe (TCE), since that particular treaty ended the EPMs focus on the Lisbon Treaty.  A 
referendum was the focus of their campaign (and also obviously that of I Want a 
Referendum) as they believed that only a plebiscite could decide the UK’s EU policy, 
given the lack of legitimacy of the political system.  This lack of legitimacy stemmed 
from the Conservatives’ active participation in European integration and failure to 
reverse the influence of EU law in the UK.  Even UKIP were perceived as being too 
“close to the system” as they became embroiled in a series of financial scandals with their 
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EP expenses and relentless party infighting
329
.  With the UK holding only one European 
referendum in 1975 and none in the post-Maastricht period, despite an electoral promise 
by Labour and a personal guarantee from Conservative leader David Cameron to hold 
referendums on the Euro and the Lisbon Treaty respectively, the holding of a referendum 
has allowed EPMs to put forward legitimate arguments about a lack of democracy over 
the UK’s EU policy.  Conscious that left wing voters held similar distrusting views of 
European integration, an EPM based around demanding a referendum held a broad 
appeal across ideologies as a unifying positive issue.
330
   
Although Usherwood and Gray were dismissive of them, grass-roots EPMs had a 
distinctive role in the UK-EU relationship.  They represented a ready-made, widely 
diffused No campaign to contest any potential future EU referendum in the UK.  As such, 
their presence, continuous activity and ability to attract cross-party support was most 
certainly noted by the government and pro-European groups in their considerations for 
holding a referendum.
331
  Grass-roots EPMs were highly motivated activists who 
campaigned against any element of European integration they deemed oppressive in their 
own locality.  This may not have affected national policy debates on the UK’s future 
relationship with the EU.  It did, however, prevent local government from instituting 
specific policies, mostly related to EU symbolism, such as EU flags on government 
buildings, metric signage and measurements on official local authority publications and 
material, and even preventing EU flags on car registration plates.
332
  
Campaign for a Referendum was mobilised despite its founders’ membership and 
work with political parties as, very similarly to Business for Sterling, they felt that their 
parties were ineffectual in contesting the ratification of EU treaties.  For them, the parties 
were too involved in the political system to be taking effective direct action against UK 
membership of the EU.
333
  The core belief of the group became that the “political process 
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is illegitimate” and that there was a huge need to “engage ordinary people” on the impact 
of European integration on UK sovereignty.
334
  Feeding into this, they believed that 
political parties and the media denied ordinary voters access to information on how 
European integration actually worked and how it negatively affected them.   
Using the Koopmans-Duyvendak model to analyse Campaign for a Referendum, 
it can be seen that they were successful in issue framing and this contributed toward their 
sustained campaigning.
335
  While they had modest success at the local level in contesting 
the introduction of EU symbols and metric signage, the closed nature of the UK policy 
making process meant that they were ineffective at the national level.   
 
 
Section Three: Evaluation of the Explanatory Factors 
 
EF1: The more pro-European the media are, the more likely that EPMs will form.   
 There was a difference between the elite and grass-roots EPMs as regards 
relations with the media.  Elite EPMs saw certain sections of the media as being open to 
their arguments and supportive of their campaigns.  They were sceptical that the BBC 
was impartial but they accepted that to be taken seriously by the BBC and the financial 
press they had to put forward well-researched arguments.  The right-wing press were 
accommodative of their press releases and opinion articles, as they were perceived to be 
‘on the same side’.  As the founders of Business for Sterling were major advertisers in, 
and personal acquaintances of, the right-wing press editors and owners, they were treated 
as experts in the impact of European integration on the UK.  Grass-roots EPMs believed 
that the entirety of the mainstream media was inherently biased against them.  They 
based this on the fact that withdrawal was not put forward as a legitimate policy goal for 
the UK government.  Instead they focused on local media through letter-writing 
campaigns and local protests because it is much easier to access.   Elite EPMs had a very 
good relationship with the national print media and so the fact that the media was 
relatively anti-European enabled them in their formation.  Grass roots EPMs, on the 
other hand, firmly believed that the media was pro-European and so formed to contest 
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media coverage of European integration and educate the public as to what they believed 
was the reality of UK membership of the EU.   
 
EF2: The lower the level of Euroscepticism in the party system, the more likely that 
EPMs will form.   
 In contrast to the other case studies, a high level of Euroscepticism in the party 
system did not dampen the mobilisation effect of EPMs in the UK.  The presence of 
Eurosceptic parties in fact played a role in EPM formation.  This appears contradictory, 
given that hard and soft Euroscepticism are clearly represented in two electorally 
successful political parties.  What the examples of Business for Sterling and Campaign 
for a Referendum show is that it is not so much the presence of Euroscepticism in the 
party system but the perception of the success of party-based Euroscepticism in 
contesting European integration that had an effect on EPM formation.  Members of both 
EPMs were convinced of the Eurosceptic bona fides of the Conservatives and UKIP but 
were less convinced of their ability to successful challenge what they perceived as a pro-
EU government and win a referendum on European integration. 
 
 
EF3: The more referendums on European issues, the more likely that EPMs will 
form.   
 The lack of referendums in the UK should have significantly limited the access of 
EPMs to the political opportunity structure, in turn reducing their ability to mobilise and 
their overall numbers.  The mobilising issue of a referendum to organise around has been 
shown to be vital in the other case studies.  In the UK the mobilising issue has become 
the campaign to hold a referendum in the first place as with Campaign for a Referendum.  
The one issue that motivated EPMs more than opposition to European integration was the 
fact that the public had not been given a vote on European integration since 1975.  
Contrary to this, Business for Sterling showed that EPMs could be mobilised to prevent a 
referendum where there was a strong chance it would be won by the pro-EU side.  The 
collective understanding of the role of referendums in mobilising social movements 
needs to be re-examined in the light of this evidence as a campaign to hold a referendum 
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has an important a mobilising effect as a campaign to defeat/win one does.  The activities 
of both EPMs followed on from that of the apparently forgotten Referendum Party of the 
mid- to late-1990s, showing the long term centrality of referendums to the UK 
relationship with Europe. 
 
EF4: The more open the policy process (including institutional factors such as the 
electoral system), the more likely that EPMs will form. 
 The first past the post electoral system did appear to play a significant role in the 
formation of EPMs.  Taken in conjunction with the rigidity of the two party system 
discussed above, Eurosceptic factions in political parties were reluctant to split and form 
their own party, as the electoral and party systems would make election almost 
impossible.  Forming an EPM allowed them to remain within the party and access the 
policy-making process while also putting forward Eurosceptic arguments.  The 
concentration of power over the holding of a referendum as the ultimate decision of a few 
key individuals (Blair, Brown, Cameron) and not as an explicit norm in the political 
system was also a factor of formation for EPMs.  Ordinary and elected members of 
political parties believed that they could not influence party leaderships over the holding 
of referendums (as they could in Denmark) and so they formed EPMs to place outside 
pressure on party leaders over the EU issue.  The closed nature of the UK political system 
and the linking of European referendums to the decision of individual politicians, meant 
that EPMs emerged as the only means of contesting the EU even to insiders in the UK 
political system.  
 
 
EF5: The more available are state and/or private resources, the more likely that 
EPMs will form. 
 For Business for Sterling resources were vital.  The EPM was set up by wealthy 
donors to the Conservatives with the specific goal of affecting elite level public opinion 
through specific means (advertising, media launches, newspaper opinion writing).  This 
was only possible due to the resources at their disposal.  Once the goal was achieved, the 
resources were pulled and the EPM dissolved.  Due to the sheer amount of resources at 
their disposal, Business for Sterling appears as something most original, an elite level 
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social movement.  Social movements almost universally rely on the power of large scale 
collective action in the form of human resources to affect policy change, as they 
generally lack financial resources.  Significant financial resources allowed Business for 
Sterling to execute a campaign strategy focused on influencing elite level opinion through 
the use of expensive advertising and media campaigns, not through the sheer number of 
people it could mobilise.  As with Libertas in Ireland, they were a rarity as regards the 
importance of financial resources in their formation.  The norm in the social movement 
literature is for financial resources to be second in importance to formation behind human 
and organizational resources.  Typically once the human and organisational capacity is 
present in a successful movement, then the financial resources follow.  The reverse was 
the case for Business for Sterling where financial resources came first and other resources 
followed.  Campaign for a Referendum on the other hand was not influenced in their 
formation by the availability of resources.  The role of resources in its formation was 
typical of social movements in that they relied on the human and organizational resources 
of its members as a key driver of formation.  
 
3.9 Main Conclusions from the UK Case 
One of the most salient points to emerge from this analysis of EPM formation in 
the UK has been that high levels of Euroscepticsm in the party system did not decrease 
the presence or number of EPMs.  The assumption that a party system with a 
withdrawalist party and a large and successful mainstream Eurosceptic party would 
attract all Eurosceptic support and activity has proven to be greatly mistaken.  The reason 
for this appears to be the desire of party leaderships to avoid conflict on Europe with 
ordinary party members.  Ordinary party members then went on to form EPMs to 
galvanise the large amount of Eurosceptic public opinion behind their anti-EU arguments 
and force the party leadership to take a more explicitly EU-critical position.  This was 
most evident with the Conservatives and to a lesser extent with Labour.  UKIP members 
also formed EPMs, as despite the party’s hard Eurosceptic policy stance, there was a 
belief that more direct action against UK participation in European integration was 
needed.  Failure to advance the UKIP Eurosceptic policy at the national level was blamed 
on the party leadership becoming too ‘Europeanised’ through their participation in the 
European Parliament. 
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Referendums became a key issue of EPM contestation beside that of EU policies 
and treaties despite their non-presence in the UK political system.  Even though there was 
only one referendum on the EU in the UK, referendums were central to the UK-EU 
debate and the source of contestation from the late 1990s to 2010.  Referendums acted as 
a factor of formation for EPMs, not so much for their presence but for the campaign to 
have them held or to prevent them from being held in the first place.  Such a situation 
was present in the political system as well, where the Conservatives and Labour were in 
conflict over the holding of a referendum in 2006 on the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, with the Conservatives in turn coming under criticism for not 
coming good on their promise to hold a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty once they 
acceded to government in May 2010.  Despite the presence of just one in 1975, 
referendums have been central to the EU debate in the UK and their importance to the 
formation of EPMs reflects this.   
The public opinion data discussed on the UK and Europe has shown that the low 
salience of the EU amongst the UK public has led to a default position of opposition to 
membership that was present at the start of UK involvement in European integration.  
Following on from the analysis of the party system it was shown that the EU was moved 
to the political sidelines as an issue in the UK as the two major parties came to a delicate 
consensus on EU policy.  The negative public position towards European integration was 
exacerbated by the repeated failure of the two main political parties to follow through on 
promises to hold a referendum.  Public support for EPM formation becomes apparent in 
such an environment.  A high level of negative sentiment towards EU membership, added 
to the failure of the political system to deal with these attitudes, was a key driver of EPM 
formation in the UK.  The EU was not a salient issue so there was little benefit in 
political parties focusing on it.   
The UK case challenges this study’s propositions not only as regards the presence 
of Euroscepticism in the party system but also in relation to the media.  The UK print 
media has been shown to have developed a strong editorial anti-EU bias in contrast to 
other long established member states.  For EPM activists the presence of Eurosceptic 
arguments in the national media did not discouraged them from mobilising.  On the 
contrary the perceived ‘soft Euroscepticism’ of the print media in criticising certain EU 
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policies and not openly advocating withdrawal, meant that they were lumped in with such 
purported august pro-EU media outlets as the BBC by certain EPM activists.  The desire 
to inform the public of their interpretation of the negative consequences of European 
integration outside of the mainstream media acted as a factor of formation for EPMs.  
This unhappiness with UK media EU coverage was symptomatic of the depth of 
opposition to the EU held by certain EPMs, and how hard it was compared to that of the 
media and political parties.  For the Business for Sterling EPM a Eurosceptic media was a 
positive boon to their activities, as it ensured that their articles and press releases received 
positive coverage and space in national media.  Their level of resources strongly 
differentiated them from the findings from the other case studies, where EPMs were 
mobilised almost wholly regardless of the level of resources.  The amount of resources 
available to them was considerable as they became the civil society proxy for the 
Conservative party, as rich financiers and retailers who stood to lose significantly from 
Euro membership resourced the EPM.  Business for Sterling emerges in an original form 
as an elite-level social movement.  A protest movement is typically a grass roots level 
campaign of ordinary individuals, Business for Sterling was not a think tank or a party 
faction but a protest movement that displayed all the characteristics of one, except for its 
small membership being made up of the wealthy and well connected.   
George referred to the UK as a “Eurosceptic state” in all its facets, from the 
opinion of the public, to the policies of the political parties, the actions of the institutions 
of state to the pervasive anti-EU sentiment in UK history and culture.  Academic analyses 
of the UK political system and Europe reinforced this perception, largely through the 
evidence of low support for membership from Eurobarometer data and electoral data 
showing strong support for parties with an anti-EU position.  What this case study has 
shown is that while the UK indeed appeared to be an archetypal “Eurosceptic state”, 
incorporating a more nuanced view of UK public opinion and the party system shows that 
the wider historical perspective was of a state consistent in its uncertainty towards 
European integration.  The UK public at only very specific times for fleeting moments 
were positively disposed towards the EU.  Incapable of resolving popular negativity 
towards EU membership and the practical necessity of it for the state, the UK party 
system chose to avoid the EU issue.  To describe the UK state as Eurosceptic would be to 
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ascribe a concerted effort on behalf of the state to undermine the process of European 
integration.  A more accurate description would be that while the major UK political 
parties came to an uneasy truce with European integration, many of its citizens did not, 
and they campaigned for their own vision of a Eurosceptic state through the myriad of 
EPMs they formed.   
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Chapter 4: The Estonian Case 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Estonia was the only Eastern European and new member state case study 
undertaken for this research.  Only a handful of previous studies have attempted to 
formulate general hypotheses about Euroscepticism in both East and West, new and old 
member states and most certainly not about civil society based Euroscepticism.
336
  
Examining the development of EPMs in Estonia not only highlighted the different factors 
stimulating Euroscepticism in Eastern Europe as opposed to those in the West, it also 
allowed an analysis of civil society development there in comparison to the highly 
developed nature of civil society in Western Europe to be made.  It is a generally 
accepted argument in studies of the former communist states that civil society is weak in 
the post-Soviet space.
337
  Only the most cursory of analyses have been made into social 
movement formation in Estonia.  Thus far there has been a relatively ephemeral 
formation on ecology and minority rights.
338
  To understand if the EU was a more 
powerful issue of formation than these issues, which are typical of social movement 
formation across the literature, this chapter is divided into three sections.  The first 
section provides extensive analysis of the Estonian party system, a timeline of Estonia – 
EU relations, levels of support for EU membership amongst the Estonian public, before 
going on to highlight key ‘outside’ issues surrounding Estonian relations with the EU and 
the accession referendum itself.  The second section focuses on EPMs and how they 
became the main proponents of Euroscepticism in Estonia.  It also discusses the issue of 
Ethnic Russian Euroscepticism specifically, as analysing this group’s failure to mobilise 
against EU accession contributes to broader research on ethnic minority support for the 
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EU.  Finally, the explanatory factors are used to investigate whether Eurosceptic 
mobilisation in Estonia follows a similar pattern to that suggested in the Eurosceptic and 
social movements literature or if its history as a former Soviet state has caused 
Euroscepticism there to take its own distinctive path.  
 
First Section: Overview of Estonian Politics and EU Relations 
 
4.2 The Estonian Party System and Europe 
To understand the post-Soviet Estonian party system, three key points need to be 
emphasised.
339
  Firstly, post-independence Estonian politics has seen the dominance of 
right-wing parties over the left.  Not until the election of 2001 was a party with any left 
leanings in government. Even in that case the largest winner in the election, the neo-
liberal Reform Party, dominated the government agenda to such an extent that it forced 
the exit of the left-leaning Centre Party in under two years.  The result of this right-wing 
domination of government during the nascent state’s early years has been that liberal 
policies became institutionalised as the de facto Estonian government position.  
Additionally, the electoral and government dominance of right-wing parties left Estonia 
initially with no relevant social democratic party and no parliamentary reformed 
communist party.  The Communist successor Social Democratic and Labour Party 
(SDLP) made a breakthrough of six seats in the 1999 general elections but failed to win 
any in the 2002 elections and subsequent elections.  In 2004 the Moderate party 
rebranded itself as the Estonian Social Democratic Party and had some degree of 
electoral success but its left policies were more focused on social issues, as it subscribed 
to liberal economic policies.
340
  This absence of an effective national left political party 
makes Estonia exceptional in Eastern European terms.
341
   
Secondly, all the main political parties have been part of government during the 
EU membership negotiation process.  While the party names have changed, elected 
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officials and indeed even the majority of members have stayed the same.  Only the 
Greens out of all the Parliamentary parties up to the 2011 parliamentary election failed to 
hold office.  While the Estonian party system was most certainly dynamic in terms of 
electoral volatility, its defining characteristic was more of consensus politics.
342
  Parties 
that had diametrically opposed policies on issues such as Europe and clashing leadership 
personalities, added up the numbers of seats, put their differences aside, and formed 
governments.  The case in point was that of the 2001-2 government of Savisaar and 
Kallas where, despite the former being centrist and ambivalent on Europe and the latter 
neo-liberal and strongly pro-Europe, both agreed with the EU negotiation policy of 
previous governments.  As Sitter has shown, Euroscepticism is a government/opposition 
dynamic.
343
  In the Estonian case each party had experience, or its members had 
experience, of government or were being considered for government at the next election.   
Thus, the particular dynamics of Estonian coalition formation had a dampening effect on 
the use of Euroscepticism by opposition political parties as a policy platform to attack the 
government.  It was difficult for Savisaar and the Centre Party to come out formally for a 
No vote in the accession referendum, despite their supporters perceiving themselves as 
those with most to lose from accession, as they had been part of a government that had 
advanced the EU negotiations significantly.
344
 
Finally, the third general point about the Estonian Party system was that extremist and 
ethnic parties failed to succeed electorally in Estonia.  Their share of the vote fell in 
successive elections from 15% in 1993 to 0.9% in 2011.
345
  This was largely the result of 
mainstream parties successfully broadening their appeal to ethnic Russians and the swift 
conclusion to the independence question which prevented the rise of national extremists.   
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4.3 A Timeline of Estonia-EU Relations 
Mikkel and Kasekamp outline a timeline of Estonian-EU relations around four 
key periods.
346
  The first period from 1991 to 1995 they label Decommunisation, whereby 
the political establishment was focused on reorientating the country away from the 
Soviet/Russian sphere towards a European sphere of influence.  This did not specifically 
mean attempting to gain membership of just the EU but also any international body such 
as NATO, the Council of Europe, and the United Nations, that would take the country in 
a Western direction.  This move was part of a dramatic shift in Estonia which saw the 
national economy, politics and society move in a liberal direction, reinforced by the 
electoral victories of right-wing parties, and the search for post-independence 
international recognition.
347
 
The second period they refer to is that of Euro-enthusiasm: 1995-1998.  In this 
period two factors placed considerable pressure on Estonia to speed up the accession 
process.  Firstly its two main trading partners, Sweden and Finland, joined the EU, thus 
leaving Estonia separated from them by the Single Market.  Post-communist Estonia  had 
sought to create a new identity for itself as part of the Nordic group of nations based on 
geography, history and some shared cultural heritage.
348
  For two of its Nordic ‘brethren’ 
to join the EU meant that Estonia had to follow in their footsteps as well lest it fall too far 
behind and be labelled as too ‘backward’ to join the Western, rich and now Nordic EU.  
The other issue was the announcement by the Foreign Minister that NATO membership 
negotiations were progressing much more slowly than previously thought, with the result 
that Estonia would not be a member for the foreseeable future.  The government decided 
that the country’s immediate security could be best pursued through the EU if the NATO 
option was not forthcoming.  They communicated this belief in the need for EU accession 
to guarantee NATO membership and thus the long-term national security of Estonia to 
the Estonian public.
349
   
The third period of Estonian-EU relations is labelled as Euroscepticism: 1999-
2002.  From the previous section on the Estonian party system it was shown that all the 
                                                 
346
 Mikkel and Kasekamp, ‘Emerging Party Based Euroscepticism in Estonia’, pp. 295 – 313. 
347
 Ibid, p. 298. 
348
 Ibid, pp. 299-300. 
349
 Interview with Prof. Anders Kasekamp, Professor of International Relations University of Tartu, 
Director of  the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, 11
th
 October, 2008. 
  
134 
 
main parties had spent time in government and come to a common position on the 
necessity of EU membership for the country.  This common position was based on the 
generally held view of the government’s need to play catch-up on the first round of 
accession states by adopting a strategy of integrating all the acquis communautaire 
without negotiating opt outs or concessions which would delay the process.
350
  The 
government believed that working towards being “the best European in the accession 
class”351 would ensure membership and address all the concerns that had driven the 
membership application in the first place.  At the same time, however, there was a 
growing perception amongst the political elite that the public was growing distant from 
the whole process of Estonian accession and so a common position on the need for 
holding a referendum was reached by the main political parties.
352
  This, however, did not 
placate an Estonian public that grew outraged with the real impacts of the accession 
process.  The first indication of this latent distrust of the accession process was when the 
European Commission confirmed that new member state farmers would initially receive 
only 25% of the levels of subsidies given to their Western counterparts.  The “Sugar 
Crises of 2001” appeared to confirm the worst suspicions of farmers when EU-produced 
sugar was dumped on the Estonian market, collapsing the price of sugar for Estonian 
farmers.  Compounding this, the Estonian government was fined for allowing 
overproduction of sugar beyond the quotas allowed by the EU negotiations.
353
  Despite 
all these developments, the Estonian government continued with the same EU negotiation 
policy of total application of the acquis communautaire.  This was due to the European 
Commission announcing that Latvia and Lithuania had advanced quickly in accession 
negotiations and would be considered for membership in the next round of enlargement.  
The Estonian government saw its imperative as completing accession negotiations at all 
costs lest it be “left behind” not only by the Nordic states, but also by its Baltic 
neighbours.  The level of Euroscepticism was dampened somewhat by the election in 
2001 of the Centre Party into government and of Arnold Rüütel of the People’s Union to 
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the Presidency.  Both represented the supposed “losers” of European integration, the 
urban and rural poor respectively.  The Centre Party’s and Rüütel’s acceptance of the 
previous administration’s EU negotiation policy was key to taking public opinion back in 
favour of accession and reducing the fallout from the CAP implementation policies.
354
   
The fourth and final period is described as the Realisation of EU membership: 
2002–Present Day.  The 2003 general election saw government parties slightly increasing 
their share of the vote for the first time since independence and pro-EU or EU neutral 
parties taking all the seats in Parliament.  This was widely interpreted as a public 
validation of the government’s EU negotiation policy.355  The accession referendum on 
14
 
September 2003 produced a resounding 66.83% to 33.17% vote in favour of 
membership on a turnout of 64.06%.  The strength of the Yes vote and the relatively high 
turnout have been attributed to the almost unanimous call for a Yes vote from the 
political, social, cultural and economic establishment.
356
  Despite this level of support for 
EU accession, however, the government did not hold a referendum on membership of the 
Euro, as Prime Minister Andrus Ansip stated there was a general political consensus in 
the Riigikogu in favour of membership (Estonia formally joined the Eurozone on January 
1
st
 2011).
357
 
The main conclusion from the Estonian EU accession process was that, while it 
was characterised by a certain degree of political consensus in its favour, it was 
ultimately a political elite driven process from the beginning.  This had the effect of 
alienating voters from the accession process, leaving them unaware and uninformed of 
the development of Estonia’s integration into the EU.  In such a situation the space for 
EPM formation was obvious and its role in the elite driven accession process will be 
discussed in the next section.  The situation whereby the Estonian public had a negative 
position on EU membership while the political parties had a pro-membership position or 
acquiesced on it, caused tremendous uncertainty as to the outcome of the referendum vote 
right until the final week of campaigning.  The reasons for these frequent and dramatic 
shifts in public opinion on EU membership will be discussed next.   
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4.4 Estonian Public Support for EU Accession 
To fully appreciate the complex nature of Estonian public support for EU 
accession, Estonian public support for accession is contrasted to that of its neighbour 
Latvia: Figures 4.1 and 4.2.  A cursory analysis of the two tables shows the fluctuating 
nature of Estonian support for EU membership against the contrast of Latvian support 
where both sides were constant until the referendum itself.  The standard deviation of 
Estonian public support for accession shows it to have been over two times that of 
Latvia’s:  at 6.3 to 2.7 showing the high rate of variance in Estonian public support for 
EU accession in the run up to the referendum. 
 
 Figure 4.1: Support for EU accession in Estonia 
 
Pettai, Vello (2005) ‘Unfounded worries?: Euroscepticism prior to the referendum’ in 
Piret Ehin and Vello Pattai (eds.) Choosing Europe: The EU Referendum in Estonia, 
Tartu: University of Tartu Press, p. 46. 
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Figure 4.2: Support for EU accession in Latvia 
 
Pettai, Vello (2005) ‘Unfounded worries?: Euroscepticism prior to the referendum’ in 
Piret Ehin and Vello Pattai (eds.) Choosing Europe: The EU Referendum in Estonia, 
Tartu: University of Tartu Press, p. 47. 
 
 
 
 
The two clear trends from this data are firstly that support for EU membership 
fluctuated significantly in Estonia and secondly that on average 40% of the population 
were against membership throughout the three year period covered by the data in Figure 
4.1.  In relation to the first point the Estonian public was strongly influenced by both 
unfurling events and elite cues.  Many Estonians were wary of participation in European 
integration and a series of problems stemming from the application of the acquis 
communautaire reinforced this suspicion.
358
  The public were indignant about the ‘sugar 
crises’ of 2001, and the reduction in CAP payments to Estonian farmers compared to 
their Western counterparts.   
This situation had changed completely by late 2001 when Estonia won the Eurovision 
song contest.  While the contest had nothing to do with the EU, it symbolised for 
Estonians that they were appreciated by the rest of Europe at what was the nation’s most 
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popular cultural outlet.
359
  The sentiment appeared to be that if Estonia can beat the big 
nations at the Eurovision, Estonia will be able to “punch above its weight” as an EU 
member.  The Eurovision victory was followed by the surprise political changes of the 
agrarian People’s Union Party candidate, Arnold Rüütel, winning the Presidential 
election and the Centre Party forming a new coalition government with their right-wing 
adversaries the Reform Party.   With Rüütel getting most of his support from the farming 
community and the Centre Party the urban poor, the supposed ‘losers’ of EU membership 
had their political representatives in senior positions in government and so trusted them 
to manage the accession process on their behalf.  The new President in particular adopted 
a strong pro-EU stance, bringing many Eurosceptic and undecided rural voters to the Yes 
side.
360
  The ultimate passing of the accession Treaty with a 67% Yes vote, and the 
continued growth in support of EU membership as Figure 4.3 shows, can be attributed to 
a combination of these various factors and not to any single event. 
 
Figure 4.3 Generally speaking do you think that Estonia's membership of the EU is a ... ? 
 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer No. 54 – No. 74. 
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An additional point on the volatility of Estonian public opinion on Europe was the 
failure of the government to educate the public on the EU, as Figure 4.4 shows.  Before 
accession Estonian voters considered themselves to have very little knowledge of the EU, 
and they were ranked as the least knowledgeable about EU affairs out of all the accession 
states.   
 
 
Figure 4.4: Respondents who reported an EU knowledge level of only 1-4 on a series of 
10 
 
Pettai, ‘Unfounded worries?’, p. 49. 
 
 
The lack of knowledge of even the most basic facts about the EU, as shown in 
Figure 4.4, made it difficult for Estonians to form concrete opinions on EU membership, 
thus leaving them more susceptible to political elite cues and events at an EU and indeed 
European level in the case of the Eurovision.  The dramatic undulations in support for 
accession were partly explained by events at the national level.  However, the effect of 
the fundamental lack of awareness of all things EU was to magnify the impact of various 
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Estonian political and EU related events on public support for membership.  Additionally 
this low level of EU knowledge explains the discrepancy between public Euroscepticism 
and political pro-Europeanism in that an EU-ignorant public opposed what they did not 
understand and an executive experienced political class accepted what they believed to 
have been a national imperative.  For EPMs this meant that a large segment of the 
Estonian public were open to the arguments of EPMs in their negative attitude to 
European integration.  As will be highlighted in the next section, the formation of 
Estonian EPMs was driven in part by a desire to educate the public to the reality of what 
Estonia was giving up in the accession process, both in terms of national sovereignty and 
economic policy.   
 
4.5 An Overview of Estonian–EU relations: the geopolitical ‘silent debate’ 
The strength and consistency of Estonian political elite support for EU 
membership was fundamentally different in comparison to the other case studies.  This 
difference can be explicitly linked to the fundamentally different geopolitical context of 
Estonian–EU relations.  The most obvious difference was that Estonia was absorbed into 
the Soviet Union for forty-six years, only emerging as an independent country again in 
1991.
361
  It is this legacy of Soviet domination that is crucial to understanding the specific 
nature of Estonian–EU relations.  The UK joined for economic reasons, while Ireland and 
Denmark joined because their largest export market was the UK and they had to accede 
to the EU for economic necessity.  The economic rationale for joining was not the 
primary driver behind the Estonian application to join.  Geopolitical security 
considerations were the most pressing issue pushing the Estonian government to begin 
negotiations to join the EU.
362
 
Estonia was not amongst the first former communist states to join NATO, as the 
organisation felt that a move to expand into a country on the Russian border that was 
until a few years before part of the Soviet Union, would create unnecessary tension with 
Russia.  Successive Estonian governments throughout the 1990s and the President, 
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Lennart Meri, held the very strong opinion that the number one issue affecting the state 
was security.  With NATO membership indefinitely stalled, EU membership was seen as 
the next best thing.  If the ‘hard’ security of NATO could not be achieved, then the ‘soft’ 
security of the EU was the next best policy that could be realistically achieved.
363
  
Preoccupation with NATO membership however, resulted in Estonia being left somewhat 
behind in the accession application to the EU compared to other Eastern European states, 
such as Poland and Hungary, who had already signed ‘Europe Agreements’ (they 
constituted a legal framework for the implementation of the accession process) in 1991 
which took Estonia until 1995 to sign.  This created an intolerable situation for the 
government and politicians whereby their geopolitical status was as unsure in 1998 as it 
was in 1991, with neither NATO nor EU membership guaranteed and with other Eastern 
European states well on the road to NATO or EU membership or both.  Falling behind 
the other Eastern European states in the NATO and EU accession processes combined 
with the dramatic economic collapse of its largest trading partner, Russia in 1998, led the 
government to aggressively seek EU membership.  The belief was that membership of the 
EU would strengthen the case for Estonia’s number one foreign policy objective of 
accession to NATO.
364
  Indeed Estonia joined NATO in March 2004 and the EU in May 
2004, linking the two in the minds of the public. 
What is perhaps even more interesting to note about the geopolitical nature of the 
Estonian debate on the EU, is that it was held mostly within the political elite.  There was 
a general consensus amongst pro-European and Eurosceptic activists that while the geo-
political issues discussed above were never explicitly debated in public, there was a 
common understanding in the public that they were in the background throughout the EU 
accession referendum.  Only at the end of the campaign when a Yes vote was somewhat 
in doubt did the government make stronger analogies on the implications of a No vote on 
potential NATO membership and a return to Russian domination.
365
  This ‘silent debate’ 
looms behind the material discussed in the rest of this section.   
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The supposed hidden dominance of geopolitical factors did provide something of 
a riposte to Franklin’s argument that European referendums and elections are ‘second 
order’ and reflect domestic concerns.366  The previous case studies of Ireland and the UK 
showed that domestic factors are key drivers of electoral support or rejection of European 
integration.  The Estonian case was an example of where the public ignored their own 
domestically rooted Euroscepticism and having analysed the geopolitical effects of 
rejecting EU membership, voted Yes.  Estonia represented a potential case of an 
electorate choosing European integration on the grounds of explicitly geopolitical 
considerations rather than the economic utility of membership.   
Analysing Estonia provides a fuller understanding of how contemporary 
electorates may vote Yes or No on EU referendums due to geopolitical factors, overriding 
their domestic Euroscepticism.  The example of Estonian EPMs’ formation on national 
level issues in a debate focused on the international level reinforces the argument of this 
study that EPM formation and activity need to be seen as national level developments. 
 
4.6 Estonia in the East European Context 
The Estonian referendum did not take place in a political vacuum.  There was a 
very conscious awareness of the other referendums taking place across the East European 
states and the momentous historical context that this represented.  National leaders spoke 
of a collective “return to Europe” by Eastern Europe away from the legacy of forty-five 
years of Communist rule.  The Eastern European public at large was well aware of the 
wider implications of accession and held a long-term historic view of the referendums.
367
  
In actively seeking to play the EU accession referendum in terms of the country’s move 
from totalitarianism to liberal democracy that was part of a similar pattern across Eastern 
Europe, the accession referendum was not focused around the utilitarian issues that have 
tended to dominate Western European referendums on European integration.  Both Yes 
and No sides instead based their arguments around differing interpretations of what 
constituted the best path for securing the fledgling independent Estonian nation.   
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This was a unique political situation, whereby the governments across the former 
communist states in Eastern Europe were united behind a single political project.  There 
was active behind the scenes coordination of the referendum between the government and 
opposition.  In the Estonian case the government was actively aware of the strong 
Eurosceptic opinion of its electorate and so actively sought agreement with other states 
that Estonia should be one of the last states to hold a referendum.  The Estonian 
government believed that holding the accession referendum after Slovakia and Lithuania, 
where a Yes vote was believed to be a formality, would lead to a “cascade effect”368 and 
encourage the electorate not to leave Estonia out of the EU on its own and without an 
international alliance to protect them from Russia.
369
   
By purposely holding the referendum at the end of the other twelve, the Estonian 
referendum campaign was not only exposing itself to the impact of presumed Yes votes 
of other nations but unseen factors that arose over the course of the accession referendum 
process.  Szczerbiak and Taggart point out that the most pressing issue for governments 
to emerge across the referendums was that of voter turnout that was far below expected 
levels.  While the predicted Yes votes were achieved with strong majorities, the 
legitimacy of the whole accession process was put into question by a succession of 
turnouts in the low 50% range of the electorate.
370
  With some states having minimum 
thresholds for referendums to be passed, No campaigners were arguing that abstention 
was the most effective form of defeating referendums.  Strongly pro-EU countries such as 
Slovakia came within several thousand votes of missing thresholds.  This scared the 
Estonian government, as even though it required no threshold for ratification, a low 
turnout could swing the outcome in favour of the No side, given the ambivalence of the 
Estonian public towards the EU.  A low turnout would additionally have the potential to 
de-legitimise a Yes vote in the eyes of the Estonian public and the EU.
371
  These ‘outside’ 
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factors forced the Estonian government’s hand into launching a lengthy, widespread and 
expensive Yes campaign.  This had a twofold effect of firstly pushing EU accession right 
to the top of national agenda, just below that of NATO membership, and secondly of 
pushing Estonian EPMs into the national media spotlight as they sought to bring a 
counterbalance to the government’s pervasive Yes campaign.  Estonian EPMs thus 
gained a national public platform denied to most No campaigners in other Eastern 
European states.  This level of activity of the government campaign forced the EPMs to 
‘up their game’ and campaign harder, in order to overcome the limit of their resources   
compared to the Yes campaign’s largesse.372   
 
 
Section Two: Euroscepticism in Estonia 
 
4.7 Overview of Estonian Euroscepticism and EPMs 
From an analysis of the continually evolving literature on Estonian-EU relations 
and more specifically Estonian Euroscepticism, this study proposed that opposition to the 
EU in Estonia can be placed into a typology of three forms.  
The first was the pro-communist/Russian bloc, which saw EU membership as a 
further disintegration of the country’s links with Russia.  Their supporters were a small 
minority of the ethnic Russian population made up mostly of pensioners.  Indeed the 
most interesting aspect of minority-based Euroscepticism in Estonia was how it was not 
effective in either visibility, votes or at the party political level.  This section will seek to 
understand why ethnic Russians did not form on the EU issue in Estonia as examples of 
non-EPM formation were just as relevant to this study as are EPMs themselves.   
The second group was hard-line Estonian nationalists, based around the 
Independence Party, which was based on anti-Russian, quasi-fascist rhetoric but received 
only 0.4% of the vote in the 2011 parliamentary elections.
373
  Another element of this 
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was nationalist members of mainstream political parties who broke party ranks to oppose 
the referendum.  The Yes vote in the referendum and subsequent surge in support for the 
EU amongst the Estonian electorate forced nationalist Eurosceptics to accept EU 
membership as an irrevocable part of Estonia’s political future, lest they ended up “in the 
political wilderness like the Independence Party”.374 
Finally, the third form of Euroscepticism was that of economic liberalism.  In the 
immediate post-soviet period the Estonian government, directed by Prime Minister Maart 
Laar, specifically followed policies diametrically opposed to communism, which were 
strongly influenced by those policies of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher as they 
had taken the lead in calling for the end of Soviet domination of the Baltic states.
375
  
Thus, the intellectual direction of independent Estonian political culture has been towards 
increased liberalisation in economic, and to a lesser degree social and political life.  The 
arguments of the most prominent Estonian Eurosceptics were based on economic 
liberalism, specifically the negative impact of the acquis communautaire on Estonia’s 
liberal economic policies.   
 
4.7.1 The Dominance of Economically Liberal Euroscepticism 
Euroscepticism based on economic liberalism existed several years before the 
accession referendum and was still active up to the 2011 parliamentary elections.  The 
most high-profile anti-accession campaigners were Professors Ivar Räig and Igor Gräzin 
of the EPM; the Research Centre Free Europe.
376
  They were given a high profile by the 
media as Räig was a former minister and Department of Foreign Affairs civil servant, and 
Gräzin was an academic and MP for the Reform Party.
377
  Similarly to the other case 
studies, Euroscepticism became associated with several individuals and the ideological 
basis of their opposition to European integration became the default arguments against 
the EU in Estonia.  This high media and public profile played a significant role in 
encouraging these two individuals to form an EPM.  Despite the personality clashes and 
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differing attitudes to the desired extent of Estonian participation in European integration, 
cooperation between them was possible due to their shared libertarian values and 
recognition of some form of EU membership for Estonia.
378
  This gave them a significant 
advantage over the nationalists and pro-Russians who opposed membership outright and 
were portrayed as isolationists who were damaging Estonia’s chance of joining NATO 
and the EU to the benefit of Russia.
379
  This element of Estonian Euroscepticism was 
soft, as in the Szcerbiak and Taggart model, in that its opposition to European integration 
was to the protectionist sections of the acquis communitaire but it accepted the principle 
of membership as an important bulwark against Russian influence in Estonia.   
The particular nature of Estonian Euroscepticism and the relative failure of more 
typical forms of Euroscepticism, based on national sovereignty and socialist critiques of 
the single market, were based on the recent history of Estonian independence.  Estonia 
engaged in the ‘shock’ therapy of economic liberalisation almost immediately after 
seceding from the Soviet Union and the independence movement of the country was 
framed in terms of moving as far away as ideologically possible from the communist 
system.  Thus Estonians began to see themselves and their national identity as liberal and 
embracing of modern telecommunications, specifically the internet.
380
  The immediate 
post-Soviet period saw intense economic hardship as the economy shifted to a capitalist 
model and inefficient industries and farmers were left to fail by the laissez faire policies 
of the government.  After these six to seven years of hardship the economy adapted 
successfully to capitalism and the early governmental investment in internet and 
telecommunications technology created the foundations for soaring economic growth of 
an average of 8.3% from 2000-2004.
381
  During this period the government initiated 
accession talks with the EU after being turned down amongst the first group of applicants 
in 1998.  As discussed earlier, the Estonian government coalition of centre right parties 
under Juhan Parts was anxious to accede to the EU as quickly as possible for two reasons.  
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Firstly, it did not want to be left behind as Latvia and Lithuania were also beginning 
negotiations to join.  Secondly it sought to use EU membership as a step on the ladder 
towards their ultimate goal of NATO membership.  Negotiations were not, however, 
going well by 2002.
382
  The thinking of the government of Parts at the time was that if the 
‘hard’ geopolitical security of NATO was not attainable for the foreseeable future then 
the ‘soft’ security of the EU would have to suffice to protect Estonia from Russian 
influence.
383
 
Thus, the dynamics of the Estonian-EU debate prior to membership are apparent.  
On the one hand, the Estonian public was starting to benefit after several years of extreme 
hardship from a dynamic, independent Estonian economy, and on the other hand, the 
Estonian government was anxious to secure the country’s long term geo-political security 
by firmly allying the country to EU institutions.  The EU accession referendum would 
create tensions between the belief that Estonia was doing fine on its own, as justified by 
the booming liberalised economy and stagnant over-regulated EU economy, and the 
concern of the country’s political elite that Estonia needed to join the EU immediately 
lest it be drawn into the Russian sphere of influence yet again.  How these international- 
and domestic-level factors combined to influence EPM formation will be discussed in the 
next section as well as how civil society based Euroscepticism in Estonia came to be so 
effective compared to party-based Euroscepticism in other EU accession states.  
Examining such a question is important in explaining EPM formation, as in this case it 
provides interesting conclusions on the importance of the open policy process and media 
propositions in this regard, as well as to the wider area of civil society development in 
former Soviet states.   
 
4.8 Two Dominant EPMs: the Research Centre Free Europe and Movement No to the 
EU  
The analysis of Estonian EPMs proceeds slightly differently to that of the other 
case studies in that it only offers a brief description of the EPMs before going on to test 
them against the explanatory factors.  This is because the two EPMs were only active for 
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a handful of years and there were only two of them.  Quite simply the story of Estonian 
EPMs is so short that there is little to discuss in comparison to the other case studies.  In 
contrast, there is much to discuss in relation to how and why they were formed and so 
this section will mostly focus on this element.   
 
4.8.1 The Research Centre Free Europe 
The Research Centre Free Europe was founded originally as a think-tank in 2001 
by Prof. Ivar Räig, a former Reform Party MP, Foreign Ministry official and university 
economics lecturer along with Prof. Igor Gräzin, a Reform Party MP and former 
university lecturer.  Their main critique of EU integration was an economically liberal 
one, where they viewed tariffs, the CAP and EU regulations as an unbearable hindrance 
to the economic development of Estonia.  They argued that the Estonian government had 
been complicit in this as officials did not secure enough opt outs or conditions in the 
negotiating process, thereby putting Estonia at a distinct disadvantage.
384
  For the 
referendum campaign the Research Centre Free Europe did not oppose membership per 
se but did oppose membership on the terms negotiated and at the time agreed.  Joining in 
2004 with the terms in question would have a negative effect on the Estonian economy, 
which was the fastest growing in Europe at the time.  The group developed strong links 
with the Bruges Group and the Conservative Party in the UK mostly due to common 
economic policies and mutual admiration of Margaret Thatcher.
385
  While the Estonians 
in the group focused on economic and policy criticisms, UK nationals ran the Research 
Centre Free Europe’s magazine, These Tides, and adopted a much harder Eurosceptic, 
more sovereignty orientated stance that attempted to create a common sphere of discourse 
between UK, Scandinavian and Estonian Eurosceptics.
386
  In the wake of the passing of 
the EU accession referendum the magazine folded and the UK elements left, leaving the 
Estonian members to change the Research Centre Free Europe back to its original form, 
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a Eurosceptic think-tank that opposed certain elements of European integration, in this 
case EU economic and trade policy.    
Räig maintained that the original motivations behind his founding of the Research 
Centre Free Europe stem from his time as a civil servant in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, participating in EU accession negotiations.  His superiors informed him that 
negotiations should proceed with all haste lest Estonia be left behind the other accession 
states, which had started negotiations to join the EU several years before Estonia.  As 
such, he stated that he was told to agree to all conditions imposed by the EU negotiators 
and not hold up the accession process by trying to agree “opt outs” or “special 
conditions” for specific Estonian interests.387  When he tried to raise this matter, he was 
posted elsewhere and so he quit the civil service to pursue his criticism of the 
government’s EU policy.  Having been an MP for seven years, he believed that the party 
system was endemically pro-EU and that he had no other option but to found the 
Research Centre Free Europe with Gräzin.
388
  This reasoning of Räig for forming the 
EPM was interesting as he was an intimate part of the policy formation process but 
decided to leave that process and challenge it from an ideological position in civil 
society.  None of the other EPMs in this study were founded by individuals who had such 
a close relationship to the political opportunity structure of their country.   
While originally founded as a think-tank for the referendum on accession, the 
Research Centre Free Europe became active in its contestation of Estonian membership 
of the EU.  A key element of this move from a think-tank to an EPM was the placing of 
the Research Centre Free Europe as leading opponents of EU membership by the media 
and political parties.  Taking the opportunity of this publicity and access to the policy-
making process, the Research Centre Free Europe moved toward more active 
contestation of EU membership.
389
  Their protest took the form of engaging in media- 
and town hall-style debates with national politicians over the accession.
390
  They 
undertook limited forms of advertising in national newspapers and dissemination of 
pamphlets but this clear practice of actively engaging in contesting the EU issue with pro-
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membership politicians comfortably fits into the definition of protest outlined in the first 
chapter.  Moreover, conscious of the need to expand their campaign of information 
dissemination against EU membership, they actively recruited volunteers and sought to 
increase membership to meet the challenge of the referendum campaign.  In this process 
they quite clearly became an EPM, the reason for which, according to themselves, was a 
desire to fill the almost complete vacuum of opposition towards accession.
391
   
 
4.8.2 The Movement No to the EU  
This EPM was founded by Uno Silberg, a local councillor for the People’s Union 
Party, in opposition to the widespread pro-European sentiment of both his political party 
and the party system at large.  He was joined in this campaign by several other local 
councillors, but crucially by no parliamentarians, from other political parties.  The group 
attracted many volunteers, many more than the Research Centre Free Europe (though 
Silberg refused to put a number on the amount).  Their main argument was that accession 
to the EU violated Article One of the Estonian constitution, “The independence and 
sovereignty of Estonia are timeless and inalienable”392.  They used ‘§1’ as a common 
symbol to make reference to the article, and placed it on campaign material across the 
whole No movement, such as posters, leaflets, t-shirts and balloons.
393
 
The factors underlying Silberg’s formation of Movement No to the EU were 
relatively straightforward.  For the People’s Union as a nationalist party, membership of 
the supranationalist EU obviously compromises the sovereignty of the Estonian nation.  
However, as the party was in government at the time of the referendum, the party 
leadership and MPs supported the Yes campaign.  This left nationalists like Silberg 
without an opportunity to express their strongly felt Euroscepticism.  Any move by 
Eurosceptics within the party to split and form a Eurosceptic party would have resulted in 
local politicians who supported Silberg losing the support base of the party’s 
parliamentary representatives and national support structure and all the resources that 
brought.  As almost a wholly-rural based party this proposed new party would have been 
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in stiff competition to compete for the small rural vote with a nationally known, financed 
and relatively historic party.
394
  The obvious decision was to create a civil society vehicle 
to allow them to act on their opposition to EU accession.  Party officials gave tacit 
approval to this group, as it played well with the party’s rural base which was wary of 
European integration, whilst also maintaining the party’s responsibilities in 
government.
395
  
Given that the Movement No to the EU was made up of local councillors with limited 
access to resources, their campaign was weak and divided.  The rural base of the 
membership made coordination difficult and the campaign found themselves unable to 
effectively organize itself to reach out to the urban population centres.  Their main forms 
of campaigning were postering, handing out pamphlets and holding presentations in front 
of local and workplace associations.  Silberg was explicit in stating that they were under 
no illusions as to the symbolic nature of their protest campaign against membership
396
.  
This was further compounded when the Estonian government launched a specific pro-
accession campaign in rural Estonia specifically designed to allay the fears of farmers 
and the elderly.  Campaign buses, posters, billboard advertising and blanket media 
coverage involving national politicians and the popular President Rüütel were employed 
in this campaign.
397
  Competing against such a large budget and organisation made it 
very difficult for the Movement No to the EU’s campaign to succeed but the EPM was 
driven by the desire to offer some form of opposition to EU membership.  They were 
acutely aware of the depth of the challenge (in securing a No vote) that they faced.  The 
additional external factors that impacted upon their decision to form are analysed in the 
following section.   
  
4.8.3 Explaining the Importance of Economic Liberal Euroscepticism in EPM 
formation 
Why did EPMs emerge in Estonia due to the low level of Euroscepticism in the 
Estonian party system but not in other Eastern European states?  In the EU referendums 
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in the other Eastern European states, civil society was sorely missing from the No side.  
The principal reason for this was the obvious communist legacy of regimes that outlawed 
independent civil society activities.  Eurosceptics in the former communist states, without 
any history of civil society campaigns, found it difficult to organise themselves into a 
coherent campaign against the institutions of the state.
398
  We can contrast this to 
Eurosceptic campaigners in referendums in the Nordic states of Norway, Denmark and 
Sweden, where civil society campaigns have been more effective than those of the 
government.
399
 
Thus, Estonia presented itself as a deviant case of civil society activity in the former 
communist states in that the most effective opposition to European integration was 
organised from civil society, a pattern seen more in Scandinavian countries.  We must 
control for this apparent discrepancy, however, with several variables.  First of all is size.  
Given the population of Estonia (1.34 million) and the urban concentration of this small 
population (the two main cities Tallinn and Tartu make up almost half the population), 
the barrier for reaching a national audience were significantly lower than Poland and 
Romania, for example, where the populations are widely dispersed and rural.  Therefore 
the barriers to entry of civil-society groups were lower.  Ivar Räig, the de-facto 
figurehead of the Estonian No campaign, pointed out that all he had to do was have an 
opinion piece published in the Postimees newspaper and he could reach 50% of the 
electorate or appear on the nightly news programme (Aktuaalne kaamera) and reach 75% 
of it.
400
  However the same could be said of Latvia, which had a similarly small 
population (2.2 million) and a small geographic area, but which was even more 
urbanised, with over 50% of the population living in Riga alone.  Yet no effective civil 
society movement against European membership occurred there.  Galbreath has touched 
on the subject in his 2004 comparative study of civil society in the Baltic states by 
pointing out that while absolute numbers of civil society groups were fairly evenly spread 
throughout all three Baltic states, Estonia had a disproportionate number of political 
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activist civil society groups.
401
  His study does not proffer any in depth reasons for this 
aberration but instead offers the generalisation that it was a reflection of the relative 
stability and ideological uniformity that has characterised Estonia since independence.  
This in turn led to the development of Estonian civil society towards a Western European 
model.  The ideological uniformity of post-independence Estonia provided those opposed 
to European integration with a strong ideological template for Eurosceptic mobilisation; 
that of economic liberalism mixed with post-communist nationalism.  Additionally, given 
that these arguments resonated with the Estonian public, Eurosceptics were able to bring 
them to the national level EU debate.  The importance of the issue framing environment 
is stressed in the literature on social movements.
402
  In comparison to the other Eastern 
European states Estonia had developed a distinct national identity around economic 
liberalism, and the Research Centre Free Europe were able to frame this issue as being 
negatively affected by the centralising force of European integration.  Given Estonia’s 
history of foreign domination and only recent re-emergence as an independent state, the 
national sovereignty issue of the Movement No to the EU should apparently have gained a 
lot more traction in the electorate than it did.  It was not as potentially successful, because 
the issue environment was charged by the government’s tying together of EU and NATO 
membership to guarantee national security.  The issue-framing environment played an 
important role in accentuating EPM formation on certain issues and not on others that 
perhaps would have been more expected.   
Secondly, there was the effect of five decades of Estonia’s membership as an 
integral part of the Soviet Union and the denial of even token independence that was the 
case with other former communist states.  Additionally, there was the substantial shift in 
population over the course of the Soviet era, with Estonians making up 95% of the 
population in 1938 but 65% in 2006.  Both these points mark out Estonia as having a 
different ‘experience’ under communism compared to the other former communist states, 
which was relevant as Estonia would be far more likely to join the EU to prevent another 
threat to its independence, as had happened in 1940 by the Soviet Union, 1941 by Nazi 
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Germany and then again by the Soviet Union in 1944.
403
  Again, however, both Lithuania 
and Latvia were subsumed into the Soviet Union and Latvia itself experienced a far 
greater population transfer during Soviet occupation, with the proportion of ethnic 
Latvians as part of the total population declining from 75% in 1939 to 59% by 2006.  
Therefore the Estonian experience under communism was not exceptional and thus does 
not explain its divergence from the other former communist states’ non-development of 
civil society-based Euroscepticism.   
The example of EPM formation in Estonia was not only exceptional in the 
Eastern European context but also in the Baltic states context as well.  Following on from 
this chapter’s analysis of the Estonian party system and Europe, there was the issue of the 
ideological critique of EU integration.  Estonian party politics has been characterised as 
lacking an even moderately left-wing party.
404
  Political discourse was supportive of 
continuous government policies to reduce the flat-tax rate and remove the government 
from the economy.  Here was where Estonia did appear to be unique amongst the Eastern 
European states, where in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, for example, left-wing or 
populist parties were swept into power on the back of reactions against such liberal 
economic policies and promises to restore certain elements of the social spending of 
communist times.  This was not the case in Estonia, where liberal policies had 
widespread public support and the populace was proud of the nation’s adage as the most 
economically free of the former communist states.  To a significant degree Estonian 
national and political identity became linked to the ideology of economic liberalism and 
the resultant success of the Estonian economy.   
Taggart points out that Euroscepticism frequently manifests itself around a 
“touchstone issue of dissent”,405 where a specific issue that resonates with the public is 
chosen as the basis for Eurosceptic activity by a group or political party who portray 
themselves as the ‘defenders’ of that issue.  In Latvia no single clear issue emerged to 
unify a potentially deep seam of public opposition to European integration into active 
campaigning but in Estonia the belief in liberalism as a national ideology was able to do 
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so.
406
  At the time of accession Latvia was struggling for a clear national direction amidst 
unending upheaval at a national political level, where nationalists, conservatives, liberals, 
reformed communists and ecologists all led governments.  The uniformity of the 
direction of the Estonian economy and society gave Eurosceptic campaigners there a 
“touchstone issue of dissent” appreciated and understood by the public which they could 
frame their opposition to EU membership around.  In the Research Centre Free Europe’s 
magazine, Räig made explicit reference to the high levels of economic freedom that 
Estonia had achieved since independence and the social prosperity and advance of the 
nation as a whole that came from this.  EU membership, according to the Research 
Centre Free Europe, would lead to a “regulatory monopoly” causing economic 
stagnation in Estonia by stifling the innovation and enterprise that they stated was the 
“pride of the Estonian nation”.407 
It appears then that the relative stability (in an Eastern European context) and 
overarching liberal ideology of the Estonian party system were important causal factors 
of EPM formation in Estonia but not in the very similar state of Latvia.  The most 
obvious conclusion to be drawn from this was that Latvia, with a dramatically fluid party 
system and society, did not have the stable domestic environment to promulgate ideas of 
active opposition to EU membership in civil society as Estonia was able to.   
 
4.8.4 Explaining the lack of a Russian based EPM 
The focus of this chapter on Estonian EPMs dealt with formation by economic 
libertarians and Estonian nationalists on the EU issue.  Ethnic Russians were identified as 
another source of Euroscepticism in Estonia, yet they did not form an EPM as these other 
two sections of society did.  Investigating why ethnic Russians failed to do so further 
confirms the paucity of civil society in the former Soviet Union amongst ethnic 
minorities but also reveals a degree of interaction with the propositions of this study.   
In the context of EU support Galbreath has discussed the impact of Estonia’s 
ethnic Russian population on Estonian–EU relations and has isolated two strands within 
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the Estonian Russian community.
408
  Firstly, one that was pro-EU, as EU membership 
enhanced their rights as a minority with acquis communitaire-enforced, equal rights 
legislation; additionally EU membership eased travel for them across the rest of the EU, 
which brought with it increased opportunities within the single market.  Secondly, there 
was an opposition strand that opposed EU membership on the grounds that it created a 
further barrier between Estonia and Russia.  This made it harder for them to maintain 
familial, cultural, religious and business ties to their ethnic ‘motherland’.   
Estonia’s Russian population were moderately in favour of EU membership, due 
in large part to Brussels’ insistence on the removal of perceived discriminatory legislation 
against ethnic Russians during the negotiation process.  However, in the concluding 
phase of the campaign a worried government played the ‘Soviet’ card and produced 
posters claiming the “USSR” would come back and “invade” Estonia again should EU 
accession be rejected.  As discussed, the issue of Russian aggression towards Estonia was 
hidden with the euphemism of “geopolitical security” but this development brought 
ethnic Russians out on to the streets protesting against EU membership.
409
   
There are two clear factors behind the failure of ethnic Russians to organise 
themselves in opposition to the referendum.  Firstly, and most importantly there was the 
primacy of the Centre Party in representing the interests of ethnic Russians.  While the 
Party never had an official No campaign, party members and elected officials were free 
to campaign according to their own opinions, with a majority joining the No side but a 
not insignificant amount moving to the Yes camp.  Ethnic Russian politicians were 
campaigning, though without a party banner and in a quite low-key manner, on the same 
points that ordinary ethnic Russians were concerned about.  These were mainly in 
relation to their outrage at the Yes side’s damaging of Estonian–Russian relations with 
their overly nationalistic rhetoric.   
Secondly, there was the issue of ‘apathy’ (lack of mobilisation) amongst the 
ethnic Russian population.  There was a widespread dislocation of ethnic Russians from 
Estonian society in general, which threw into severe doubt whether they would act on 
their Eurosceptic opinions and actively campaign against the EU.  This segregation 
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between ethnic Russians and the Estonian state was emphasised by only 35% of the some 
343,000 ethnic Russians in Estonia (or about 120,000) holding Estonian passports and the 
right to vote.  The low level of social movement formation in Estonian society in general 
combined with this level of apathy towards Estonian politics helps to explain the failure 
of ethnic Russians in Estonia to form EPMs in opposition to accession to the EU.  Ethnic 
Russians failed to access the policy-making process themselves through forming an 
ethnically based political party.  Instead, they relied on the ethnically Estonian led Centre 
Party to represent them.  Given their failure, indeed for many their inability, to form a 
political party in the relatively open Estonian political system, it is not surprising that 
ethnic Russians failed to form an EPM.  Moreover, given that the two positions on 
European integration clouded the issue environment and the Centre Party sent them 
ambiguous cues as to their position on accession, ethnic Russians were unsure of what 
position they should hold.  All of these factors combined to negate ethnic Russian 
formation on the EU issue.   
 
 
Section Three: Evaluation of the Explanatory Factors 
Though there was less contextual information on the activities of Estonian EPMs 
in comparison to those of the other case studies, this was only to be expected given the 
short term of the period of Estonian negotiations to join and membership of the EU, let 
alone its independence as a sovereign state.  While this meant in effect that the ‘story’ of 
Estonian EPMs was far shorter than that of other EPMs, their relationship to the 
propositions was far more explicit.  This section will therefore explore these relationships 
in more detail than the other case studies, as there are many important and fascinating 
conclusions to be made with regard to Estonia emerging as an original example of EPM 
formation amongst the former communist states.   
 
 
EF1: The more pro-European the media are, the more likely that EPMs will form.   
In contrast to the Irish case, and similarly to the UK case, the Estonian 
Eurosceptics all agreed that the Estonian media was biased against their case but there 
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was disagreement as to the opportunity of getting their arguments across.  Erkki Bahovski 
of the Postimees newspaper (the newspaper of record of Estonia), argued that the 
Estonian media had a tradition of offering political advertising at a highly discounted rate 
to all legally registered political parties.  The EU accession referendum was no different, 
with the situation being much like the Irish one as regards an equal sharing of resources 
between both Yes and No sides by the national media.
410
  
Gräzin and Räig of the Research Centre Free Europe were taken seriously by the 
media due to their background in politics and the civil service.
411
  Silberg and the 
Movement No to the EU felt that they were not taken seriously by the mainstream media 
and were denied access to it.  The group claimed that the media was part of an elite 
campaign to take the EU off the Estonian political agenda and remove it from the public 
sphere altogether.  As proof of this, they pointed to the government’s announcement that 
they planned on Estonia joining the Eurozone in 2013, despite not holding a referendum 
on the issue as both Denmark and Sweden had.
412
 
In the cases of the Research Centre Free Europe’s and the Movement No to the 
EU both believed that the media was part of a pro-European elite that stifled debate on 
the EU.  The Research Centre Free Europe, however, was more engaged with the media 
and was able to participate in the arena of contestation on the accession issue that the 
media represented due mostly to the qualifications of its members as academics, 
politicians and former senior civil servants.  The Movement No to the EU disengaged 
from the media and rejected it as a pawn of the political elite.  Both viewed the media as 
pro-European but only one of them considered their views to be somewhat accepted by 
the media.   
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EF2: The lower the level of Euroscepticism in the party system, the more likely that 
EPMs will form.   
The only relevant political party
413
 to come close to advocating a No vote in the 
referendum was the Centre Party of Edgar Savisaar, the largest party in parliament, which 
called on members to vote according to their conscience (which was largely to vote No, 
as witnessed at the party’s special congress on the matter).  The reason for the failure of 
party based Euroscepticism to develop was twofold.
414
  Firstly, there was political elite 
consensus on the long-term geopolitical interests of the country being best served by EU 
membership.  Events, such as the 1999 collapse of the Estonian stock market due to the 
Russian currency crisis and the long drawn out process of NATO membership, further 
reinforced this consensus that Estonia had to join the EU to fundamentally shift its 
orientation away from an economically and politically unstable Russia to the West.
415
 
Secondly, post-independence Estonian politics had been exceptionally dynamic and fluid.  
Parties emerged and dissipated, changed names, and reinvented themselves with equal 
rapidity; politicians fell in and out of favour and shifted alliances repeatedly, with parties 
losing elections by landslides before winning them again at the next election and 
returning to government.  The result of such political tumultuousness was that the vast 
majority of Estonian parties and politicians had experience of government.  As the 
literature on Euroscepticism has emphasised, it has a strong government/opposition 
dynamic.  A party of government of either an EU member state or a candidate for 
membership is rarely critical of that country’s membership/proposed membership, as the 
national interest supersedes party-political concerns.
416
  In the Estonian case, given that 
all the main parties had at one time been part of a coalition government, they became 
ingrained in the established political culture of the necessity of membership for 
Estonian’s independent future.  It is, however, interesting to note that the only EU-critical 
party, the Centre party, drew its support from the urban and rural poor and ethnic 
Russians.  These were the groups in Estonian society that had suffered and lost the most 
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from the end of communism and who perceived themselves as being the most vulnerable 
should Estonia join the EU.
417
  The Centre Party was widely believed by other parties and 
their supporters to have strong clandestine links to Moscow and that its charismatic 
leader, Savisaar, was Moscow’s man in Tallinn.  His ambivalence towards the EU and his 
party’s open criticism of the EU project encouraged other political parties to advocate a 
Yes vote to EU accession even if they were not wholly convinced themselves.  This was 
because mainstream parties automatically took the opposite position to him on any issue, 
such was the perception of his close links with the Russian government.   
The referendum campaign of mainstream political parties was largely negative, 
emphasising what Estonia would lose by not being an EU member rather than what it 
would gain by joining.  Only the leading members of the cabinet and the Prime Minister 
campaigned, while ordinary backbenchers were somewhat ambivalent.
418
  Such an elite 
level campaign opened space for civil society based opposition to EU membership to 
emerge.  Pro-accession arguments went unchallenged at the national political level 
despite a degree of uncertainty amongst ordinary politicians that was mirrored in public 
opinion.  There was a clear gap between the elite level discourse on EU accession and the 
opinion of many Estonians on it.  Estonian political parties made a conscious decision to 
ignore the concerns of party members and the public about accession, to either campaign 
for accession or to stand on the sidelines.  This left significant space for EPMs to emerge 
to contest the accession referendum.  Moreover, the participation of almost every political 
party in EU accession negotiations from the mid-1990s on meant that non-government 
parties could not publically criticise a process they had been intimately involved in.  
Again, this left space for an EPM to form to contest these negotiations as the party 
system was not doing so.   
 
EF3: The more referendums on European issues, the more likely that EPMs will 
form.   
The two EPMs differed in the impact of referendums on their formation.  For the 
Research Centre Free Europe, the group was founded in 2001 not specifically to 
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campaign against any forthcoming accession treaty but to provide “detailed critiques of 
current government EU negotiations policy”.419  Chairman Ivar Räig intended to carry on 
the group’s activities regardless of accession.  This was because the group did not reject 
membership of the EU outright, but rather was critical of the terms on which membership 
was negotiated and the timing of membership; their main argument was “not now, 
later”.420  We can see from the case of the Research Centre Free Europe that the lack of a 
referendum on the EU in Estonia would not have prevented the emergence of an EPM, as 
the Research Centre Free Europe emerged in the late 1990s to raise public awareness of 
the terms of accession, not to contest accession in a referendum on EU membership. 
Uno Silberg of the Movement No to the EU, formed the group specifically to 
oppose accession.   His membership included members and supporters of government 
parties who opposed joining the EU.  He was adamant that once the referendum passed, 
the government parked the EU issue and forcibly kept it off the media and political 
agenda.  The EPM he led “now exists in name only”, with the group resigned to the fact 
that the government will not hold another referendum on the EU.
421
   
Thus, we can see that Estonia had two EPMs representing two different sides of 
the EPM formation coin.  The Research Centre Free Europe would have formed 
regardless of whether a referendum was being held or not.  The Movement No to the EU, 
on the other hand, was formed by disgruntled members of mainstream political parties 
upset at the perceived abandoning of fledgling Estonian independence with accession.  
The accession referendum provided them with the opportunity to mobilise and contest 
EU membership that otherwise would not have been available to them.     
 
 
EF4: The more open the policy process (including institutional factors such as the 
electoral system), the more likely that EPMs will form. 
The Estonian case is an example of civil society being brought into the national 
political opportunity structure by the institutions of the state.  In the other cases EPM 
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resources came mostly from private donations and sales of paraphernalia, books and 
pamphlets.  With Estonia, however, EPMs received financial resources from both the 
state and from institutional NGOs for the purposes of campaigning (this will be discussed 
in greater detail in the next point).  Additionally the government changed broadcast laws 
so that both Yes and No sides were awarded equal coverage in the media.  The purpose 
behind this was to include a No voice in the referendum campaign, and hence give it 
legitimacy not only in the perception of the public but also in that of the EU.  With no 
major political parties coming out uniformly against accession and a broad consensus 
across business, the media and the intellectual elite, the Estonian government deemed it 
necessary to include EPMs in the political opportunity structure.  
For Estonian EPMs there was no recourse to contest European integration through 
the court system or to exploit tensions within government coalitions.  The Estonian 
constitution allowed for the giving up of national sovereignty in the form of international 
treaties by referendum, while government coalitions were unstable on many issues, but 
accession to the EU was one of the very few policies that all parties in government agreed 
on.  In effect, Estonian EPMs did not need an open policy process to the same extent that 
those of the other case studies did.  The small size of the country and openness of the 
media to the arguments of certain Eurosceptics meant that any EPM formation received a 
degree of profile and access to the national political discourse that only occurred in other 
case studies due to access to specific areas of the policy process in those countries.   
 
EF5: The more available are state and/or private resources, the more likely that 
EPMs will form. 
There were several interesting factors that mark the Estonian experience of 
resources as different from those of its Irish, UK and Danish contemporaries.  The first 
was that Estonian EPMs received funds from both Danish and UK EPMs.  Secondly, they 
received funds from the Estonian government and NGOs with the explicit purpose of 
providing a No side to the campaign
422
.  Thirdly, EPM activists concluded that the level 
of resources they received was ultimately irrelevant as the government was determined to 
pass the referendum and would have spent a multiple of the money the No side spent, be 
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that the two million Kroons the No side did spend, or even if it had been able to match 
the Yes side’s twenty million Kroons campaign, the impression was that the Yes side was 
always going to outspend.
423
 
A fund was organised for the Research Centre Free Europe by the Bruges Group 
(discussed in the UK section).  This money was contributed by Eurosceptic members of 
the Conservative Party but was also collected by UK EPMs and distributed to the 
Research Centre Free Europe by the Bruges Group.
424
  Ivar Räig of the Research Centre 
Free Europe presented the Estonian case to the Bruges Group several times after being 
invited, and argued the case for receiving funds from their members on the grounds of 
both groups’ shared affinity for the policies of Margaret Thatcher and the strong chance 
of an upset, given the strong Eurosceptic leaning of the Estonian electorate.
425
  Twenty-
five percent of the money was spent on advertising costs, nine percent on printing 
referendum materials and the rest on various administrative expenses.
426
 
The legacy of an undeveloped civil society from the Soviet era proved a 
tremendous burden to the activities of the Estonian EPMs.  They had nowhere near 
enough volunteers to engage in widespread canvassing, leaflet drops and postering that 
were common in Denmark, Ireland and the UK.  The two most high profile EPMs were 
essentially elite-driven projects that when in receipt of resources, used these to develop 
their arguments further through professionally acquired research to be communicated to 
the public through media campaigns and town hall-style meetings.  There was no 
spontaneous emergence of concerned ordinary citizens who volunteered to campaign 
against the accession referendum.  It was various groups of ex-, minor and failed 
politicians and their supporting organisations.  Such groups were set up by individuals 
with other responsibilities, who simply did not have the time to canvass the Estonian 
public.  This led them to focus their campaigning through the media.  At first they did not 
arrange meetings throughout the country.  Instead, local organisations prompted them to 
take this approach by asking them to appear to present the No argument to an electorate 
hungry for both sides of the debate.  Whereas for most Irish and UK EPMs, the 
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information meeting was a crucial component of their campaigning, organising such 
meetings did not register with the Estonian EPMs.  For a short period in the build-up to 
the accession referendum Estonian EPMs had comparatively much greater resources than 
were available to most Irish (with the notable exception of Libertas) and UK (with the 
exception of Business for Sterling) EPMs, but were incapable of using them efficiently as 
they were organisationally fundamentally different from those other EPMs.  They were 
argument creators, not campaigners.  There was only so much money that could have 
been spent on the formulation of arguments and ideas.  Indeed, this took time, with the 
result that several hundred thousand Kroons were returned to the Open Estonia 
foundation unspent by the Movement No to the EU, as they could not spend it all.
427
   
As with the Irish and UK cases there was always a presumption on behalf of the 
participants in any potential EPM formation that if they were willing to consider forming 
a group in the first place, then there must be others willing to fund them.  Resources were 
always a secondary consideration; there was the firm belief that money for a campaign or 
general activities would be found somewhere.  Silberg was of the conviction that 
resources were not the motivating factor in setting up the Movement No to the EU, but 
that he knew a Eurosceptic group would attract resources from those Estonians who 
identified with their cause.
428
   
 
4.9 Main conclusions from the Estonian Case 
              The most important factor in the formation of Estonian EPMs with regard to the 
explanatory factors was that of the EPM’s relationship with political parties and the level 
of Euroscepticism in the party system.  Academics, journalists, Estonian ‘observers’ and 
even the EPM campaigners themselves agree that had the Centre Party and its leader 
Edvar Savisaar actively campaigned for a No vote, then the focus of the campaign would 
have shifted entirely to the charismatic and polarising figure of the Mayor of Tallinn.  
This would have left Gräzin, Räig and Silberg de-motivated, as they all believed that they 
could not hope to compete with the media attention and public support of Savisaar and 
his party.  Savisaar and the Centre Party did not get involved in the campaign, however, 
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and so a tremendous political vacuum emerged into which EPMs were drawn.  In 
complete contrast to Kitschelt’s thesis on the nature of political opportunity structures 
where he found that in four major Western European democracies by and large interest 
groups were significantly hindered from actively engaging in the policy making process, 
in Estonia EPMs were not so much hindered from becoming involved in the campaign on 
accession but were actively brought into the political opportunity structure by the 
institutions of the state and other ‘insider’ civil society organisations.  Given the dearth of 
active Euroscepticism in the party system, there was a need for some form of Eurosceptic 
representation in Estonia.  Lacking any efficient organisation structure made the EPMs 
incapable of taking advantage of this situation (unlike the Irish case, where even the 
presence of Sinn Féin could not prevent EPMs engaging with the media, taking the lead 
in organising meetings and general debate on the first Lisbon referendum), and thus they 
were brought into the political opportunity structure by the media as well as the 
government.  This was achieved by providing them with funding and access to the media 
that forced them to develop necessary organisational competency and capacity to play a 
role in the Estonian EU accession debate.  In this regard Estonia differs from the other 
case studies and other West European states more generally.  It does, however, follow the 
stated desire of the European Commission to include civil society in the debate on 
European integration.  The concerted effort of the Estonian government in providing 
resources, however limited, was due in part to the effect of Europeanisation of civil 
society discourse on Europe that the European Commission was heavily promoting at this 
time in what would become the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.  Kohler-
Koch has questioned the success of this project but the example of EPMs in Estonia 
shows that it has at least been attempted.
429
   
 Before the referendum on accession the level of public Euroscepticism in Estonia 
created paranoia amongst the political elite that EU membership would be rejected.  As a 
result the Yes campaign was more aggressive, and therefore more effective, than those in 
the other accession states.
430
  From the Danish and UK case studies it was shown that 
EPMs there were reflecting the deeply held Euroscepticism of a significant element of the 
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population, with the result that EPMs there were more successful and more numerous.  In 
Estonia the large level of public opposition to membership was not as deep-rooted as it 
was in Denmark and the UK.  It was more a reaction to a perceived lack of information 
about what membership entailed than outright opposition to accession to the EU.  Once 
the government and the party system engaged in a substantial information campaign, the 
tide of public opinion turned decisively in favour of membership.  This, combined with 
organisational deficiencies, meant that Estonian EPMs did not attract a wider level of 
public involvement in their activities.  Rather, they noted that their most successful and 
commonplace form of campaigning was in town hall-style meetings across the country, 
organised by various vocational and voluntary organisations.  This does, however, reveal 
the degree of democratic development of the Estonian populace and civil society in that 
they actively sought to engage with both sides of a vital national issue rather than accept 
without question the cues of the government and party system.   
 Aligned with the successful government pro-membership campaign was the 
movement towards joining NATO.  The legacy of Soviet occupation and Estonia’s 
position as a military zone during the Soviet era (the last Russian soldiers left in 1994), 
meant that the question of EU membership was tightly bound to a desire to protect 
Estonia from Russian aggression.  In effect EU membership became seen as soft 
protection against Russia in unison with NATO membership providing hard protection.  
Understanding how different the Estonian relationship with the EU was in relation to not 
only the Western European member states but also to other Eastern European states is 
key to appreciating why EPMs based around nationalism failed to develop much traction.  
The obvious proviso was that civil society in the former communist countries was 
underdeveloped.  The relevance of this to nationalism in Estonia was debatable, however, 
as Estonia was part of the ‘Singing Revolution’ in 1989 whereby civil society actors 
mobilised effective opposition to the Soviet government.  The Movement No to the EU 
was mobilised by local politicians, with limited involvement from national politicians.  
Estonian EPMs were thereby greatly inhibited in their formation by wider geo-political 
factors that were not present in the other case studies.  These findings have potentially 
interesting implications for the study of Euroscepticism in Eastern Europe.  The most 
influential study on this topic, that of Kopécky and Mudde, found that ideology was the 
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main determinant of Euroscepticism in political parties in Eastern Europe.
431
  The 
evidence from Estonia corresponds quite neatly to this conclusion and also extends it by 
detailing why this clearly present Euroscepticism did not manifest itself.  Collective 
political elite fears over the security of the Estonian state pushed aside concerns such as 
the threat to national sovereignty and economic effects on farmers and pensioners.   
Kopécky and Mudde argue that strategic concerns play a role, though far less than 
ideology, in positions on Europe.
432
  The example of political parties in Estonia shows 
that at times of heightened awareness of the EU issue, such as referendums, strategic 
concerns can reach beyond the government/opposition party dynamic and into the 
perceived national interest.  While the Estonian case showed there to be much 
commonality between Euroscepticism there and in the other case studies, the highly 
specific nature of the geopolitical situation there greatly impacted on Eurosceptic 
mobilisation both in the party system and civil society.   
 There was one group within Estonian society which potentially could have been 
mobilised against EU accession by the government’s discourse of the importance of EU 
membership for security against Russian aggression, the ethnic Russian minority.  Due in 
part to their high level of social exclusion, ethnic Russians failed to mobilise against EU 
membership.  There was also the conflict between the utilitarian benefit of greater 
economic and social opportunities they would attain as EU citizens, and the 
psychological and practical implications of the border with Russia turning into an 
external EU border.  Russian-Estonians therefore had strong reasons to support both a 
Yes and a No vote.  But due to the lack of a decisive cue on accession from their 
representatives in the party system, the Centre Party, they were reluctant to make a 
decision and did not vote let alone mobilise to oppose membership. 
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Chapter Five: The Danish Case 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 This chapter on Denmark is different from the other case studies in that the two 
EPMs, the People’s Movement No to the EU (People’s Movement) and June Movement, 
that formed to contest European referendums, went on to contest European Parliament 
elections as well.  They have been included in this study, as not only did they originate as 
civil society based movements but they continued to define themselves as movements run 
by members of political parties who saw their involvement with these EPMs as no 
contradiction to their party political affiliation.  The Danish case is highly relevant not 
just for the study of EPMs, but also for that of social movements in general, in that it 
details how social movements can successfully make the transition to contesting elections 
whilst retaining their original members, supporters and ethos.   
The Danish voter’s relationship with Europe has been used as the example from 
which rival theories of public support for European integration, particularly in 
referendums, have been developed by Franklin et. al.
433
 and Svensson.
434
  Denmark was 
used as a perfect example of domestic Euroscepticsm due to three factors which form the 
backbone of this chapter.  Firstly, Denmark had a history of strong public opposition to 
European integration going back to accession in the early 1970s.  This public sentiment 
against EU membership increased through the 1970s and 1980s, providing public support 
for the formation and activities of Danish EPMs.  While the level of Euroscepticism in 
the party system and multiple referendums on Europe played additional roles in EPM 
formation, the large and sustained Euroscepticism of the Danish electorate needs to be 
appreciated before the impact of the party system and referendums can be analysed.  
From the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979 Danish voters 
maintained two different party systems
435
 at the European and national levels.  At the 
European Parliament level EPMs received up to 25% of the vote, yet they never 
contested national elections.  The conclusion reached by this chapter is that Europe 
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became a contested issue at European Parliament elections largely due to the failure of 
the party system to deal with the Euroscepticism of its members, which was concentrated 
in the Social Democratic and Social Liberal parties.  Toleration of their members and 
supporters participating in EPMs allowed mainstream parties to avoid internal party 
conflict but it also allowed the two party systems to persist and the EPMs to remain 
influential in the Danish European debate.  This influence was articulated most explicitly 
in the six EU referendums held in Denmark between 1972 and 2000.  Not only did the 
EPMs play significant roles in the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty and EMU 
membership but they also played a role in the establishing of referendums as the default 
method of ratification of EU treaties in the Danish political system during that time 
period.  Examining the Danish EU referendums in chronological order will illustrate how 
EPMs were formed and sustained by public opposition to Europe that was expressed in 
these referendums, and facilitated by the party system.   
The second section focuses on the People’s Movement and June Movement.  The 
People’s Movement was the first to emerge as a non party political ‘brand’, founded to 
campaign against Danish accession to the EU in 1972.  After accession was ratified, it 
was disbanded by its radical left founders, who went back to their domestic parties, but in 
1979 it was reformed to contest European Parliament elections, as members of 
mainstream parties had grown unhappy with their parties’ support for EU membership 
and sought to contest this at the European Parliament level.  Immediately they became 
the second largest party in Danish European Parliament elections and held this position 
until the emergence of the June Movement in 1992.  The June Movement formed after a 
split from the People’s Movement by the majority of its MEPs, who felt that the 
Movement’s anti-membership platform and radical left policies were out of touch with the 
electorate.   Instead they supported a pre-Maastricht form of European cooperation that 
they believed better reflected Danish public opinion.  These groups labelled themselves 
as ‘movements’, despite contesting elections, as they sought to attract a widespread base 
of support from functionaries, members and elected officials of national parties by 
labelling themselves as a civil society based movement.  At the zenith of their success in 
1994 both EPMs took 25.5% of the vote.  In the 2009 election, however, they managed 
just 9.6% of the vote and the June Movement folded three months afterwards.  The 
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Danish relationship with the EU has been of much interest to political science scholars 
and Danish referendums on the EU have been the focus of the majority of academic 
enquiry into EU referendums, but the truly exceptional nature of the Danish EU 
relationship has been the willingness and the ability of Danish Eurosceptics to mobilise 
effectively on the issue.
436
  Examining how EPMs came to play such a prominent role in 
the EU debate in Denmark will isolate what factors specific to Denmark allowed them to 
do so, and in turn what factors missing from other case studies prevent such successful 
EPM mobilisation.   
 
 
 
First Section: Overview of Danish Politics and EU Relations 
 
5.2 Danish Public Opinion and EU Integration 
Tracing the development of public opinion on European integration is vitally 
important in understanding the emergence of EPMs in Denmark.  As Figure 5.1 shows, 
support for EU membership was low in the immediate post-accession period and despite 
a rise in positive sentiment further declined in the mid 1980s.  It began a steady rise in the 
late 1980s, however, that continued to the early 2000s so that support for Danish EU 
membership increased by over 30% to 65% from its lowest point of 35% in 1981.  The 
implications of this shift in the formation and functioning of EPMs are highlighted in this 
section and discussed in greater depth in the section on EPMs.   
 Before 1972 the European issue did not resonate with the public due to the long 
drawn out nature of Danish accession, which began in 1962 and only began to come to 
fruition by 1970.  Only when accession negotiations were being finalised and the 
prospect of membership became a reality did a notable rise in opposition to membership 
take place. From the late 1970s to the mid–1980s opposition towards membership of the 
EU grew even further.  By late 1985 38% had a positive and 44% had a negative view of 
membership, as Figure 5.1 shows.  This was in contrast to the 63% Yes vote in the 
accession referendum.
437
  This steady growth in Euroscepticism, which was put down to 
                                                 
436
See: Siune, ‘The Danes Said No the Maastricht Treaty’; Franklin et. al., ‘Attitudes toward Europe and 
referendum votes’; Svensson, ‘Five Danish Referendums on the European Community and the European 
Union’; Hobolt, ‘Choosing Europe’. 
437
 Worre, ‘The Danish Euro-Party System’, pp. 85-7. 
  
171 
 
‘disappointment’ with membership by the public, is important in understanding the push 
by the People’s Movement and party factions towards holding a referendum on the 
SEA.
438
  The argument of Eurosceptics was that increasing public disillusionment to 
membership was not being articulated at the national political level and that a referendum 
was the only means by which this public opinion could be articulated.   It was in 1979 
that members and supporters of mainstream parties, in particular the Social Democrats 
and Social Liberals, met with the original founders of the People’s Movement to reform it 
and take advantage of this declining support for the EU by contesting the EP elections of 
that year.
439
  Further falls in the level of pro-European public sentiment followed the 
People’s Movement’s success in those elections and allowed the movement to claim that 
they were articulating a popular position ignored by the mainstream political parties.   
 
Figure 5.1: Do you think that Denmark’s membership of the EU is a good thing? 
 
Source: McLaren, Laruen (2006). Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European 
Integration, Basingtstoke: Palgrave, p. 23; and Eurobaromter (Note that data for 
‘Disagree, bad thing’ not available before 1978). 
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Referring back to Figure 5.1, the dramatic rise in pro-EU sentiment post 1987 
was obvious.  It appeared that the main outcome of the 1986 SEA referendum was 
nothing to do with the impact of the SEA itself but more with a dramatic change in the 
Danish–EU relationship.  The People’s Movement had campaigned strongly, not so much 
against the Treaty itself but more as a means of securing Danish withdrawal from the EU, 
a policy they believed had wide support.  The outcome took Danish withdrawal from the 
EEC off the agenda for all the parties in the parliament.   So the People’s Movement and 
the Red-Green Alliance were left as the only elected political entities in Denmark 
advocating withdrawal.  Public support for EU membership continued to increase in the 
post-SEA period and only began to decline in 1992 at the time of the Maastricht Treaty.  
This levelling off was interpreted as a rejection of the direction of European integration 
as represented by Maastricht but crucially not against membership, however.
440
   
International events also played a role in increased Danish public support for EEC 
membership.  The collapse of communism and the application of Norway, Sweden and 
Finland for membership, removed alternatives to membership from the national debate 
and gradually acceptance of membership became prevalent.
441
  Given that the radical left 
had been one of the strongest critics of EU membership, the collapse of communism was 
a significant factor in the radical left Socialist People’s Party’s re-evaluation of their 
European policy.
442
  It was in the Maastricht period that the June Movement emerged.  
Unlike the People’s Movement, the June Movement accepted Danish participation in 
European integration but in a pre-Maastricht form.  Their European Parliament electoral 
success from this policy position can be understood from the increase in support for EU 
membership post SEA but the rejection by the electorate of Danish participation in EMU 
and a common European citizenship that were the issues driving the No to Maastricht 
vote.   Public opinion on Europe at the time of Maastricht saw 80% of voters in favour of 
membership, but 80% opposed to any further cession of sovereignty.  The type of Europe 
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proposed in the Maastricht Treaty was therefore unacceptable to them, given the explicit 
creation of political institutions by the Treaty.
443
  This did not mean that the Danish 
people wanted to leave the EU.  Instead, the great majority preferred an 
“intergovernmental community”.444  This was the form of European integration that the 
June Movement offered.  The extent to which this policy was driven by public opinion or 
genuine ideological factors will be discussed in the section dealing with the June 
Movement. 
The clear message from the literature on the Danish relationship with Europe was 
that it was a unique one.
445
  The data shows that while the Danish public were conscious 
and supportive of the benefits of economic co-operation, they were highly sceptical of the 
benefits of political integration.  A more nuanced analysis of the Danish public debate on 
Maastricht views it not as one where a sceptical electorate rejected all of Europe outright, 
but one where a public sceptical of political and monetary union demanded, and received, 
a less political and more social relationship with Europe
446
. The June Movement sought to 
exploit this shift in public opinion away from the rejectionist People’s Movement position 
by articulating a form of Euroscepticism more critical than the pro-integrationist 
mainstream party position but accepting of public support for membership.
447
  They did 
this by putting forward to the public a strong critique of political and economic 
integration but also, as will be discussed, a call for cooperation in the fields of 
environment and international development, and support for the single market. 
In the post-Maastricht period there were several strong discrepancies between 
Danish public opinion towards the EU, found in Eurobarometer surveys, and their voting 
behaviour at national and European elections and at European referendums.  Firstly, there 
was the belief in the benefits of EU membership for Denmark which historically was well 
                                                 
443
 Worre, ‘The Danish Euro-Party System’, p. 84. 
444
 Ibid, p. 79. 
445
 See: McLaren, Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration, p. 27; Hansen, European 
Integration and National Identity, pp. 51-2. 
446
 Interview with Drude Dahlerup, Founder, former EU referendums campaign director June Movement, 
2
nd
 September 2009; Interview with Lave Broch, Campaigns director with the People’s Movement, 10th 
September 2009; Interview with Holger K. Nielsen, leader of the Socialist People’s Party 1991 – 2005, 15th 
September 2009. 
447
 Interview with Drude Dahlerup, Founder, former EU referendums campaign director June Movement, 
2
nd
 September 2009. 
  
174 
 
above the EU average (see Figure 5.2).
448
  Secondly, Danes believed that their own 
voices and those of their government and of the Danish interest more generally were 
heard in the EU at levels well above the EU average.  Taking a snapshot from the 2010 
Eurobarometer data, this sentiment fed into levels of trust in the EU institutions, where 
the Danish public showed support for the EU 10-15% above the EU average and trust in 
the EU at 58%.  When compared to the UN however, there was far more trust in the UN 
at 75%, compared to the EU at 58%.
449
  
 
Figure 5.2: On the whole do you think that Denmark has benefited from EU 
membership? % Agree 
 
 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer No. 62 – No. 74. 
 
Looking at the public opinion data presented in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2, a clear 
difference can be seen in the post-accession values as opposed to those of the post-
Maastricht period.  The post-accession period saw a rise in opposition to membership and 
a sustained decline in public solidarity with the concept of European integration.  There 
was thus significant support amongst the Danish electorate for an EPM like the People’s 
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Movement that articulated their opposition to membership and a return to the pre-
accession situation.  In the post-Maastricht period, membership of the EU was accepted 
by the public but European integration was not embraced.  This called for a new form of 
Eurosceptic mobilisation, taken up by the June Movement that formed to represent this 
pro-Europe but anti-Maastricht public sentiment.  The final set of public opinion data 
showed that the pro-integration trend increased to well above the EU 27 average, a trend 
that represented the widespread acceptance by the Danish public of participation in 
European integration.  
Changes in public opinion towards European integration created the necessary 
conditions for the People’s Movement and the June Movement to mobilise.  Anti-EU 
sentiment amongst the Danish electorate led to the People’s Movemen’st success in the 
1979 EP elections, and the successful emergence of the June Movement in the 1994 EP 
elections.  Public opinion was only one segment of the overall picture, however, as the 
majority of member states had rates of opposition to European integration similar to 
those of Denmark.  Other factors were also important to their emergence, and one of the 
most important of those was the Danish party system’s relationship with the European 
issue.  High levels of public Euroscepticism fed into opposition to established parties 
pro-EU position from their own members. The following section examines how these 
factors played a role in EPM formation.   
 
5.3 The Danish Political System and Europe 
 There were several key features of the Danish political system that collectively 
created an opportunity that allowed opposition to European integration to be present at 
the national level.  Firstly, Denmark has a multi-party system (with the effective number 
of political parties being 5.6
450
) with coalition governments the norm, and indeed since 
1992 minority governments being the norm.  This gave significant political power to 
minority parties who became ‘king makers’ after every election.  Danish voters 
traditionally used the small centre parties (Social Liberals, Conservative People’s Party, 
the Centre Party) as a moderating force by voting for  them in the event of the big centre-
left party (Social Democrats) or centre-right party (Liberals) holding an overall 
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majority.
451
  As Szczerbiak and Taggart point out,
452
 Euroscepticism often exists at the 
extremities of the political system and Denmark was no exception, with small parties on 
the radical left, centre-left and far-right holding explicitly Eurosceptic, or at least non-
committal, positions on Europe.  Their positions on Europe had to be accommodated in 
any programs for government coalitions.
453
   
Secondly, the powerful European Affairs Committee of the Danish parliament 
gave Eurosceptics additional power, as it had by convention been composed of as wide as 
possible membership from across the political spectrum.  The Committee had the power 
to overrule government policy on Europe, and more importantly perhaps, the government 
needed to have Committee approval on any negotiations agreed at the European Council 
level.  Having such an institutional brake was designed to provide a consensual, 
uncontroversial European policy.
454
  Compromise was obviously at the heart of Danish 
party politics, with the institutional political system and political culture designed to 
create common policy positions to aid both government creation and government policy 
execution.   
Thirdly, this emphasis on compromise at the national political level failed in 
relation to the creation of a European policy with cross-party support.  As will be 
discussed, shifting party positions on European integration forced a series of referendums 
on Europe to be held, despite the fact that constitutional provisions existed for European 
treaties to be passed by parliament.  With regard to foreign treaties that impact on the 
Danish Constitution, the Constitution itself states that they can be passed either by a 5/6
th
 
majority in the Folketinget (Danish Parliament) or if this is unachievable, by referendum.  
This was caused partly by government–opposition tensions, where opposition parties 
sought to gain politically by embarrassing the government through the loss of a 
referendum or the loss of a parliamentary vote on a European treaty.  The main factor 
driving the political pressure for the holding of these referendums however was the depth 
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of anti-European feeling among the membership and supporters of Danish political 
parties.  Danish parties, in particular those on the left and centre left were riven by 
internal party divisions on Europe from the mid-1970s and were unable to resolve them 
until the 2000s.  Understanding the failures of the party system to resolve the European 
issue is necessary in understanding how EPMs in Denmark were formed and endured for 
so long.  
 
5.4 The Impact of National Politics on EU Party Positions 
The most important trend in the Danish party system over the 1990s and 2000s 
was the collapse in support for the small centrist parties: the Centre party, Social Liberals, 
and the Conservative People’s Party.455  The Liberals and far-right Danish People’s Party 
were the main beneficiaries of this and increased their representation in the Folketinget.  
This had the effect of successive Danish governments since 2001 being of a right-wing 
orientation.  This development was important, as in contrast to previous centre-right 
administrations, these governments did not need the ‘calming’ votes of centre- or left-
wing parties to get laws passed.  The Liberal-led post-2001 governments relied on the 
votes of the non-government Danish People’s Party to get legislation passed.  Such 
legislation included increased restriction on immigration and the rights of asylum seekers, 
in addition to the first programme of sustained tax cuts in modern Danish history.   
Parties of the left and centre left were placed in a position where they had very little say 
in how policy was formed, a most unusual situation in post–war Danish politics and for 
these parties in particular.  Europe was one of the few policy areas where the left wing 
opposition still had a say in government policy.
456
  Parliamentary consensus on Danish 
relations with Europe was exemplified by the powerful European Affairs Committee.  
One of the most powerful committees in EU Parliaments, it had the power to dictate EU 
negotiating positions to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
457
  The committee had been 
given these powers so that European policy would be formed in a consensual manner, to 
                                                 
455
 Bille, ‘Political Data in 2005: Denmark’, p. 1088. 
456
 The other being the powerful Finance committee, which oversees the budget. 
457
 Bergman, ‘National Parliaments and EU Affairs Committees’, p. 378. 
  
178 
 
jointly confer legitimacy on it and also (perhaps more importantly) to calm internal party 
dissent on Europe given, that Eurosceptic voices had a say in policy formation.
458
 
These developments at the national level had forced the left in Denmark to re-
evaluate their European policy.  Two former party leaders, Holger K. Nielsen of the 
Socialist People’s Party  and Mogens Lykketoft of the Social Democrats, helped to direct 
their parties to a more pro-EU position by arguing to party members and officials that the 
consensus policy of the EU was the only restraining force on a right-wing Danish 
government.
459
  For left-wing parties it made no sense to argue in favour of more 
sovereignty for the national government, as the government was instituting a series of 
policies diametrically opposed to left-wing interests.  For the Socialist People’s Party and 
Social Democrats in particular, common EU policies on asylum-seekers’ rights and 
workers’ rights were to the left of what the Danish government was proposing.  Closer 
Danish co-operation with the EU in this area was put forward as a ‘calming’ influence on 
the ‘extreme’ right-wing policies of the government.  With the dramatic shift in the 
Danish electorate to right-wing parties, the traditional Danish government model of 
policy consensus across the political spectrum disappeared.  For left-wing parties, the 
only way for them to achieve influence on policy was to increase Danish participation in 
the EU, as they believed it would force the Danish government into holding more 
moderate positions.  
 Electoral shifts were replicated at the European Parliament level also as voters 
moved away from the Eurosceptic June Movement and People’s Movement, as shown in 
Table 5.1.  The combined vote share of the two was at its highest in 1994, with 25% of all 
European Parliament votes, but fell to 14% in 2009.  This left the June Movement without 
an MEP (in September 2009 it was wound up) and the People’s Movement with one 
MEP.
460
  This compares with the increasing vote share for the pro-EU Socialist People’s 
Party (up from one seat in 1999 to two in 2009) and the Social Democrats (up from three 
                                                 
458
 Ibid. 
459
 Interview with Drude Dahlerup, Founder, former EU referendums campaign director June Movement, 
2
nd
 September 2009 Interview with Drude Dahlerup, Founder, former EU referendums campaign director 
June Movement, 2
nd
 September 2009; Interview with Mogens Lykketoft, Danish Minister for Foreign 
Affairs 2000-1 and leader of the Social Democrats 2002-5, 15
th
 September 2009. 
460
 European Parliament, EP Elections Results 2009. 
  
179 
 
in 1999 to four in 2009).
461
  The pro-European left was not the only beneficiary of these 
shifts in voting patterns, as the largest Eurosceptic party at European Parliament 2009 
elections became the Danish People’s Party with two seats.  By 2009 the most successful 
form of Euroscepticism in Denmark came to be associated with the far right and not the 
hard left as represented by the electoral decline of the People’s Movement and the 
dissolution of the June Movement showed.
462
   
 
Table 5.1 Danish European parliamentary results by % vote and seat numbers 
 
Social 
Dem’s 
Liberals Con. SPP 
Social 
Liberals 
Centre 
Dem’s 
Progress 
Party 
DPP 
Peoples’ 
Move’t 
June 
Move’t 
2009 22%/4 20%/3 13%/1 16%/2 4%/0 N/A N/A 15%/2 7%/1 2%/1 
2004 33%/5 19%/3 11%/1 8%/1 6%/1 N/A N/A 7%/1 5%/1 9%/1 
1999 17%/3 23%/5 9%/1 7%/1 9%/1 4% 1% 6%/1 7%/1 16%/3 
1994 16%/3 19%/4 18%/4 9%/1 9%/1 1%/0 3%/0 N/A 10%/2 15%/2 
1989 23%/4 17%/3 13%/2 9%/1 2.8%/0 8%/2 5.3%/0 N/A 19%/4 N/A 
1984 20%/3 12%/2 21%/4 9%/1 3.1%/0 7%/1 3.5%/0 N/A 21%/4 N/A 
1979 22%/3 14%/3 14%/2 5%/1 3.3%/0 6%/1 6%/1 N/A 21%/4 N/A 
Source: Statistic Denmark http://www.dst.dk/valg/Valg1191212/valgopg/valgopgHL.htm 
- accessed 6
th
 June 2010.  N/A, refers to party not being in existence at the time of 
election.   
 
 The shift in the party system from centrist to right partly explains this situation.  
As Euroscepticism became associated with the radical right in Danish politics, Socialist 
People’s Party and Social Democrat members drifted away from the People’s Movement 
and the June Movement as their parties dealt with the European issue.  As with the UK 
case in Chapter Three, Denmark confirms the Hooghe-Marks model in the evolution of 
Euroscepticism from being based in the political left to the right in line with the progress 
of European integration.  The specificities of the Danish party system with regard to 
European integration meant that the changes affected by this shift were more dramatic 
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than those in the UK.  Hooghe and Marks were unsure of how this change would affect 
domestic party competition but in the Danish case its effect was to removed the support 
for the two EPMs.
463
 
   
 
5.5 Two Different Party Systems Start to Merge Into One 
 Since the first elections to the European Parliament in 1979 there has been a split 
in the Danish party system between voting patterns at national and European level.
464
  At 
the national level there was a multi-party system of parties from across the spectrum of 
radical left to populist right.  At the European level, however, since the first European 
elections in 1979 self-labelled EPMs took up to 25%.  These movements were successful 
in attracting so many votes, as they were not so much political parties as they were 
political brands with wide appeal.  While the leadership of both movements maintained 
that they were inclusive of all political beliefs, it was clear that both attracted the majority 
of their support from Eurosceptic Social Democrat and Social Liberal voters.
465
  The 
1979 and 1984 European elections showed that the European Parliament votes of the 
centre-right parties correlated fairly closely with those of general elections.  The 
European Parliament votes of the Social Democrats in particular were up to 18% less 
than in general elections.  The votes for the two other largest parties, the Liberals and 
Conservatives, either increased or decreased by just over 2%.
466
  This trend continued 
throughout the 1980s until the 2004 EP election, where the Social Democrats came closer 
to matching their national election results to their European results, while the People’s 
Movement and June Movement lost substantial support.  The position of the Social 
Democrats on Europe has therefore had an important effect on Danish EPMs.  Moreover, 
how the party dealt with the European issue helps to explain why so many of its 
supporters founded and continued to be involved with the two EPMs.   
During the various European referendum campaigns the Social Democrats 
allowed party members and several high profile elected officials to participate in the 
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People’s Movement.  This was done so as to prevent a split in the party over the European 
issue.  The section on public opinion discussed how popular opposition to European 
integration grew at an accelerated rate in the post–accession period.  This opposition was 
concentrated in the working-class and trade-union base of the Social Democrats.  As the 
realities of EU membership sunk in and the promised economic benefits failed to 
materialise, these groups began to voice strong internal opposition to Danish 
membership.
467
  The party leadership had committed itself totally to participation in 
European integration,
468
 but at the same time they could not ignore their members’ and 
supporters’ anti-European position.  Allowing the anti-European faction in the party to be 
active in the People’s Movement acted as a vent, sending Euroscepticism into the 
European level away from the national level.  The European issue did not ‘contaminate’ 
the domestic party system, by causing the formation of new parties or splits over it, as 
party leaders came to a tacit agreement with their Eurosceptic members to keep their 
Eurosceptic activities to European Parliament elections and European referendums.  It 
was indeed surprising that, given the level of public opposition to the EU in the 1970s 
and 1980s, there was not more of an impact on domestic Danish politics.  This impact 
failed to materialise, as votes in European Parliament elections became viewed as ‘mini-
referendums’ on the European issue, allowing Eurosceptic party members to become 
involved with the EPMs and voters to vote for them.  Mainstream party leaders were 
happy for this to happen and even facilitated, it as it allowed for the frustration of 
Eurosceptic members and supporters to be taken out on the party at the European 
Parliamentary level, where they believed there was no real political power, but at the 
same time retaining them for far more important national elections.
469
  Events in Danish 
politics were therefore key to understanding the origin of EPMs but just as important was 
the mobilising force of the referendum in EPM formation.  Referendums acted as a 
triangulation between EPMs, political parties and the EU.   
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5.6 Danish Referendums on Europe 
An important distinction of the use of referendums in Danish politics was that 
they were most frequently used as a means of consultation, rather than as a vehicle for 
drawing the public into the policy decision-making process.  While a handful of 
referendums were held on purely constitutionally issues, such as voting age, the vast 
majority were consultative and six were held specifically on Europe as Table 5.2 
shows.
470
  For accession to the EEC in 1972 the Social Democrat-led government decided 
to hold a referendum even if they succeeded in gaining the 5/6
th 
Folketinget majority 
needed to ratify a foreign treaty by parliament only.
471
  This approach was adopted so as 
to confer public legitimacy on membership, given the divisions created in Danish society 
over the prospect of membership.
472
 
Table 5.2: List of European referendums in Denmark 
 
Referendum Turnout % Yes % No % Result 
Accession 
(1972) 
3,080,150 90.1  63.4  36.6 Yes 
Single 
European 
Act 
(1986) 
2,897,824 75.4  56.2  43.8 Yes 
Maastricht 
(1992) 
3,962,005 83.1 1,606,442 49.3 1,653,289 50.7 No 
Maastricht 
II 
(1993) 
3,974,672 86.5 1,930,391 56.7 1,471,914 43.3 Yes 
Amsterdam 
(1998) 
3,996,333 76.2 1,647,692 55.1 1,342,595 44.9 Yes 
EMU 
(2000) 
3,999,325 87.6 1,620,353 46.8 1,842,814 53.2 No 
From: Svensson ‘Five Danish Referendums on the European Community and the 
European Union’; and Worre ‘The Danish Euro Party System’. 
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Not only did the Constitutional provision for referendums envisage them as a tool 
for public consultation but also as a safeguard for parliamentary minorities against 
legislation being forced through by a majority government.
473
  A parliamentary minority 
may demand that a bill passed by parliament must be passed by referendum as well for it 
to become law.  Thus majority governments would be required to take into account 
public opinion if they decided to force through law without wider consensus: given that 
majority governments were rare in Danish politics, such a measure was never used by a 
minority opposition.  It was, however, used by a minority government during the 
ratification process of the SEA in 1986.  The SEA referendum was unusual not just for 
the political crisis surrounding it but for the employment of a referendum by the 
government as a means to proceed with the ratification process.  Conservative PM 
Schlüter found his minority centre-right government could not muster a majority in 
parliament to pass the SEA and so put ratification before the Danish electorate.  If he had 
allowed a parliamentary defeat, then he would have had to call an election, which was not 
in his best interests, as his party was low in opinion polls at the time.   
 The two Maastricht referendums represented a major crisis for the Danish 
parliament as, unlike the SEA, the Maastricht Treaty was passed by a large parliamentary 
majority (still not more than the 5/6
th
s majority required), yet the public voted against the 
Treaty by slightly less than 50,000 votes.  This dissonance between parliamentarians and 
the public on Europe caused much questioning of the consensual nature of European 
policy making in the Folketinget, as it had clearly failed to take into account the views of 
a majority of the Danish electorate.   
The SEA referendum was crucial in establishing the use of a referendum as a 
means of de-facto direct democracy on European issues.
474
  This precedence was 
followed by first and second votes on Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty, and the 
rejected referendum on membership of EMU in 2000.  This convention was ended in 
2008 as the Folketinget voted to pass the Lisbon Treaty by more than the 5/6
th
 required, 
with just the Danish People’s Party and the hard left Left/Green Alliance voting 
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against.
475
   After the French and Dutch No to the European Constitution, and the No to 
the Euro in 2000 the Danish government was not going to risk another referendum.
476
  
Coupled with the move of the Social Democrats and Socialist People’s Party to a more 
pro-EU position (as outlined above) the Treaty passed with a strong majority in 
parliament, the first to do so since the Treaty of Accession in 1972.
477
 
 Looking at each Danish referendum on Europe will therefore help to trace the 
evolution of the Danish relationship with Europe, and the role of referendums in 
sustaining EPM formation in Denmark.  Due to the strong feeling of the Danish public on 
the European issue in particular, a referendum was an opportunity to make an impact on 
the European policy for individuals who would otherwise be outside the political process.  
The repeated use of referendums lends itself to the establishment of a permanent group, 
one that exists to campaign in the likely event of another referendum to challenge 
European integration.  All of these factors will now be discussed in the context of EPM 
formation. 
 
5.6.1 The 1972 Referendum on Accession 
 The Folketinget voted to hold a referendum on accession in 1971 regardless of 
whether or not the 5/6ths majority was reached or not.  At this time over 5/6ths of the 
parliament favoured membership so there was no constitutional requirement to hold a 
referendum.  The opposition Social Democrats called on the government to hold a 
decisive referendum, regardless of the outcome of the parliamentary vote, in an effort to 
assuage the Eurosceptic elements in their party.  The Social Democrats, acutely aware of 
increasing opposition to membership amongst their supporters and growing support for 
the anti-membership Socialist People’s Party, wanted to remove the membership issue 
from the forthcoming election.  Holding a decisive referendum on accession after the 
election defused the issue and prevented anti-membership votes going to the Socialist 
People’s Party.  The centre-right and right-wing parties reluctantly came to accept the 
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decision to hold a referendum but it was clear that the Social Democrats were the main 
drivers behind the decision to hold it.
478
 
 This tactic worked well for the Social Democrats as they went into a minority 
government with support from the Socialist People’s Party in late 1971 and the 
referendum was passed in June 1972.  This same negative public sentiment that pushed 
the Social Democrats into demanding a referendum was still evident in the outcome, 
despite the two to one vote in favour of membership.
479
  Support for membership was 
conditional on utilitarian benefits that trumped the widely held mistrust of European 
integration amongst the Danish electorate.  As many as 25% of Yes voters, acted against 
their opposition to membership and voted Yes, due to the greater appeal of the “tangible 
benefits” of integration and their identification with pro-membership parties.480 
Economics was emphasised as almost the sole reason for Danish membership, 
despite the presence of numerous other issues in the debate.
481
  Denmark first applied for 
membership in 1961 along with the UK and Ireland, as the UK was the most important 
market for its large agricultural export industry and so Denmark was forced to follow the 
UK in seeking membership.  The “long and torturous” negotiation process largely 
bypassed the attention of the Danish public, as it was ongoing for so long with no end 
result.  No mention was made of federalism or political union in the public discourse 
leading up to membership, so there was no public support for it given its low salience.  
Indeed, from 1973 to 1976 Danish support for political integration decreased 
significantly, while it remained steady in the other member states (as Figure 5.1 
shows).
482
  Negative public sentiment towards political integration was reinforced by No 
campaigners, who put forward the argument that membership would start off as purely 
economic, but would inevitably lead to political integration, regardless of the promises of 
the Yes side.  This focus on the “intangibles” of sovereignty and self-determination did 
not resonate with voters, compared to the explicit economic arguments made by the Yes 
side.  It did, however, set the parameters of the Danish EU relationship that continued to 
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exist up to and beyond the 2000 Euro referendum– that the relationship was purely 
economic and participation in political union was not, and never was, an option for 
Denmark.   
It was in the period of 1971-2 that there was a huge surge in opposition to 
accession, as the public realised that membership would soon be a reality for Denmark.  
Given that the major political parties, and all the main social groups and media outlets, 
supported membership, opposition to membership became indelibly linked to “mistrust in 
Danish officialdom”483.  On the No side were radical left parties, two small trade unions, 
and conservative nationalists.  These groups came together under the umbrella People’s 
Movement, which additionally attracted prominent intellectuals and activists from the 
Social Liberals and Social Democrats, to represent the No campaign in the mainstream 
media.
484485
  As will be discussed in the following section, the People’s Movement was a 
reaction by these groups to a perceived ostracisation of anti-accession arguments by the 
media and mainstream political parties.  The umbrella organisation, People’s Movement, 
was seen as a means by which a broad coalition of groups could force themselves into the 
national debate on the referendum, as they believed themselves to be “untouchable” by 
the mainstream media and would not get any coverage in separate campaigns.  The use of 
the People’s Movement brand was as much to gain widespread support as it was to 
overcome perceived media bias against radical-left groups.  This focus on “branding” of 
the EPM shows that the founders were indeed conscious of the media interpretation of 
their campaign and so sought to avoid it pre-emptively with the ditching of their domestic 
party identities and formation of the People’s Movement.  Despite this wide-ranging No 
campaign, membership was ratified by a 63.4% majority.   
The accession referendum in many ways set the agenda for Denmark’s 
relationship with Europe.  The pro-integrationists emphasised the economic benefits of 
participation, anti-integrationists argued that this was a Trojan horse for political union.   
 
                                                 
483
 Worre, Torben (1995). ‘First No then Yes: The Danish Referendums on the Maastricht Treaty’, Journal 
of Common Market Studies, 33: 2, p. 249. 
484
 Interview with Drude Dahlerup, Founder, former EU referendums campaign director June Movement, 
2
nd
 September 2009.  
485
 At this time anti-immigrationism was not a major issue in Denmark and so conservative nationalists had 
no policies wholly objectionable to left wing activists.   
  
187 
 
 
5.6.2 The 1986 Single European Act (SEA) Referendum 
Whereas the opposition to the membership referendum was based in grassroots 
movements, and political parties on the radical left and right, opposition to the SEA took 
the additional form of factions in mainstream political parties.  These factions were most 
concentrated and active in the Social Democrats and Social Liberals.  It was these 
Eurosceptic factions that caused the crisis (the SEA referendum vote) over the ratification 
of the SEA, fourteen years after there was apparently no such opposition in these same 
parties during the accession process.  To control these factions these parties openly 
allowed elected officials and party members to campaign with the People’s Movement, so 
as to prevent splits and defections.
486
  Instead of the factions being expelled from 
ostensibly pro-European parties, they were allowed to stay and cultivate their own 
candidates, with reciprocal advantages in securing parliamentary resources and national 
political and media outlets for Eurosceptic arguments.   
The impetus for the pressure to have a referendum on the SEA came from these 
factions.  The Social Democrats threatened Prime Minister Schlüter that they would vote 
against the Treaty in parliament should it be presented before them.  Their intention for 
doing this according to Worre, was that the Treaty was too much of an advance of the 
EEC into a political union.
487
  With a 5/6
ths
 majority needed for the passing of any foreign 
treaty before Parliament, and defeat on such a matter meaning resignation for his 
government, Schlüter called a referendum, and referred the issue to the electorate and 
away from parliament. 
The main motivating factor for Yes voters was that rejection of the Treaty would 
lead to a negative economic situation in Denmark.  This was a strong perception even 
amongst centre-left and left-wing voters.  The key to the Yes victory was the 41% of 
Social Democrat voters who ignored party cues, due to concerns about economic damage 
and Denmark leaving the Community, and voted Yes.
488
  While the Eurosceptic factions 
won out in forcing the referendum on the SEA Social Democrat supporters were not 
wholly behind them, showing the depth of the party division over the EU issue. 
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 The dramatic victory for the Yes side came against a sustained rise in public 
opposition to membership from the year of accession onwards (see Table 5.1 above).  
This public opposition began to manifest itself in the party system where factions of the 
Social Democrats and the Social Liberals not only forced the holding of the referendum 
in the first place but then left their parties to campaign with the People’s Movement.  The 
People’s Movement was thus able to expand its support beyond ‘outsiders’ of the political 
system and into institutional party ‘insiders’ with the ‘political opportunity’ to force the 
government to call referendums.   
 
 
5.6.3 The 1992 Maastricht Referendums  
While at the time of the first Maastricht referendum Danish public support for EU 
membership was in a clear majority, this did not signify a wider embrace of full Danish 
participation in European integration.  The rejection of Maastricht by a margin of 1.4% 
could be more correctly interpreted as an inevitable national dialogue about the extent of 
Danish participation in the European project.
489
  The Danish public were unsure of what 
participation in European integration would mean in the new ‘European Union’ created 
by the Maastricht Treaty.   
The public wanted to withdraw from cooperation on any policy that would lead to 
political union, in this case from monetary union, tax harmonisation and foreign 
policy.
490
  These three policy areas were frequently identified with national sovereignty.  
The Edinburgh Compromise negotiated Danish opt-outs in these three policy areas from 
the Maastricht Treaty with the other member states.  The most extensive opt out was from 
the creation of a common European citizenship: here, Denmark negotiated a position 
whereby any proposed rights granted to member state citizens must always refer to 
Danish law, and an explicit reference to the primacy of national citizenship was made.  
The Protocol on EMU membership took Denmark out of the third stage, which was 
membership of the Euro currency.  These protocols were obviously sufficiently 
acceptable for the Danish public as parameters for the Danish relationship with the post-
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Maastricht EU, given the 56.7% Yes vote in the referendum re-run.  The Edinburgh 
Compromise represented a move back to a more consensual style of policy, as the 
government was willing to facilitate the policy proposals of Eurosceptic opposition 
parties to deal with the apparently insurmountable situation of an EU unwilling to 
renegotiate and a Danish government unwilling to leave the EU.
491
 
 With their involvement in the Edinburgh compromise the Socialist People’s Party 
leadership moved to a pro-EU position.  Their membership, however, did not.  Socialist 
People’s Party voters still overwhelmingly voted No, with just 16% voting Yes, an 
increase of just 5%, thus leaving 84% of party members opposed to European 
integration.
492
  While the leadership of both the SPP and the Social Democrats made 
moves to be more actively pro-European, as they had accepted the national importance of 
full Danish involvement in the EU, a majority of their members had not.  This was shown 
in the strong No vote in both referendums.  The move of the party system towards a more 
pro-European stance and the shift in public opinion towards acceptance of Danish 
membership of the EU, amongst other points to be discussed later, caused a split in the 
People’s Movement.  Three of the party’s four MEPs left to form the June Movement.  
Essentially, while the new June Movement campaigned against the Maastricht Treaty, 
they were supportive of Danish membership of a pre-Maastricht Europe, a position that 
was more in line with the Danish public than outright rejection of membership.   
  
 
5.6.4 The 1998 Amsterdam Referendum 
 On this occasion the Socialist People’s Party split amicably, with Yes advocates 
forming New Europe to campaign for a Yes vote.  The Social Democrats continued to let 
members campaign with the People’s Movement and June Movement though they did not 
provide them with resources as with the SEA and Maastricht referendums.  The 55.1% 
Yes vote was not taken as a victory for the Yes side, as they sounded a conciliatory note 
in promising to take the views of No voters on board in future EU policy.  This reaction 
was evidence of the divisive nature of the EU issue, and particularly of the Yes side 
always being on the defensive, seeking compromise and never calling the result as an end 
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to the EU question in Denmark.
493
  The Social Democrat-led government refused to use 
the result to drive out Eurosceptics from the party, as the power of the factions was still 
too strong for them to take this action at this stage.  
People’s Movement and June Movement campaigners took considerable succour 
from the amount of No votes, particularly as the referendum came two months after a 
very closely fought general election, with media coverage of the referendum substantially 
reduced in comparison to the heated public debate of the Maastricht campaigns.
494
  The 
deference shown to them and to No voters by the government and Yes campaigners gave 
the People’s Movement and June Movement relevance to voters by showing that their 
arguments were taken seriously by the government.
495
  This provided much-needed 
psychological support in the wake of the split in the People’s Movement in 1992 and the 
gradual strengthening of mainstream party support for the EU.    
 
 
5.6.5 The 2000 Referendum on Euro 
One of the Danish opt-outs from Maastricht was on participation in the third stage 
of European Monetary Union (EMU).  The pressure to reverse this stance through a 
referendum was threefold: firstly, from the successful launch of the Euro; secondly, from 
Danish business groups; and thirdly, from the staunchly pro-EU Liberals and Christian 
People’s Party.  The Social Democrat-led government was very wary about holding a 
referendum, as the party was still split on the issue of EMU membership.  Although 
Prime Minister Nyrup Rasmussen was in favour, and public opinion was slightly in 
favour, he needed a long consultation period with ordinary party members before he 
could hold a referendum and campaign for a Yes vote.  At a party conference members 
who were active in the People’s Movement and June Movement were offered a platform.  
In an open party vote 486 out of 500 delegates voted to support a Yes vote in the 
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referendum.  The party leadership successfully resolved internal party dissent and 
removed an important base of support for the People’s Movement and June Movement.496   
 The crux of the referendum campaign fell on the word of the Danish Economic 
Council (DEC), who concluded that EMU would have a negligible effect on the Danish 
economy, neither good nor bad.  The DEC, as an independent statutory body, was 
charged by the government with compiling a report on the effect of Eurozone 
membership on the Danish economy.
497
  As a widely respected economic authority, their 
conclusion was all the more damning to the Yes campaign.  This undermined the Yes 
argument of the economic imperative of a Yes vote, while strengthening the No claim 
that it was more political than economic.  The clear No vote of 53.2% was given great 
legitimacy with the 87.6% turnout, the second highest for a European referendum.  This 
was a serious defeat for the political establishment, given their explicit support for a Yes 
vote, and that just 47% of supporters of pro-Euro parties voted Yes.
498
  After the 
Maastricht referendums the Danish EPMs were seen as the big winners, who went on to 
receive an extra 200,000 more votes in the 1994 European Parliament elections than the 
1989 elections.  From the post-Euro referendum analysis, however, it can be seen that 
support for the Danish EPMs declined and the link between support for them and votes in 
European referendums was broken.  The resolution of the European issue in the Social 
Democrats and the Socialist People’s Party, coupled with the rise of the Danish People’s 
Party, attacked the Danish EPMs support base from the left and the right causing their 
vote to decline by 200,000 in the 2004 EP elections.
499
  After the Euro referendum 
Danish voters no longer felt that the People’s Movement and the June Movement 
articulated opposition to aspects of European integration in the form that they, in large 
numbers, clearly wanted expressed at the national political level.   
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5.6.6 Referendums as vital to EPM mobilisation 
The successful strategy of Danish EPMs was of campaigning for referendums to 
be held, as they argued that this was the only means by which the true voice of the people 
on the European issue could be heard.  This tactic worked successfully with the SEA 
referendum, where People’s Movement members in the Social Democrats and Social 
Liberals pushed their parties to challenge the government on holding a referendum.  The 
threat of a repeat action led the government to do the same for the Maastricht and 
Amsterdam referendums. 
 Referendums were therefore important to the Danish EPMs, as not only did they 
focus activity around a specific event, but in campaigning for them to be held in the first 
place, they provided legitimacy for their actions, as they claimed to be fighting for the 
“right of the people to decide”.  In successfully establishing the precedents for 
referendums to be held on European treaties, the EPMs were able to label themselves as 
“defenders of the right of the people to decide”, as opposed to mainstream pro-Treaty 
parties that they labelled as elitist for wanting European issues decided at the 
parliamentary level only.
500
  As the number of referendums from the SEA increased to 
four by 2000, the claims of the EPMs to be defending the rights of the public against the 
elite were contradicted.  As the public opinion data showed, it became a widespread 
belief amongst the Danish electorate that their view on Europe mattered and was taken 
into account.  Once the public came to appreciate that the government and the EU would 
listen to their views via a referendum, a key policy of the EPMs was removed.  Originally 
referendums were a source of mobilisation and of promotional strength for Danish EPMs.  
As the number of referendums increased, and the electorate voted No in two of them, 
thereby securing significant concessions on the Maastricht Treaty and preventing 
membership of the Euro, referendums became symbols of a responsive EU and political 
elite that was willing to negotiate with the EU to secure what the Danish public wanted.  
Such a situation dramatically reduced the relevance of the EPMs.    
The repeated use of referendums to ratify Danish participation in European 
integration allowed Danish EPMs to put forward their arguments to the public and 
                                                 
500
 Interview with Drude Dahlerup, Founder, former EU referendums campaign director June Movement, 
2
nd
 September 2009. 
  
193 
 
mobilise support.  Party factionalism over Europe and intense domestic party competition 
that came to the fore at these referendums created additional opportunities for the EPMs 
to draw membership and support from experienced political functionaries.  The role of 
referendums was therefore highly important in the formation and presence of EPMs.  The 
repeated use of referendums as a means of legitimising government EU policy was at 
odds with the People’s Movement’s and June Movement’s argument that only a vote for 
them would allow the true voice of the Danish people on Europe to be heard.   Just as 
repeated referendums became a source for EPM formation, they eventually served to 
undermine the activities of the EPMs.  As a consequence of so many European 
referendums, by the 2000s the majority of Danish voters believed that the EU listened to 
them.  Without a sense of alienation from the EU, and with a political elite apparently 
compliant with the electorate’s wishes on European integration, the level of public 
support available to EPMs declined significantly. 
 
 
Section Two: EPMs in Denmark 
 
5.7 Overview of Danish EPMs 
Euroscepticism in Denmark was synonymous with the People’s Movement and 
the June Movement and their success in European Parliament elections (as Table 5.1 
shows) and in organising campaigns against European Treaties at referendums.  They are 
referred to as EPMs throughout this chapter, despite both of them contesting European 
elections for several reasons.  Firstly, they referred to themselves as movements, with 
supporters, functionaries and elected officials seeing the EPMs as extensions of civil 
society based campaigning that was not in conflict with their contestation of European 
Parliament elections.  Secondly, the People’s Movement’s first appearance was as a 
movement that encompassed the Left Socialists’ Party, the Communist Party of 
Denmark, the Socialist Workers Party and smaller anti-nuclear, ecologist and left wing 
grassroots groups in the early 1970s.   Finally, they did not contest national parliamentary 
elections as they did not seek to govern.  Only with the first European Parliament 
elections in 1979 was the move to contesting elections made.  They retained much of the 
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appearance of the umbrella movement they started out, as due to the continued 
participation of a series of youth movements, socialist and ecological groups in 
supporting the People’s Movement.  While the June Movement was begun by European 
Parliament members, it too acted as an umbrella organisation for several trade unions and 
youth movements.  Labelling both as EPMs therefore takes into consideration their self-
taxonomy, their organisational structure, their focus on singular contestation of Europe 
and their acceptance of both elected and ordinary members of political parties into their 
ranks.   
In addition to looking at the mobilising factors for the EPMs, this section will 
look at the factors that caused them to move to contest European Parliament elections, 
and it will also look at the factors that led to their dramatic decline (and in the case of the 
June Movement their dissolution).  The Danish case was indeed interesting, for it saw 
EPMs achieve tremendous electoral success.  Only in Denmark did EPMs move to 
contest European elections, not in the other case studies, or in any other member states.  
Locating the causal factors for the formation of the EPMs enables an understanding to be 
formed as to why they progressed to contest European Parliament elections.  This is a 
question that has been posed by Mair and Thomassen in their analysis of representation 
and European integration.
501
  Looking at the Danish EPMs is therefore highly relevant to 
this debate.   
 
5.7.1 The People’s Movement No to the EU 
 The People’s Movement represented an example of opponents to European 
integration overcoming their domestic political differences and uniting successfully to 
campaign firstly against membership and successive referendums, and secondly for their 
movement to win election to the European Parliament.  In 1973 they represented far left 
parties, the Communist Party of Denmark, Left Socialists, and Socialist Workers Party, 
but also civil society movements such as Danish CND, several small trade unions and 
environmentalist groups.  In the post-accession period members of the Social Democrats 
and the Social Liberals, and the whole of the Socialist People’s Party, met with former 
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People’s Movement members to discuss re-launching the People’s Movement to contest 
the European Parliament elections.  Thus the People’s Movement broadened out its 
membership from the hard left to the centre left and centre.  The desire to challenge 
Danish participation in European integration at the accession referendum and European 
Parliament elections proved to be a strong enough force to bind these individuals to the 
People’s Movement.   
To the members of political parties there was no conflict in supporting their party 
in local and domestic elections, and then campaigning against them at European 
Parliament elections.  They held the genuine belief that they were involved in a 
movement, not a political party, that the domestic and European policies of their parties 
could be separated.  When factionalism within the party system over Europe was at its 
height in the 1980s and early 1990s, political parties facilitated the involvement of their 
members with the EPMs by tacitly condoning their participation and, in the case of the 
Social Democrats, providing them with the resources to campaign against Europe from 
within the party itself.  As the European issue dissipated in salience in the 1990s, the 
parties began to act more decisively against members who were still involved in the 
EPMs.  While this did not involve the ultimate action of expulsion, more subtle and 
effective forms were employed.  The main method was the placing of candidates, who 
were still involved in the EPMs, down the party list thereby making it very difficult for 
them to be elected, a process that was used in both local and European elections, thus 
ensuring that elected party members followed the party line on Europe (used in particular 
by the Social Liberals).  The Social Democrats’ leadership forced a vote on their 
European policy at an Emergency General Meeting on the Euro referendum, which the 
Eurosceptics lost in a landslide, and hence the party considered Eurosceptics removed as 
an effective faction in the party.   
People’s Movement supporters placed their membership and participation with the 
EPM in the specific sphere of European and foreign affairs.  They considered this 
fundamentally different from their involvement in their national parties, which was in 
relation to their domestic policy concerns.
502
  Such an explicit display of party disloyalty 
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effectively went unpunished by parties during the 1970, 1980s and into the early 1990s, 
as the sentiment of members on the European issue was so strong that party leaderships 
could not risk damaging splits over Europe.  The People’s Movement therefore became a 
safety valve for parties, primarily the Social Democrats and Social Liberals, for venting 
member dissatisfaction on their party’s position on Europe.  If the People’s Movement 
had gone on to challenge these same parties at the national level, this tacit acceptance of 
their activities would have been reversed and the valve of support shut off.   
From this history of the People’s Movement its left-wing origins are obvious.  It 
was founded as left-wing activists needed a non-party vehicle that would attract both the 
party politically- and non-party politically-aligned in opposition to the membership 
referendum in 1972.  Party political-based campaigning would have been too divisive and 
would have alienated Social Democrat members and supporters, who were a potentially 
large source of support.  Danish voting patterns in European Parliament elections, as the 
radical left parties who partly composed the People’s Movement obtained no more than 
15% of votes in national elections at the time.
503
  
 
“The People’s Movement is not a political party, and the European election is not a 
party affair, but an opportunity to demonstrate the people’s attitude to EC. It is 
important to underline that the Folketing today does not represent the people’s 
attitude to EC.’  The purpose was, thus, to transform the Euro-election into a new 
referendum for or against EC-membership”.504 
 
 By 1979 it was not clear whether or not Denmark would have another referendum 
on Europe.  The European issue was still not settled in the party system and so European 
Parliamentary elections became the obvious focus for the EPMs.  There was no plan for 
what would happen should they be successful and eventually force Denmark out, the 
People’s Movement was too diverse a coalition for such a policy to be formulated, the 
intention being that their success alone would force the government into alternative plans 
against which they could then react.
505
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Aside from the determination to contest EU membership at the European 
Parliament level, the more functional factors of resource allocation and media exposure 
added to the decision to contest European Parliamentary elections.  Constant 
campaigning against Danish participation in European integration required significant 
resources.  Obtaining the resources available to MEPs would provide badly needed funds 
for the creation of a full time office and staff to ‘keep the flame of resistance’ to Danish 
EU membership alive.
506
  Additionally, receiving an electoral mandate and elected office 
was envisaged to provide significant legitimacy amongst the media and public alike with 
regard to press releases and participation in public debates.
507
  The success of the 
People’s Movement ‘brand’ was shown when the Communists were unable to win seats 
in the Folketinget but two of their candidates won MEP seats under the People’s 
Movement list in 1979 as Table 5.1 shows.
508
 
 The movement label was important to members of the People’s Movement, as the 
majority of them were active members of other political parties, both pro- and anti- 
European parties.
509
  Adopting such a label was not just important for attracting voters, 
they argued, but had important organisational and tactical implications. Firstly, as a 
movement they refused to seek election to the Danish parliament, as this would have led 
to divisions amongst their members.  It would have also suggested that the party sought 
to govern Denmark with a specific policy agenda.
510
  Secondly, as a movement and not a 
political party, they focused on the single raison d’être of the movement, that of Danish 
membership of the EU, and did not need to broaden their appeal into other policy issues 
as a political party, such as UKIP, would need to do to stay electorally relevant.  
Broadening their policy positions would have been difficult for members, as the potential 
for an ideological clash was high given that members ranged from communist to 
conservative.
511
  NATO membership was one of the most controversial issues for the 
movement.  As a result, the People’s Movement did not have a position on Danish NATO 
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membership.
512
  Finally, as a movement, the People’s Movement’s leadership believed 
they had an advantage over political parties in that they could tap into ordinary citizens’ 
goodwill towards civil society movements and exploit their cynicism toward political 
parties.  Rebranding themselves into a political party, they believed, would have had a 
negative impact, not only on their membership, but on the Danish public’s perception of 
them.   
The organisation of the People’s Movement further differentiated itself from 
political parties especially with regard to contesting European treaties in referendum 
campaigns; the executive board point out that their organisational structure was the 
“backbone of the movement”.513  The People’s Movement had over 100 local branches 
organised throughout the country, in particular on the small islands of the Danish 
archipelago and the rural areas of the Jutland peninsula.  Given the isolated nature of 
these areas, few political organisations were represented there, thus giving a distinct 
advantage to the group.  These local branches usually revolved around a single person, 
who kept “the flame burning”514 for the People’s Movement by writing letters to local 
newspapers and handing out copies of their newsletter.
515
  Before referendums and 
European elections, local branches elected committees to campaign and distribute 
material from the People’s Movement’s head office.   
As discussed earlier, given the self-applied label of ‘movement’, these local 
branches held a distinct advantage over political parties, especially in relation to 
European referendums.  These branches had individual canvassers on the ground from an 
early period in the campaign with extensive EU specific literature, in areas where the 
mainstream political parties had little or no local presence.  Similarly to the Irish 
Eurosceptic campaign strategy, the People’s Movement used posters to get their 
arguments into the public discourse on Europe/the EU referendum in question, despite 
lacking in mainstream media exposure or the resources to hold press conferences.  The 
People’s Movement engaged in the extensive use of posters, specifically using bus stops, 
train stations and other public areas across the country, with local organisations picking 
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out the locations and suitability of each poster for the area in question.
516
  The practical 
campaigning of the EPM easily fits into the parameters of collective action as undertaken 
by a social movement from the established literature detailed in Section 1.4.3.   
This dissonance between the People’s Movement as civil society-based 
campaigner against European treaties and their contesting of European elections came to 
a head by the time of the 2000 referendum on Euro membership.  Despite organising an 
effective campaign against membership, support for the People’s Movement at the 
following European elections in 2004 had collapsed by some 15% from its peak in 1979.  
In Section 5.6 on Danish EU referendums it was shown that the two major sources of 
support for the People’s Movement, the Socialist People’s Party and Eurosceptic 
members of the Social Democrats, came under pressure from party leadership to resolve 
the EU issue once and for all.  By the 2004 European Parliamentary elections this had 
largely been achieved.  Thus, the People’s Movement was left effectively as the European 
Parliament branch of the Red-Green Alliance.  Its role as an umbrella movement for 
Eurosceptic activists to contest elections at the European level had effectively ended.  
What did not end however, were their protest movement actions.  In contesting the 
Lisbon Treaty the People’s Movement organised themselves to campaign for a 
referendum.  When the Treaty was passed in the Folketinget, members lodged an 
unsuccessful constitutional challenge in the court system to force the government to hold 
a referendum.
517
  While their strategy of contesting European integration through the 
European Parliament received a severe setback, their ability to form and contest the EU 
through civil society remained intact.   
 
 
5.7.2 The June Movement 
On September 5
th
 2010 the June Movement held an extraordinary general 
meeting, the purpose of which was to wind up the movement.
518
  This decision came in 
                                                 
516
 People’s Movement campaign literature for proposed referendum on EU Constitutional Treaty, 
including posters, pamphlets and flyers. 
517
 Marckmann-Andreassen, Andreas, ‘Danish MPs vote against EU treaty referendum’, The EU Observer, 
12
th
 December, 2007. 
518
 Announcement by the June Movement - http://j.dk/nyheder/kommentar/junibevaegelsen_er_nedlagt/ 
accessed 9
th 
September 2009. 
  
200 
 
the wake of their electoral collapse in the European Parliamentary elections of June 2009, 
when their vote was reduced from 9.1% to 2.4% and they lost their sole MEP (see Table 
5.1).  During the 1990s the June Movement received the third largest amount of votes in 
European Parliamentary elections, coming only a few thousand behind the Social 
Democrats and significantly ahead of the People’s Movement.  How the June Movement 
came to dominate Danish Euroscepticism in the 1990s but then went on to collapse by 
2009 is illustrative of the dynamic factors that can cause EPM formation, yet also lead to 
their dissolution.   
The June Movement originated as a split by three of the MEPs of the People’s 
Movement, Jens Peter Bonde, Birgit Bjørnvig and Ulla Sandbæk from the People’s 
Movement.  They took this decision due to differences over what they believed the 
People’s Movement’s policy on participation in European integration should be.  
Compounding this was a personality clash between the three individuals who organised 
themselves around Bonde and the other MEP Karup who had the support of the 
Movement’s leadership.519  Their experience of working in the European Parliament led 
the founders of the June Movement to believe that although they were hostile to European 
integration, with certain reforms and a more democratic structure a deeply reformed EU 
could play an important role in organising international cooperation to solve a range of 
issues important to them.  This position was untenable to the People’s Movement 
leadership, as firstly this would undermine the movement’s unifying policy of Danish 
withdrawal from the EU, and secondly it came into conflict with the People’s 
Movement’s socialist critique of European integration as a project driven by the capitalist 
interests of larger member states.
520
 
Tensions rose during the first Maastricht referendum in 1992, and in the wake of 
the successful No campaign Bonde and the others took the opportunity of high national 
interest in the European issue to launch the June Movement.  The name was a reference to 
the first Maastricht referendum having been held in the month of June.  They chose as 
their symbol a strawberry, a fruit synonymous with June in Denmark and a vivid emblem 
for use in campaigns.  The three MEPs were joined by veteran anti-European 
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campaigners Drude Dahlerup and Niels Meyer.
521
 Using funds available from their MEP 
positions, the June Movement campaigned against the second Maastricht referendum but 
placed Dahlerup and Meyer as their representatives in media debates and campaign 
literature, as they sought to emphasise that they were a movement with strong roots 
among civil society activists.
522
 
Despite the Yes outcome of the second referendum in 1993, the June Movement 
were satisfied with their contestation, as they believed that they were well positioned to 
take advantage of the shift in public opinion towards membership that had occurred after 
the Maastricht referendums.  The June Movement sought to portray themselves as 
pragmatic Eurosceptics who, while having vigorously opposed the Maastricht Treaty and 
the Edinburgh compromise, recognised the will of the electorate in supporting a limited 
form of European integration.  This was in contrast to the People’s Movement who 
appeared totally wedded to their commitment to end Danish membership of the EU 
against popular sentiment and almost the whole of the party system.
523
  This positioning 
paid significant dividends for the June Movement in the 1994 European Parliament 
elections the following year, where they received 15.2% of the vote and two European 
Parliament seats (see Table 5.1).  In doing so, they not only took votes from the People’s 
Movement but votes from the Centre Democrats and Social Democrats, showing the wide 
appeal of the movement relative to the smaller vote (10.3%) of the People’s 
Movement.
524
 
The June Movement sought to attract support and membership from two main 
sections – ordinary members of Trade Unions and members of the Social Democrats.525  
The June Movement found particular support during the 2000 Euro referendum in the 
unskilled labour union FFF
526
, the largest Danish trade unions, where local branches 
donated money, volunteers and organised meetings.  Leading members of the movement 
identified distaste among trade union members for the union’s leadership in sharing the 
same platform with business and employer representatives in support of Euro 
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membership.
527
  Given that there were some 100+ trade unions in Denmark there was 
substantial scope for the June Movement to attract support from centre-left trade unions 
alienated by the hard-left People’s Movement and the pro-European leadership of the 
Social Democrats and Socialist People’s Party.   
The June Movement’s policy was based on a ‘reformist’ critique of European 
integration.  Though they sat with the secessionist UKIP in the European Parliament, 
their common cause was ‘transparency and democracy’.  It was a marriage of anti-
European convenience, with UKIP using the term Eurosceptic and the June Movement 
insisting on the term ‘Eurorealist’.  This term, Eurorealist, was arrived at as a response to 
accusations that they were anti-European and Eurosceptic.  The June Movement 
countered that they accepted both Danish public support for and the reality of European 
integration.  Their argument against claims that they were Eurosceptic was that they 
believed that the EU should be reformed to be more democratic, with a focus on issues 
that could only be dealt with at the European level.  Their policies were grouped in two 
broad areas: firstly, democracy in the EU with specific emphasis on transparency and 
subsidiarity, and secondly, the development of a new form of European-level co-
operation in dealing with genetically modified foods, the environment, and workers’ 
rights.   
The slogan of the June Movement that “we don’t want Denmark out of Europe, 
we want the EU out of Europe”,528 sought to encapsulate a new paradigm of Danish 
opposition to European integration, one that was accepting towards membership but 
sceptical towards the then current trajectory of European integration.  In relation to the 
functioning of the EU they proposed that all budgets, decision making, and lobbying 
should be in the open in full public view.  This emphasis on transparency was shared by 
Eurosceptics, such as UKIP, and co-operation on these issues, in particular on the EU 
budget, was a major component in them forming the ‘Independence and Democracy’ 
European Parliament group with them.  Where they differed from UKIP was in their call 
for a form of European cooperation that allowed for “political decisions [to] be taken at 
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the lowest possible level at which effective decision-making can occur”.529  On European 
cooperation their argument was that “[a] flexible form of European cooperation, where it 
is possible for a country to participate in selected areas of cooperation while not 
participating in others, would also help us to distance ourselves from the formation of a 
unitary EU State, which is only the next step from a supranational federation”.530  Other 
policies they promoted were a roll-back of EU bureaucracy and ‘sunset’ clauses for EU 
regulations, closer scrutiny and great powers to national parliaments in relation to the 
Commission, and greater use of referendums to involve the EU populace in decision 
making.
531
 
In addition to the specific alternative European policies to the EU, the June 
Movement highlighted more general issues of concern but not to the same extent as their 
democratic critique.  These policies were based on ecological concerns over the 
imposition of genetically modified foods through the CAP where they argued for an 
explicit total ban on GM foods in the EU.  Additionally they put forward a traditional 
left-wing defence of public healthcare that they believed was under threat from the 
proposed EU services directive.   
 A significant obstacle for the June Movement to overcome was the labelling of 
them as extremist and xenophobic by the pro-EU campaigners.  Their main policy 
platform of subsidiarity as a necessity for the EU to be truly democratic was used to 
counter the extremist label, as they sought to portray themselves as defenders of the 
Danish tradition of grassroots democracy.  In campaigning their argument was that the 
mainstream pro-EU parties were overseeing the transfer of Danish sovereignty to 
Brussels, and that only they could provide a voice to a Danish public that was used to 
“direct contact with politicians” and was now on the receiving end of decisions from the 
EU “with no one to talk to” about them.532  Former senior June Movement officials 
conceded that they never truly succeeded in overcoming the extremist label that their 
opposition to European integration brought them.  This was exemplified during the Euro 
referendum campaign where they found significant problems in getting their arguments 
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covered in the Danish media.  While the broadcast media had specific guidelines about 
allotting equal coverage to both sides, the print media did not.  The June Movement 
believed that political pressure was put on the media not to cover their campaign.  In 
retaliation they held an international press conference about how the Danish media was 
not covering their campaign, whereupon the Danish media covered the international 
media coverage of the June Movement’s campaign.533   
The June Movement continued this success into the 1999 European Parliament 
elections where they slightly increased their vote by 0.9% and managed to secure an extra 
seat at the expense of the People’s Movement.  Building on this success, the June 
Movement campaigned against Euro membership in the 2000 referendum.
534
  Again 
Dahlerup was placed as the movement’s main public representative, and not the more 
high profile MEPs, as part of a loose coalition of trade unionists and academic 
economists but not with the Danish People’s Party and People’s Movement who led their 
own individual campaigns.  EMU membership was rejected with a 53.2% No vote, but 
this outcome did not prove beneficial to the long-term success of the June Movement.  As 
discussed in Sections 5.3 and 5.4, Euroscepticism in Denmark had changed significantly 
from the time of the Maastricht Treaty.  The Social Democrats were no longer indecisive 
on their European policy and the continued electoral success of the Danish People’s Party 
signalled that the form of Euroscepticism espoused by the June Movement no longer 
resonated with the Danish electorate.  In the 2004 European Parliamentary elections June 
Movement lost two of its seats in a more competitive election environment, as Denmark’s 
representation was reduced by two seats, to the resurgent, Eurosceptic faction free, Social 
Democrats.
535
  Finally, in the 2009 European Parliament election the June Movement’s 
vote collapsed to just 2.4%, with Table 5.1 illustrating this steady decline in support.   
The June Movement can be viewed similarly to the People’s Movement in that 
they sought to balance out their role as a civil society movement and their participation in 
European integration.  Unlike the People’s Movement, they could not achieve a balance 
that allowed them to survive their European Parliamentary electoral meltdown, and so, 
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devoid of a relevant base in civil society from which to continue their contestation of 
European integration as a social movement, they ended.   
 
 
5.7.3 Inter-Eurosceptic Electoral Rivalry 
The difference between the two EPMs was that the People’s Movement wanted 
Denmark to leave the EU and the June Movement wanted to revert to a pre-Maastricht 
form of European integration.  The People’s Movement’s goal was for Denmark to 
withdraw from the EU and adopt a relationship with the EU that most closely resembled 
that of Swiss–EU relations.536  For the June Movement, withdrawal was not a 
consideration.  Instead they sought to roll back the advance of the Maastricht Treaty on 
Danish sovereignty, and seek to re-establish a pre-Maastricht Danish relationship with the 
EU.  The People’s Movement became a totemic symbol of opposition to the EU for left-
wing voters, whose national parties had oscillated for and against various EU treaties, 
despite their opposition to European integration remaining constant.
537
  
The June Movement’s Bonde, on the other hand, was quite well known outside of 
Denmark.  They made a conscientious effort to disseminate their specific criticisms of 
EU integration beyond Denmark across the member states and candidate countries 
through the TEAM
538
 network.  They represented a less ideologically constrained 
criticism of the EU, one more focused on sovereignty, EU reform and specific post-
materialist issues, such as healthcare and the environment.
539
  Bonde moved towards a 
‘Eurorealist’ critique of European integration in the post-1989 Maastricht period.  His 
skill in using the media for self-promotion made him the ‘face’ of Danish 
Euroscepticism.  What made Bonde stand out amongst other Eurosceptics, not just in 
Denmark but across the EU, was his success in creating a wider, non-ideological critique 
of European integration that was used by EPMs such as the Bruges Group, the Irish 
National Platform, the Irish People’s Movement and the Estonian Research Centre Free 
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Europe amongst others.
540
  Whereas members of the People’s Movement kept their 
activities to their hard left EP GUE/NGL
541
 group, Bonde sought to promote himself as 
the intellectual leader of the form of Euroscepticism he labelled ‘Eurorealism’ by 
promoting his arguments to both left-wing and right-wing opponents of European 
integration.
542
  
These key differences between the People’s Movement and the June Movement 
could be generally classified around personality, ideology and finally nationalism versus 
internationalism.  What role these issues played in the formation of the EPMs will now be 
discussed and their relevance evaluated.  In addition, the question as to why only two 
EPMs emerged will be addressed.  
 
 
Section Three: Evaluation of the Explanatory Factors 
 
 Over the course of this chapter the relationship between the focus of the thesis as 
a whole, what causes the formation of EPMs, to that of the propositions was touched on 
and highlighted, where appropriate.  This final section will now draw from the rest of the 
chapter and locate the main factors impacting on the relevance of each proposition.  
 
EF1: The more pro-European the media are, the more likely that EPMs will form.   
 The media played an important role in the formation of the People’s Movement.  
Founder members were angered by the lack of exposure anti-EU arguments were getting 
in the national print media and the negative light in which they were portrayed in the 
national public broadcast media.  As with the other cases, however, it represented an 
element of an overall confirmation that they were ‘outsiders’ from the main political 
system.  It did not cause formation but it helped create the environment in which an EPM 
was the most effective means of campaigning.  The founders of the People’s Movement 
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as members of radical-left political parties knew that they needed an effective political, 
non-ideological ‘brand’ to put forward a Eurosceptic argument in the media.  A non-
political, civil society-based movement would receive more neutral coverage in the media 
than a political party-based one, as it would come largely unencumbered with domestic 
political baggage.  Therefore, considerations of media coverage played a role in deciding 
to form the People’s Movement EPM, ahead of a purely political party-based campaign 
against the accession referendum.    
 
EF2: The lower the level of Euroscepticism in the party system, the more likely that 
EPMs will form.   
 The most important impact of the role of the level of Euroscepticism in the party 
system was in not only sustaining EPM formation but in also facilitating its growth and 
increased importance in the Danish political system.  Danish Euroscepticism in the 
1970s, 1980s and into the early 1990s was spread out amongst voters in greatest numbers 
on the hard left but in significant numbers on centre left, centre and radical right.  The 
leaders of mainstream centre parties and the Social Democrats were unsure of how to 
deal with the level of Euroscepticism amongst their supporters, given the pro-European 
leanings of their respective leaderships, and so they took neutral positions.  Frustration at 
this impasse mobilised supporters and functionaries of these parties to re-form the 
People’s Movement to participate in the first European Parliament elections in 1979 as a 
means of expressing their opposition to Danish membership of the EU.   
 
EF3: The more referendums on European issues, the more likely that EPMs will 
form.   
 Referendums were the main causal factor behind the original formation of Danish 
EPMs.  Once government negotiations were concluded and a referendum on membership 
proposed, the People’s Movement was launched to campaign against the accession 
referendum in 1972.  Beyond this, referendums played a role in sustaining EPMs as they 
provided a locus by which they could mobilise support in opposition to Europe and 
provided them with media exposure as the leading opponents of European integration.  
The Maastricht Treaty played a significant role in the formation of the June Movement, as 
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it allowed Eurosceptics who favoured some, but not full, cooperation with Europe a 
framing point to present an alternative to the then trajectory of European integration.  
Their alternative was for a pre-Maastricht Europe, which allowed for European-level 
cooperation on the single market and on environmental policy but left key policies in the 
competencies of national governments.  More importantly, the passing of the second 
Maastricht referendum made a policy of withdrawal from the EU out of step with public 
opinion and thus created political space for the June Movement to emerge.   
 
 
EF4: The more open the policy process (including institutional factors such as the 
electoral system), the more likely that EPMs will form. 
 Radically different voter behaviour at national and European elections allowed 
both movements to form.  The open nature of a single national constituency for European 
Parliamentary elections allowed for issues of national importance (e.g. Europe) to take 
precedence over local issues.  The People’s Movement were fully conscious of this 
benefit when they decided to re-form and contest the first European Parliamentary 
elections in 1979.  This gave confidence to the founders of the June Movement, in that 
they knew they could take the risk of forming their new movement and compete 
successfully in European Parliamentary elections.  Additionally, judicial rulings on equal 
coverage for both No and Yes sides in the public broadcast media meant that the EPMs 
knew they would have a public platform from which to put forward their arguments. 
 
 
EF5: The more available are state and/or private resources, the more likely that 
EPMs will form. 
 The availability of human resources played a central role in the formation of the 
People’s Movement.  The sheer number of trade unionists, mainstream party members 
and individual citizens who wanted to actively contest European integration through a 
protest movement was a key driver in the formation of the People’s Movement.  
Additionally, financial resources did play a role in their decision to move from civil-
society, grassroots campaigning to contesting European elections.  It did not have a 
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mobilisation effect but more of an evolutionary effect.  The promise of monetary and 
organisational support from holding a European Parliamentary seat was one of the 
reasons why the People’s Movement re-formed to contest European elections in 1979.  
Their plan was to use these resources to increase their campaigning against Danish EU 
membership. 
 
 
5.8 Main Conclusions from the Danish Case 
Danish EPMs were a fascinating study in how EPM formation and development 
reflects national relationships with European integration.  The People’s Movement first 
originated as an umbrella movement of left-wing groups and political parties to contest 
the accession Treaty.  Following on from that, the People’s Movement was re-formed to 
contest the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979 in order to keep 
resistance to European integration in the public sphere and a live political issue.   
The People’s Movement was allowed to do this, because of the political space 
ceded to them due to the clumsy handling of the European issue by domestic political 
parties.  EPMs in Denmark evolved with the Danish relationship with European 
integration.  The June Movement was formed in a split from the People’s Movement from 
a personality clash but also to represent a different form of Euroscepticism, Eurorealism, 
a position which accepted public support for a form of European integration but rejected 
‘European Union’.  Once domestic parties resolved their positions on Europe, almost 
wholly in favour, and began to send single unified cues to their voters, then the electoral 
support for both movements was eroded.  Danish politics finally came to terms with its 
post-Maastricht situation by the early 2000s, as parties with significant Eurosceptic 
factions articulated European policies that were acceptable to anti- and pro-European 
members alike.  Added to the rise of the Danish People’s Party on the right, and pro-
European unity on the left, there were no more disgruntled centre-left and centre-right 
voters to support either group.  Only the People’s Movement survived as the proxy of the 
Red-Green Alliance.   
While the depth of public opposition to European integration was obvious, the 
explanatory factors used in this study were important in explaining how this opposition 
came to be mobilised as EPMs.  The level of Euroscepticism in the party system played a 
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crucial role in EPM formation.  Opposition to European integration increased amongst 
the public post accession but the level of Euroscepticism in the party system did not.  
Ordinary members of mainstream parties and of civil-society groups closely aligned to 
mainstream parties (such as trade unions) formed EPMs to represent their views on the 
EU at the national political level.  An open policy process, whereby mainstream party 
members, both ordinary and elected, were not openly punished for the involvement in 
EPMs, facilitated the formation of EPMs to contest European Parliamentary elections 
successfully.  With the repeated use of referendums to pass European treaties, EPMs 
were formed to take advantage of the opportunity to contest, again successfully, 
European integration.  The Danish case therefore conforms strongly to the political 
opportunity model of social movement formation, with resources being unimportant in 
explaining their origin.  With regard to issue framing, however, a different picture 
emerges.  Here, Danish EPMs fall into the grievance model, as they were formed as a 
reaction to the shifting nature of Danish public opinion on European integration.  The 
June Movement sought to develop a frame alignment with their Eurorealist critique of 
European integration but the fundamental nature of the Danish relationship with the EU 
had changed and it failed for them.  As mentioned in the first chapter, Section 1.5.3, the 
Danish relationship with European integration has been the basis for some of the key 
theories of how political parties, voters and referendums respectively interact with 
European integration.   
This chapter has shown that a wide degree of nuance is needed when seeking to 
understand Euroscepticism in a particular state.  The complexities of the Danish case, 
with its two party systems at the national and European level, multiple referendums on 
European integration, and dynamic public opinion toward the EU, makes it problematic 
to tease out generalisable points in relation to Euroscepticism from it: hence Franklin and 
Svensson hold diametrical opinions  on support for European integration in Denmark.
543
  
The one clear lesson that does emerge, however, is that Euroscepticism can be a very 
dynamic phenomenon.  What constitutes opposition to European integration can change 
in tandem with other dynamics, such as the emergence of new political parties on either 
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side of the political spectrum, who articulate a new Eurosceptic narrative.  The entry of 
European integration into new post-materialist areas of competency can turn Eurosceptics 
into pro-integrationists to a degree.  In this respect the evolution of Euroscepticism in 
Denmark followed along the lines of the Hooghe-Marks model with the left/right divide 
being based not simply around economic issues but also along environmental and 
immigration issues as well.  The fate of the People’s Movement and June Movement 
offers a possible answer to a residual question from the Hooghe-Marks model about the 
effects on domestic party competition when Euroscepticism shifts from left to right.
544
  In 
Denmark such changes allowed the Social Democrats, Socialist People’s Party and Social 
Liberals to both reabsorb factions and supporters that formed EPMs back into their party, 
and take their votes at European Parliamentary elections.   
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Chapter Six: Explaining EPM Formation Across 
the Four Case Studies 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapters focused on the four individual case studies and identified 
various different factors that caused EPMs to form in each.  This chapter concludes the 
study by providing generalisations on the wider factors that cause EPM formation that are 
common across several, if not all, case studies.  This study began with the assumption 
that all of the explanatory factors chosen had the potential to be relevant to EPM 
formation.  Just as importantly the lack of relevance of any of the explanatory factors is 
also discussed.  Where the explanatory factors were not of use, this was most commonly 
due to the case-specific nature of each example, which in itself provides information as to 
the specificities of the case in question and its relationship to the EU.   
The following analysis proceeds thematically, factor by factor, with an evaluation 
of each one made with reference to its influence in the case studies examined.  Finally, a 
conclusion on the factors is made as to their overall validity, based on the number of 
EPMs in each case study.  This chapter concludes by proposing a list of factors, both 
from and beyond this thesis, which would lead to an ‘ideal type’ case of EPM formation.  
The example of Spain is also discussed as a case of non-occurrence where no EPMs were 
present, despite the explanatory factors being in evidence.   
 
 
6.2 Testing the Conclusions from the Four Case Studies against the Explanatory 
Factors 
This section provides a brief conclusion on the points from each case study on 
each explanatory factor and then identifies the effectiveness of each proposition in 
predicting EPM formation.  It goes on to discuss why the propositions were or were not 
effective with reference to the case studies and to suggest how the explanatory factors aid 
in the understanding of wider issues in relation to European integration: namely, EU 
referendums, party politics and the EU.   
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The focus of this study is EPM formation, with the explanatory factors being 
employed to understand why individuals formed EPMs.  In this regard, the study 
measured EPM formation in each case study by the number of EPMs formed.  In relation 
to EPM formation the case studies were characterised as being high, medium or low.  As 
outlined in Section 1.6, this approach was taken on the basis of the social movement 
literature that assumes that the more favourable an environment for EPM formation, the 
more EPMs there will be, and so the actual number of EPMs can be used to measure the 
favourability of a country for EPM formation.  This thesis sought to question the 
relevancy of this approach by also looking at policy outcomes in each of the case studies.  
As will be discussed throughout this chapter the answer was ambiguous and highly case 
specific.  The UK saw extremely high EPM formation with some important policy 
outcomes, though EPMs there were not an overtly influential force in the UK–EU debate.  
Estonian EPMs were also not overtly influential either in the EU debate or in the policy 
process in Estonia.  The People’s Movement in Denmark, as the only relevant EPM there 
for a substantial period of time, was able to exert considerable influence over Danish EU 
policy throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.   Irish EPMs on the other hand represented 
a mid-point between the linkage of EPM numbers to policy influence.  Though the 
numbers of EPMs was nowhere near as high as that of the UK, as they increased they 
began to exert an influence over policy comparable to that of the Danish People’s 
Movement.  What this chapter will stress as the key to understanding both the increased 
incidence of EPM formation and policy influence, is the make-up of the political 
opportunity structure (POS) in each case study. 
The literature on Euroscepticism outlined in the first chapter focused on political 
parties and public opinion amongst other issues.  This study has sought to extend this 
work by asking, why did social movements emerge from civil society to contest 
European integration?  And, why were more conventional means of opposition, such as 
through the party system, not pursued?  All of these underlying questions inform the 
analysis of each proposition and form the basis of the conclusions reached in this chapter 
and the next.    
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EF1: The more pro-European the media are, the more likely that EPMs will form.   
What was being measured with this explanatory factor was the impact of the 
perception of the pro-European bias of the media on the decision of EPM activists to 
form their EPM.  As has been discussed throughout this study, the media was highlighted 
repeatedly as a key area of contestation for EPMs.  This follows the literature on social 
movements, which emphasises the significance of raising awareness of issues in the 
media as a key factor in formation for many domestic social movements, as it allows 
them influence without having to expend conventional resources.
545
  The key to 
understanding the media as a factor in the formation of EPMs is to understand that the 
emphasis is on the perception of the media as pro-European by EPMs.  Moreover, “the 
mass media arena is the major site of contests over meaning, because all of the players in 
the policy process assume its pervasive influence”.546  It is clear that EPMs were formed 
to contest the media sphere over European integration just as much as they were to 
contest the EU issue in referendums and with political parties.  This study contrasted the 
case studies against this assumption and identified if EPMs followed typical social 
movement behaviour as regards their interaction with the media.   
 
Denmark 
The media played an important role in the formation of the People’s Movement.  
Founder members were angered by the lack of exposure that anti-EU accession 
arguments were getting in the national print media and the negative light in which they 
were portrayed in the national public broadcast media.  As with the other cases, however, 
it represented an element of an overall confirmation that they were ‘outsiders’ of the main 
political system.  This did not cause EPM formation but it helped create the environment 
in which an EPM was the most effective means of campaigning.  The founders of the 
People’s Movement, as members of radical-left political parties, knew that they needed an 
effective, political, non-ideological ‘brand’ to put forward a Eurosceptic argument in the 
media.  A non-political, civil society-based movement would receive more neutral 
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coverage in the media than a political party-based one, as it would come largely 
unencumbered with domestic political baggage.  Therefore, considerations of media 
coverage played a role in deciding to form the People’s Movement EPM, ahead of a 
purely political party-based campaign against the accession referendum.   The June 
Movement, as a split from the People’s Movement, followed the same line of thinking.   
 
Estonia 
In contrast to the Irish case, and similarly to the UK case, the Estonian 
Eurosceptics all agreed that the Estonian media was biased against them but there was 
disagreement as to the opportunity of getting their arguments across.  The Research 
Centre Free Europe and the No to the EU Movement both believed that the media was 
part of a pro-European elite that stifled debate on the EU.  Their belief that the media was 
pro-European did encourage them to form EPMs but it was not a decisive factor.   
 
 
Ireland 
For Irish EPMs, gaining access to the media was not a problem.  Coverage was 
given to their press launches and they had occasional articles published in the main 
newspapers.  They all believed, however, that the media editorialised against them, and 
were strongly biased in favour of the pro-EU/pro-treaty side.  There were strong 
similarities with the Danish case, where ostensibly the media gave coverage to EPM 
campaigners but EPMs were of the strong opinion that editorials urged Yes votes, 
criticised No arguments and gave far more coverage to Yes campaigns.  A perception of 
pervasive pro-EU coverage in the media did indeed play a role in the formation of Irish 
EPMs.  In a similar manner to UK EPMs, they felt that the real facts of the impact of 
European integration in Ireland – workers’ rights, ECJ rulings, the reduction of Irish 
neutrality, Franco-German dominance of the EU – were not reported in the Irish media, 
and that they had a duty to inform the Irish people of what they saw as the negative 
reality of Irish EU membership. 
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UK 
Those UK EPMs (Business for Sterling) that operated at the Elite level saw 
certain sections of the media as being open to their arguments and supportive of their 
campaigns.  They were sceptical as to whether the BBC was impartial but they accepted 
that to be taken seriously by the BBC and the financial press, they had to put forward 
well researched arguments.  The right-wing press were accommodative of their press 
releases and opinion articles, as they were perceived to be ‘on the same side’.  UK EPMs 
operating at the grassroots level (Campaign for a Referendum) believed that the entirety 
of the mainstream media was inherently biased against them.  They based this on the fact 
that withdrawal was not put forward as a legitimate policy goal for the UK government.  
Instead they focused on local media through letter writing campaigns and local protests, 
because it was much easier to access.  Business for Sterling were not mobilised by 
opposition to a pro-European media, their campaign was actually facilitated by certain 
sections of the media.  Campaign for a Referendum, on the other hand, was mobilised in 
part at the perceived failure of the media to provide detailed information to the public on 
the true negative impact of the EU on UK sovereignty.  A clear distinction was drawn 
between the broadcast media, which was perceived by both sides to be pro-European, and 
the print media, which was broadly seen by the majority of EPMs as more 
accommodative of Eurosceptic arguments but still with a degree of pro-EU bias.  When 
the EPMs discussed the media, they were roundly dismissive of broadcast media and 
focused almost exclusively on the print media, as they believed that this was both the 
main arena of contestation on the EU issue and their best opportunity to affect public 
opinion on the EU.  For these two issues in particular the desire to challenge a perceived 
pro-EU narrative in the media was a key factor explaining the formation of UK EPMs.   
 
Conclusion 
The explanatory factor has proven to be quite accurate in relation to the evidence 
from the case studies.  The majority of the EPMs studied across all of the case studies 
believed the media to be wholly biased against them and their arguments (Business for 
Sterling being the notable exception).  The pervasive feeling was that the media reflected 
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an inherent, elite, pro-EU, political bias and refused to countenance alternatives to the 
current trajectory of European integration.  Even the supposedly strongly Eurosceptic UK 
media was criticised by some EPM activists for being pro-EU in failing to question 
national membership of the EU itself.   
Despite the belief in a bias against their arguments, many of the EPMs had access 
to the media itself.  Therefore, EPM relations with the media can be characterised on two 
levels, actual physical access to the media in terms of coverage and publishing and 
secondly, on the perceived overall editorial stance of the media towards their arguments.  
Estonian and Irish EPMs believed that they were not on the receiving end of a coverage 
blackout, as Danish EPMs did, in their respective national media but that, seen in the 
overall context of the editorial narrative of the media, their arguments were highlighted in 
a negative manner.   They believed that their campaigns were presented as “fringe” and 
“off the wall”, and labelled coverage of their events as tokenism.547  In Estonia this was 
not so disadvantageous as, given the small media market, an article in the national 
newspaper of record, Postimees, and visual coverage in the nightly news programme 
Aktuaalne kaamera meant that their arguments would reach at least 60% of the 
population.  Despite the negative editorial line against their arguments, the Estonian 
EPMs were pleased that they at least had access to the media.  In Ireland the perception 
was far more negative.  Though access was still granted, they believed this was 
grudgingly so due to a court case won by EPM campaigners (albeit on an unrelated issue) 
forcing the national broadcaster to allot equal airtime to No arguments.  In Denmark the 
belief among EPM activists was that the media was wholesale against them, both the 
print and national broadcast media.  This was not the case at the beginning of Danish 
membership where significant sections of the media came out against membership.  As 
Euroscepticism grew in Denmark, so did a determined pro-EU line from the major media 
outlets with only small regional newspapers providing EU-critical coverage.  The two fed 
into each other, as Eurosceptic activists saw themselves as outsiders to a political, 
economic and media elite that was pro-EU.  In the UK the strongly Eurosceptic print 
media was a boon to those EPMs that had the connections and resources to access it.  
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Those EPMs – the overwhelming majority – that did not have such access believed the 
UK media to have a pro-EU bias, as they did not actively advocate withdrawal as a 
legitimate option for the UK. 
The key to understanding the impact of this explanatory factor is in utilising the 
social movement literature.  This body of work emphasises the media as a vital arena of 
contestation that has a strong say over the issue environment in which the EPM operates.  
All of the EPMs in this thesis engaged with the media almost all with the aim of changing 
the issue environment.  In this respect the explanatory factor closely follows social 
movement interaction with the media.  For an issue such as European integration, which 
offers little in the way of avenues of contestation for a civil society-based protest 
movement, media engagement on the issue was one of the means by which the perceived 
elite pro-European position could be challenged.  EPMs, though, had differing 
interpretations of the importance of contesting European integration in the media.  Irish 
and Estonian EPMs had good access to the media but were more motivated to form by 
contesting the EU through other channels.  In Denmark there was a strong link between 
EPM formation and a view of the media as pro-European.  This view formed part of a 
wider perception of an overarching, pro-EU, elite bias in Denmark that led to the 
formation of the People’s Movement.  In the UK the Campaign for a Referendum was 
mobilised in part as a reaction against the supposed failure of the media to effectively put 
forward withdrawal from the EU as a legitimate option and to communicate what they 
believed as the ‘truth’ of the negative impact of EU membership on the UK.  In Denmark 
and the UK, therefore, the factor was found to be relevant to EPM formation, as the 
media was a key component of contesting the issue-framing environment in both cases.   
 
 
EF2: The lower the level of Euroscepticism in the party system, the more likely that 
EPMs will form.   
 What was being measured in this explanatory factor was the extent to which 
EPMs were influenced by the articulation of Euroscepticism in the party system in their 
decision to form.  The literature on Euroscepticism is dominated by analysis of party 
systems, and how Euroscepticism is missing in the mainstream but present on the 
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extremities.  This gives the appearance of Euroscepticism having little or no traction in 
national politics.  Correspondingly, research into social movements emphasises that they 
form when support for party politics is low or when specific issues are ignored by the 
party system.  Both literatures appear to converge on the proposition that a low level of 
Euroscepticism in the party system will be a strong determining factor in the formation of 
EPMs.  Each case study was examined in turn against this argument and conclusions 
drawn on the differences and similarities of EPMs to other social movements in this 
regard.    
 
Denmark 
The level of Euroscepticism in the party system facilitated the growth and 
increased the importance of EPMs in the Danish political system.  Activities in Danish 
EPMs in the 1970s, 80s and into the early 90s was concentrated amongst voters on the 
radical left but also in significant numbers on the centre left and radical right.  The 
leaderships of the centrist Social Liberal party and the Social Democrats were unsure of 
how to deal with the level of Euroscepticism amongst their supporters, due to the 
contradiction with their own pro-European policy, so they took neutral positions.  
Frustration at this impasse mobilised supporters and functionaries of these parties to re-
form the People’s Movement to participate in the first EP elections in 1979 as a means of 
expressing their opposition to Danish membership of the EU.  This situation continued 
right up until the mid-2000s when the Social Democrats and Social Liberals finally 
confronted the EU issue at party congresses and took unequivocal pro-EU positions.  The 
ambiguity surrounding parties’ positions on the EU in Denmark led to EPMs being 
mobilised, as party members wanted to take effective action and did not wait for their 
party to resolve its EU position to do so.  The evidence supported the proposition in the 
Danish case but to rephrase it slightly to take into account the specificities of the case: ‘a 
low level of unambiguous Euroscepticism in the party system is likely to encourage EPM 
formation’.   
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Estonia 
There were extremely low levels of Euroscepticism in the Estonian party system.  
The only party to come close to being Eurosceptic was the Centre Party.  This party’s 
perceived strong links to Russia meant that Estonian nationalists opposed to European 
integration did not have an ‘acceptable’ form of Euroscepticism in the party system.  
Other Eurosceptic parties were far too marginal (not even having local authority 
representation) to be considered as a party-political vehicle for Euroscepticism.  The 
formation of Estonian EPMs was driven almost exclusively by former and present 
members of political parties, who opposed EU membership and the terms of the 
accession negotiations, both of which were silenced in the party system.  The Estonian 
case gives positive evidence to the proposition.  While indeed there was a lack of 
Euroscepticism in the party system, more specifically there was a lack of ‘acceptable’ 
Euroscepticism.  The party-based Euroscepticism on offer was ideologically unacceptable 
to the Estonian nationalists and economic liberals who made up the bulk of opposition to 
Estonian membership of the EU.  While a low level of Euroscepticism did indeed lead to 
the formation of Estonian EPMs, a more correct interpretation would have the 
proposition rephrased as “a low level of acceptable Euroscepticism”.   
 
 
Ireland 
Irish EPMs emerged despite the presence of Euroscepticism in the party system.  
As that party-based Euroscepticism declined, they became increasingly influential, to 
such an extent that smaller Eurosceptic political parties associated themselves with 
EPMs, such as the No to Nice campaign.  As the number of Eurosceptic parties in 
parliament declined further, with the Greens no longer advocating a No vote, the number 
of EPMs increased reciprocally.  This showed a clear relationship between EPM 
formation in Ireland and the level of Euroscepticism in the party system.  As the elites of 
formerly anti-EU parties took pro-EU treaty stances they failed to take a significant 
proportion of their members and voters with them.  These members and voters, who 
perceived themselves to be negatively affected by European integration, became involved 
in Eurosceptic circles providing increasing levels of resources, both financial and 
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manpower, that made EPM formation more feasible and their campaigns more 
successful.  At the beginning of the Irish accession process EPMs were mobilised despite 
the presence of Labour, a large mainstream Eurosceptic party.  But by the time of the 
Nice and Lisbon Treaties a reduced level of party-based Euroscepticism led to EPMs 
such as Libertas and the People’s Movement mobilising.  In the Irish case the proposition 
can be seen to be generally supported.  Looking at EPMs at the time of accession it was 
not supported by the evidence, but looking at more recent EPM formation from the 1990s 
on, it can be seen that the proposition was correct for this time frame.  In Ireland the 
evidence leads to the conclusion that ‘a low level of Euroscepticism in the mainstream 
party system is likely to encourage increased EPM formation’.   
 
UK 
In contrast to the other case studies the UK clearly had a high level of 
Euroscepticism in the party system throughout the entire period of its membership. This 
did not, however, dampen the formation effect of EPMs in the UK.  The presence of 
Eurosceptic parties, in fact, was a causal factor in EPM formation.  This appears 
contradictory, given that hard and soft Euroscepticism are clearly represented in two 
electorally successful political parties.  What the examples of Business for Sterling and 
Campaign for a Referendum show was that it was not so much the presence of 
Euroscepticism in the party system but the perception of the effectiveness of that party 
based Euroscepticism in contesting European integration that had an effect on EPM 
formation.  Members of both EPMs were convinced of the Eurosceptic bona fides of the 
Conservatives and UKIP but were less convinced of their ability to successfully challenge 
what they perceived as a pro-EU government and defeat a referendum on European 
integration.  From the UK data the proposition might be amended to read ‘the perceived 
effectiveness of Euroscepticism in the party system is likely to encourage EPM 
formation’. 
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Conclusion 
The Estonian and Irish cases reveal that, while there was most definitely a low 
level of Euroscepticism in the party system, even if those Eurosceptic parties had had 
greater representation, EPMs would still have been founded, due to the ideologically 
unacceptable nature of the party-based Euroscepticism.  As discussed in the first chapter, 
the literature on Euroscepticism in political parties locates the phenomenon almost 
exclusively in those who hold radical positions, on both the left and right of the party 
system.  The lack of mainstream parties holding Eurosceptic positions, as Ray has 
discussed,
548
 and the dominance of the Eurosceptic issue by radical parties, was perhaps 
the most influential explanatory factor in understanding EPM formation.  In the Estonian 
and Irish cases despite the presence of Eurosceptic parties or parties with Eurosceptic 
leanings, EPMs were formed.  This was because Eurosceptic parties in both countries 
held extreme positions on issues outside of European integration, making them 
unacceptable vehicles for disparate groups in civil society to channel their 
Euroscepticism.  In the case of Estonia it was explicit links between the Centre Party and 
the Russian government.  In Ireland it was the radical left socio-economic policies of the 
Socialist Party, the Workers’ Party and Sinn Féin’s explicit links to the IRA.  In the UK 
case, not only was Euroscepticism present in the party system but it was also of an 
ideologically acceptable form to those who formed EPMs.  Opposition to European 
integration, being over-represented on the right side of the ideological spectrum, saw 
liberal economic and national sovereignty critiques of UK membership of the EU present 
in the party system in the Conservatives and UKIP.  This however, did not prevent EPM 
formation, as this party-based Euroscepticism was not deemed to be effectively 
challenging European integration.  In Denmark there was a limited presence of 
Euroscepticism in the party system but the largest and most influential party, the Social 
Democrats, failed to resolve internal party divisions on the issue and so remained 
ambiguous on European integration.  It was supporters and functionaries of the Social 
Democrats that joined with other smaller left-wing parties to form the People’s 
Movement as a reaction to the Social Democrats’ hesitation on the EU issue.  The Danish 
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case shows that Euroscepticism in the party system needs to be decisive if it is to act as 
an acceptable channel for wider anti-EU public sentiment. 
The broad range of the case studies provides some useful data on the ‘level of 
Euroscepticism in the party system’ proposition.  The UK case showed that it can have 
low relevance to EPM formation, the Estonian case showed it to be strongly relevant to 
the EPM formation, but taken together all cases showed that it was necessary to look 
beyond categorizing a party system as having either high or low levels of Euroscepticism.  
From this research it is apparent that to channel popular opposition to European 
integration into the party system and to prevent EPMs from forming, party-based 
Euroscepticism must firstly be ideologically compatible with the dominant forms of 
public Euroscepticism and not be ‘tainted’ with any extreme position.  Secondly, this 
Euroscepticism must be seen to be effective in both challenging European integration, at 
either the national or European level.  Thirdly, it must be decisive, in that parties cannot 
‘flip-flop’ on the issue for electoral advantage and/or government efficacy.    
While these assertions on the nature of party-based Euroscepticism are driven by 
the case-specific exceptions of this thesis, a brief examination of the Dutch case suggests 
that they have potentially wider applicability.  In the Netherlands, the Socialist Party and 
the Freedom Party represented a possible case for the level of Euroscepticism in the party 
system working against EPM formation.  They represent the dominant strains of 
Euroscepticism in the country, radical-left and radical-right; they effected successful 
opposition to the EU, with both playing strong roles in the rejection of the EU 
Constitutional Treaty, and their Euroscepticism remained unequivocal.  Thus, the expert 
survey on EPM formation across Europe conducted in the first chapter found that there 
were no EPMs in the Netherlands.  Applying these conclusions to the UK, typically 
characterised as the archetypal example of a party system with a high level of 
Euroscepticism, it is perhaps more accurate to describe the UK party system as having a 
high level of Euroscepticism but a low level of effective Euroscepticism.  This would go 
some way towards explaining the high number of EPMs that have emerged in the UK 
despite the presence of the Conservatives and UKIP.  From the example of the 
Netherlands it is clear that the level of Euroscepticism in the party system does indeed 
affect rates of EPM formation, but not for the simple presence or lack of a large number 
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of parties.  There are more case-specific reasons for this, as the case studies discussed 
here show.   
The level of effective Euroscepticism in the party system proved to be an 
important explanatory factor, as it contributed significantly toward EPM formation in 
Denmark and the UK.  It showed the difference between political parties’ and their 
supporters’ positions on Europe.  The slight, yet important, difference between the UK 
and Danish cases was that Danish EPM activists were dissatisfied, not with party action, 
or lack thereof, on European integration, but more with the variable nature of it.  These 
were perhaps solid examples of May’s law of curvilinear disparity in that the difference 
between the ‘middle actors’ of the Danish Social Democrats and UK Conservatives and 
party officials was so great that they formed EPMs to actively challenge their own party 
on the EU issue.
549
  Unfortunately testing May’s law against the evidence present in this 
study was beyond its scope.  Nevertheless, the experience of the People’s Movement, 
Business for Sterling and the Campaign for a Referendum could provide a basis for 
testing the hypothesis of May’s law in a future study.   
In conclusion, the level of Euroscepticism in the party system explanatory factor 
plays a role in the case studies but the various nuances discussed need to be taken into 
account to appreciate the true explanatory effect of the proposition to EPM formation.   
 
 
 
EF3: The more referendums on European issues, the more likely that EPMs will 
form.   
 Given that each of the case studies was a unitary state political opportunities were 
at their most relevant at the national level.  National-level political opportunities, as 
Kitschelt has well documented, are typically the most difficult to access for social 
movements.  As a referendum provides a unique opportunity to challenge the political 
elite on the EU issue at the national level, it should obviously strongly encourage EPM 
formation.  It follows on logically that there should be a corresponding increase in EPM 
formation with the number of EU referendums.  This explanatory factor measured this 
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assumption; that more EU referendums meant more EPMs.  Given that Ireland and 
Denmark held numerous referendums on European integration, while Estonia and the UK 
held just one each, comparing all the case studies provided some evidence to test the 
explanatory factor.   
 
Denmark 
Referendums were the main causal factor behind the formation of Danish EPMs.  
Once government negotiations were concluded and a referendum on membership 
proposed, the People’s Movement was launched to campaign against accession in 1972.  
Beyond this initial formation, referendums played a role in sustaining EPMs as they 
provided a locus by which they could mobilise support in opposition to Europe and 
provided them with media exposure as the leading opponents of European integration.  
The Maastricht referendum played a significant role in the formation of the June 
Movement, as it allowed Eurosceptics who favoured some but not full cooperation with 
Europe an alternative to the then present form of European integration: i.e. a pre-
Maastricht Europe.  But more importantly the passing of the second Maastricht 
referendum made a policy of withdrawal from the EU out of step with public opinion and 
thus created political space for the June Movement to emerge.   
 
Estonia 
The Research Centre Free Europe would have formed regardless of whether a 
referendum was held or not, as it was formed to contest the context of Estonian accession 
negotiations with the EU.  The main motivation for its formation was the belief of its 
founders that the Estonian government’s negotiating position with the EU was deeply 
flawed and needed to change fundamentally.  It was not opposed to membership per se, 
as it was aware of the geopolitical necessity for Estonian membership. The lack of a 
referendum on the EU in Estonia would not have prevented the emergence of the 
Research Centre Free Europe, as it emerged in the late 1990s to raise public awareness 
of the terms of accession, and not to campaign for a No vote in the 2003 referendum.  
The Movement No to the EU, on the other hand, was formed by disgruntled members of 
mainstream political parties upset at the perceived abandoning of fledgling Estonian 
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independence.  Uno Silberg of the Movement No to the EU, formed the group specifically 
to oppose accession by campaigning for a No vote in the referendum.  When accession 
was passed, he wound the group up.  Given that Estonia has only had one referendum on 
the EU, in 2003, it was difficult to draw a comparison with the other case studies.  But in 
the space of time between Estonia beginning accession negotiations, and holding a 
referendum, two EPMs were formed.   One was formed in response to the negotiations 
and the other to contest the referendum itself.  The explanatory factor found a degree of 
confirmation in understanding EPM formation in Estonia.   
 
 
Ireland 
The history of Irish-EU relations was dominated by the eight referendums on the 
EU.  Referendums had foremost relevance in the formation of EPMs in Ireland.  EPMs 
were first mobilised to contest the onset of negotiations between Ireland and the EU, and 
then to campaign for a No vote in the accession referendum.  When it became apparent 
that the then government was going to pass the SEA without holding a referendum, an 
EPM was formed to challenge the government and force the holding of a referendum.  
This was similar to the UK case, where not only the EU, but also the holding of a 
referendum itself, became an issue of EPM formation.  Since then, EPMs were formed to 
contest specific referendums and after the vote they disbanded, only for the same 
individuals to come together for the following referendum and form a new EPM to 
contest European integration.  As with the other case studies, some EPMs would have 
been formed regardless of whether referendums were held or not, but given their 
preponderance in Ireland, the presence of referendums led to many more being mobilised. 
 
UK: 
The lack of referendums in the UK should have reduced their ability to mobilise 
and the overall number of EPMs there.  In the UK the mobilising issue became the 
campaign to hold a referendum in the first place as with Campaign for a Referendum.   
This works for the opposite position as well with Business for Sterling, showing that 
EPMs could be mobilised to prevent a referendum where there was a strong chance that 
the outcome would have been in favour of further European integration.  The collective 
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understanding of the role of referendums in mobilising social movements needs to be re-
examined in the light of this evidence, as campaigns to hold referendums and to get them 
off the political agenda appear to have as important an effect on formation as a campaign 
to defeat/win one.  The activities of both EPMs followed from that of the Referendum 
Party of the mid- to late-1990s, showing the long-term centrality of referendums to the 
UK relationship with Europe, despite only one being held in 1975.  Moreover, the UK 
EPMs showed the centrality of referendums and direct democracy to both civil society 
and political party-based Euroscepticism, despite the country’s sole EU referendum being 
held well in the past, in 1975. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The presence of referendums and their repeated use to decide on national policy 
towards European integration were predicted to be an important, if not the most 
important, explanatory factor in EPM formation from the literature review on 
Euroscepticism.  This was confirmed in the case studies, where the presence of 
referendums was one of the most important causal factors in the formation of EPMs.  
Looking beyond EU referendums and EPMs, the testing of the proposition also shed light 
on a number of issues involving European integration and referendums that will be 
discussed later. 
Each of the case studies saw the formation of EPMs to contest referendums on 
accession or on confirming membership, as in the case of the UK.  This tells us just as 
much about the nature of referendums on European integration as it does on EPM 
formation.  In Denmark, Estonia and Ireland those EPMs formed to contest membership 
referendums were largely made up of fringe political and social activists, but in the UK 
they were made up of members and elected officials of the Labour party, and to a lesser 
extent the Conservatives.  The UK example was replicated in the post-accession period in 
Denmark, where opposition to European integration surged, so that by the time of the 
SEA in 1986 members and elected officials of the Social Democrats were clamouring for 
a referendum to express their Euroscepticism.  Forming EPMs allowed party members 
and officials to contest the referendum and reduce the risk of splitting their party over the 
EU issue.  In the cases of Denmark and the UK the presence of referendums allowed for 
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the formation of EPMs that acted as a vent for internal mainstream party divisions over 
Europe.  Even in a multi-party state with a proportional representation electoral system, 
such as Denmark, the EU issue was not salient enough for party members and officials to 
be confident that if they split and formed their own Eurosceptic party, they would be 
electorally successful.   
The repeated use of referendums in Denmark saw increased public involvement 
with EPMs, as this gave public opposition to Danish EU membership an opportunity to 
express itself.  Combined with the continued failure of the Social Democrats to establish 
a definite EU policy, and the Socialist People’s Party and Social Liberal parties’ 
leadership moves towards a more pro-EU position, EPMs became more powerful than 
when they were formed.  Something similar, though not on the same scale, happened in 
Ireland as increased opposition by ordinary members and supporters of the Green and 
Labour parties to their parties’ EU policy, led them to join the Peoples’ Movement.  A 
high number of referendums on Europe meant that those individuals in Denmark and 
Ireland who disagreed with their party’s EU policy could form EPMs to successfully 
contest the EU outside of the party system, while at the same time retaining their party 
allegiance at all other times.  
In the UK, despite the lack of referendums on the EU, members and officials of 
political parties, the Conservatives, UKIP and somewhat less so Labour, formed EPMs to 
campaign for the holding of a referendum.  The role of referendums became central to the 
UK-EU relationship, as the evidence from the UK chapter and the existence of the 
Referendum Party in the mid-1990s shows.  Conflict over whether the UK should join the 
single currency was typically highlighted as the main issue of contestation over the EU in 
the UK.  The Euro issue was, however, largely subsumed by the question of whether an 
EU referendum should be held in the UK.  The fact that the UK did not hold any 
referendums on the EU after 1975 did not deter the formation of UK EPMs on the issue 
of referendums.  This was not just a reaction against the failure of the Labour government 
to follow through on its promise to hold a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty; it was 
a continuation of the 1975 referendum and the campaigning of the Referendum Party.  
Comparing the evidence from the UK to that of Denmark and Ireland, it shows that a 
high number of referendums led to a high degree of EPM activity and, indeed, to 
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successful activity, but more importantly the UK case reveals that the establishment of a 
precedent of just one referendum is required for EPMs to mobilise around referendums.   
In relation to the literature on referendums the evidence presented in this thesis 
confirms the Svensson thesis, whereby referendums on European issues are a first-order 
issue, as EPMs were formed to contest European integration.
550
  Additionally, it found 
strong corroborating evidence for Hobolt’s hypotheses on the importance of political 
parties in communicating cues in referendums and the overall importance of the 
campaign.
551
  Overall the evidence from this thesis extends the findings of Szczerbiak 
and Taggart’s wide-ranging study of referendums on Europe by showing that their initial 
assumption was correct in that non-party actors can have an important effect on the 
outcomes of such referendums.
552
 
This explanatory factor presented much evidence across the case studies of actors 
operating across different groups.  Such a feature is common in social movement 
activism and in the literature on social movements is labelled “multi-positionality”.553  
This refers to actors who are involved in many different groups across many different 
“scenes”.554  Multi-positionality in the social movement literature refers almost 
exclusively to left-wing anti-globalisation groups.  Such groups were long-term and 
knowledgeable critics of European integration,
555
 and there were obvious similarities 
between them and Danish Peoples’ Movement and certain Irish EPMs, that were 
dominated by left-wing, ‘global justice’ activists.  This thesis has extended this body of 
work and shown that such activities can be seen in right-wing political parties and social 
movements as well.  This further emphasises the specific nature of the EU as an issue of 
formation for social movements.  With Euroscepticism there can be a certain degree of 
unanimity between left and right, for example on campaigning for a No vote in an EU 
referendum, but thereafter little consensus emerges on what should follow after a 
referendum defeat: the wide ideological breath of Irish EPMs and their campaign against 
the Lisbon Treaty are a good example of this.  This made alliance formation difficult, not 
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only because of the lack of an agreed platform but also because both sides did not want to 
be associated with the other.  In the UK, where right-wing Euroscepticism has been 
dominant since the mid-1980s, active Euroscepticism amongst the left was far more 
muted than opinion polls for left-wing voters would suggest.  Denmark, in contrast, was 
until the 2000s dominated by left-wing Euroscepticism and so strong alliances existed 
between EPMs and political parties.  As right-wing Euroscepticism, embodied in the 
radical-right Danish Peoples’ Party, grew, so the alliances among left parties and 
Eurosceptics decreased.   
The Irish Lisbon Treaty campaigns were different to those of the other case 
studies in this regard.  Here, EPMs of left and right ideological backgrounds were able to 
complement each other’s campaigns without an overarching alliance structure.  Despite a 
degree of contradictory arguments, they did not attack each other and instead presented a 
wide ranging critique of European integration based on arguments relevant to a broad 
segment of the Irish population.  These referendum campaigns gave rise to a form of 
understanding between differing groups that has not been researched to a significant 
degree in other social movements.  A similar pattern emerged in France for the 2005 
Constitutional Treaty but here political parties on the radical left and radical right, as well 
as left-wing social movements, were to the fore in campaigning to reject the Treaty.
556
   
 Beyond the actual opportunity to challenge the political elite on the EU, 
referendums provided experience for EPM campaigners.  In Denmark and Ireland EPM 
members made reference to the importance of participation in previous referendum 
campaigns that allowed them to hone their communication skills that enabled them to 
play an influential role in referendum defeats in 1992 and 2000 in Denmark and 2001 and 
2008 in Ireland.  Multiple referendums on Europe meant that mobilising an EPM became 
a worthwhile endeavour, as even if the referendum was passed, the contacts and skills 
developed formed the basis for the next referendum campaign.  EPMs in Ireland were 
able to avail themselves of the knowledge of seasoned Eursoceptic campaigners and 
prepare months in advance of referendums on EU treaties that they knew would have to 
be held.  In comparison, the No to the EU Movement in Estonia immediately disbanded 
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after the accession referendum, as they believed that the government would never hold 
another referendum on Europe.  Had Estonia the convention of holding EU referendums 
like Ireland, or a constitutional provision to hold referendums on matters of foreign 
policy that a parliamentary vote could not reach like Denmark, then Estonian EPM 
activists would have put their movement on hold, ready to mobilise again for a 
referendum on, for example, Estonian membership of the Euro.   
 The evidence from the case studies showed the explanatory factor to be very 
useful in explaining EPM formation.  Furthermore the evidence from the UK shows that 
once a referendum is held, EPMs mobilise around the issue of holding a referendum 
despite several decades passing since its use.  The Estonia case proved itself to be very 
different from the UK case in that post accession the No to the EU Movement disbanded 
itself, as the Estonian government announced that it would hold no more referendums on 
European integration, as any further changes, such as adoption of the Euro, were covered 
by the accession Treaty.  The contrast between the two cases shows the lower level of 
civil society formation in Eastern Europe as, though the UK government faced a similar 
EU legal situation on accepting Treaty changes, EPM activists increased their demands 
for a referendum.  Referendums were not always needed to mobilise EPMs, however, as 
in both the Irish and the Estonian cases EPMs were set up before accession referendums 
had been agreed.  In this regard the focus of the National Platform and the Research 
Centre Free Europe was to critique the negotiation strategy of their respective 
governments.  Overall, the conclusion is that referendums were important to the 
formation of EPMs but they were not the sole reason for them.  A high number of EU 
referendums does seem to lead to a high number of EPMs, but as the UK example shows, 
this was not always the case.  
 
 
EF4: The more open the policy process (including institutional factors such as the 
electoral system), the more likely that EPMs will form. 
 While the presence of EU referendums and the level of Euroscepticism in the 
party system proved to be vital in understanding EPM formation, it was vitally important 
to examine other aspects of the policy-making process, as such an approach forms the 
methodological bedrock of political science research into social movements.  An open 
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policy process was taken from Kitschelt to mean “the capacity of political systems to 
convert demands into public policy”557.  Specifically this explanatory factor took on 
board a mixture of areas, such as such as party discipline, government strength, 
legislature/executive independence, coalition building capacity, electoral systems, 
pluralist style of interest intermediation, a written constitution, the centralisation of state 
apparatus, government control over resources of participation and the independence and 
authority of the judiciary, all of which were detailed in Section 1.6.  These issues were 
more subtle than those of referendums and the party system but they were part of a long-
established literature on the wider “political context” in which social movements form 
and operate.
558
  As this explanatory factor measured elements which are typical for social 
movement formation it provided insights into the similarities between Euroscepticism as 
an issue of social movement formation to that of more common issues, such as the 
environment and workers’ rights.   
 
Denmark 
The People’s Movement were confident that the more open nature of a single 
national constituency for European Parliament elections made it far easier for smaller 
single-issue parties to contest, when they decided to re-form and contest the first 
European Parliament elections in 1979, and their 21% share of the vote proved them 
right.  This gave confidence to the founders of the June Movement in that they knew they 
could take the risk of forming their new movement and compete successfully in European 
Parliamentary elections.  Constitutional provisions that compelled the holding of 
referendums, when 5/6ths of the Folketinget failed to pass an international treaty, 
provided a clear prospect for EPMs to access the political opportunity structure.  This, 
they exercised in the SEA referendum, which was held when EPM activists in the Social 
Democrat party refused to vote with their party and the government to ratify the Treaty, 
thus forcing a referendum.  Judicial rulings that forced equal coverage in publically 
owned media for both Yes and No sides in a referendum gave EPMs a public platform 
from which to put forward their arguments.  A powerful Folketinget committee on 
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European affairs kept opposition to the EU in the national political discourse and 
prevented mainstream pro-EU parties from stifling Euroscepticism as happened in 
Ireland.  The openness of the Danish policy process most definitely did encourage EPM 
formation.   
 
Estonia 
The Estonian case was an example of civil society being brought into the national 
Political Opportunity Structure (POS) by the institutions of the state.  Estonian EPMs 
received resources from both the state and from institutional NGOs for the purposes of 
campaigning.  Additionally, the government changed broadcast laws so that both Yes and 
No sides were awarded equal coverage in the media.  The purpose behind this was to 
include a No voice in the referendum campaign and hence give it legitimacy, not only in 
the perception of the public but also in that of the EU; both the institutions and the 
member states.  With no major political parties coming out uniformly against accession 
and a broad consensus across business, the media and the intellectual elite, the Estonian 
government deemed it necessary to included EPMs in the POS and opened up the policy-
making process to them.  This happened, however, after they were formed.  Estonian 
EPMs were not formed due to these actions, so the explanatory factor was not useful in 
this case.   
 
Ireland 
With a referendum held to ratify each EU Treaty and media laws ensuring equal 
coverage, the policy process in Ireland strongly favoured the activities of Irish EPMs.  
These processes were not opened for EPMs by the goodwill of the Irish government, as in 
Estonia.  It was Irish EPMs themselves who used the court system and the judiciary to 
achieve their access to them.  The courts ruled in favour of EPM activists in two very 
important decisions that strengthened their hand immensely.  Firstly, they enabled them 
to contest EU policy by forcing referendums on EU treaties to be held in the first place.  
Secondly, they ensured that the government could not spend the full resources of the state 
solely on the side of a referendum vote that they agreed with, and that the state had to 
give equal coverage to No arguments in the public media and official government 
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documents on EU referendums.  The contrast between the closed nature of the Dáil and 
the openness of the referendum system in accommodating dissenting views on the EU 
meant that Eurosceptic activity became channelled into contesting referendums rather 
than the party system.  The openness of the policy process outside the Irish parliament 
encouraged opponents of European integration in Ireland to express their arguments in 
EPMs during EU referendums and not at election time in political parties.  The 
explanatory factor therefore played quite a significant role in EPM formation in Ireland.   
 
UK 
The first past the post electoral system played a significant role in the formation 
of EPMs.  Taken in conjunction with the rigidity of the two-party system, Eurosceptic 
factions in political parties appeared unwilling to split and form their own party, as the 
electoral and party systems would make election almost impossible.  This explains why 
individual MPs such as Conservatives Bill Cash and John Redwood, and Labour MPs 
such as Austin Mitchell stayed members of their party despite their explicit opposition to 
their respective partyies EU policies.  Forming an EPM allowed them to remain within 
the party and access the policy-making process, while also putting forward Eurosceptic 
arguments. Ordinary and elected members of political parties believed that they could not 
influence party leaderships over the holding of referendums, as they could in Denmark, 
and so they formed EPMs to place outside pressure on party leaders over the EU issue.  
With no constitutional provisions for the holding of a referendum over European or 
foreign policy matters, the court system was of no use to Eurosceptics.  The depth of anti-
EU feeling in the UK was so strong, that despite no access to the policy process, EPMs 
were still formed.  The explanatory factor therefore, did not provide a useful analysis for 
EPM formation in the UK.   
 
Conclusion 
In comparison to the two explanatory factors shown to be the most important – 
the level of Euroscepticsm in the party system and the presence of referendums, the 
openness of the policy process had a more nuanced influence on EPM formation.  Table 
1.4 in Section 1.6 projected the open/closed nature of the policy-making process for each 
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of the case studies and the evidence from the case studies largely corroborated these 
assumptions.  Examining the openness of the policy-making process through the 
framework used in this thesis allowed for these nuances to be clearly understood.   
The policy process explanatory factor was not relevant in the UK, where all 
avenues of public policy were closed off to Eurosceptic activists.  The rigid two-party 
political system, the first past the post electoral system and lack of a constitutional 
provision to deal with foreign affairs or European issues through the judiciary meant that 
every official avenue was closed to Eurosceptic activists.  In comparison to the other case 
studies the total number of UK EPMs was not commensurate with their effectiveness; 
though Business for Sterling played an important role in national debate over EMU 
membership.  This showed the importance of the explanatory factor not just to EPM 
formation but to EPM effectiveness.  A rewriting of the explanatory factor in the light of 
this information could read that ‘an open policy process is likely to encourage EPMs to 
be more effective’.  The UK was quite clearly closed in terms of preventing input into the 
policy making process with members and elected officials of political parties frustrated at 
their inability to influence national European policy.  The output policy was weak as the 
UK government failed to hold promised referendums and the two main political parties 
gradually removed the EU issue from the national policy agenda.   
 The ineffectiveness of the UK EPMs can be compared with that of the 
effectiveness of their Irish counterparts who had a profound effect on the Irish EU 
relationship.  Ireland had an open policy input structure, largely due to its constitution 
being a highly specific and far reaching document.  This allowed government policy to be 
the subject of frequent constitutional challenges by individual citizens.  EU policy was to 
prove no exception, as a member of an EPM took the government to court for failing to 
hold a referendum over the SEA in direct conflict with the Irish Constitution’s provision 
for a referendum in the event of the ceding of national sovereignty over foreign policy 
matters to a supranational authority.  Subsequent rulings secured by lawsuits from EPM 
activists forced the Irish media to provide equal coverage to both sides of a referendum, 
and ‘levelled the playing field’ between the government and EPMs significantly.  
Moreover, the Irish government failed to challenge the convention of the use of the 
referendum as the final means of ratification of EU treaties, despite the defeat of the Nice 
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and Lisbon Treaties.  This kept the policy input structure firmly open.  In contrast to 
Denmark, the defeat of EU treaties did not mean dramatic changes in Irish European 
policy outputs.  Irish EPMs had the political opportunity of further referendums on 
European integration that allowed them to increase in influence, while their Danish 
counterparts, denied more referendum campaigns to raise money and their profile, 
withered.   
The use of the judiciary to challenge the EU was also evident in Denmark where 
EPM activists secured a similar ruling to the Irish one.  Comparable constitutional 
provisions relating to the ceding of foreign policy decision making to supranational 
bodies allowed for the holding of referendums.  Danish EPMs were an important element 
of the campaign against the Maastricht Treaty that secured substantial policy opt-outs for 
Denmark from European integration, thereby showing the strength of Danish policy 
output structures.   
The findings from Estonia in relation to the explanatory factor proved to be 
different from those of the other cases.  Holding a referendum on Estonian accession was 
a mobilising factor for Estonian EPMs, but rather than prevent EPMs from participating, 
the Estonian government sought to actively include them in the campaign debate.  In all 
the other case studies national governments vigorously defended themselves against court 
actions and public campaigns by EPMs to open up the policy process.  Such a decision 
was taken by the Estonian government, as it was based on their desire to overcome the 
Soviet legacy of a poorly developed civil society.  It is interesting to juxtapose the efforts 
of the Estonian government to bring EPMs as members of civil society into the debate on 
European integration and to the more established member states that sought to keep civil 
society out.  This was not to say that the Estonian government wholeheartedly embraced 
EPMs, it was more that they recognised the importance of having dissenting voices in the 
national debate on the EU.  In this regard the open/closed nature of the Estonian policy 
making process becomes more confused.  The government opened up the policy making 
process for EPMs when it suited its interests, but as soon as accession was ratified, it 
closed the process again by not holding further referendums on European issues such as 
Euro membership.  From this perspective the Estonian policy making process appears to 
have moved to a closed position but with the government retaining the ability to achieve 
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desired policy outputs; in the example of Estonian EPMs, civil society involvement in the 
EU policy-making process.   
 
 
EF5: The more available are state and/or private resources, the more likely that 
EPMs will form. 
 That resource availability enhances the “likelihood of collective action” is one of 
the most widely accepted truths in relation to social movements
559
.  The literature on 
social movements places specific emphasis on human time and effort in addition to 
money as universally applicable mainstays of resources.  For resources to be effective in 
actual movement formation however, another resource, that of the managerial skills of 
coordination and strategy development, is required.  Examining this explanatory factor 
revealed much about the nature of civil society-based Euroscepticism, as it showed 
whether EPMs formed on the basis of volunteer efforts could effectively contest the EU 
issue with professional party and other pro-European activists.  Financial resources are 
not considered to be central to social movement formation in the literature.  The 
examples of Libertas and Business for Sterling appear as outliers not just in the thesis but 
in the study of social movements themselves.   
 
Denmark 
The presence of resources did play a role in the decision of the Peoples’ 
Movement to move from civil-society, grassroots campaigning to contesting European 
elections.  Its effect was less on formation but more on the evolution of the EPMs.  The 
promise of monetary and organisational support from holding a European Parliamentary 
seat was one of the reasons why the People’s Movement re-formed to contest European 
elections in 1979.  Their plan was to use these resources to sustain and increase their 
campaigning against Danish EU membership.  The explanatory factor was not relevant in 
understanding EPM formation in the Danish case.   
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Estonia 
There were several interesting factors that marked the Estonian experience of 
resources as different from those of their Danish, Irish and UK counterparts.  Firstly, 
Estonian EPMs received significant funds from the UK.  Secondly, they received funds 
from the Estonian government and NGOs with the explicit purpose of providing a No 
side to the referendum campaign.  Without all these outside resources, Estonian EPM 
activists would have mobilised a campaign against accession regardless.  The explanatory 
factor was not relevant in explaining EPM formation in the Estonian case.   
 
Ireland 
For the most part resources were not a factor in EPM formation in Ireland.  Those 
EPMs who mobilised around the time of accession relied mostly on the institutional 
knowledge of their members as academics, economists and barristers, as their main 
resources.  As the Eurosceptic movements in Ireland matured and more individuals 
became involved the main resource became the number of ordinary members.  This was a 
key resource of the No to Nice EPM which – despite forming a coalition campaign with 
Sinn Féin, the Greens and the Socialist Party – was able to call upon thousands of 
volunteers to drop leaflets and place posters.  The presence of a potential membership 
willing and able to campaign did play a role in the formation of certain EPMs.  This was 
particularly true of the People’s Movement for which the level of inquiry from trade 
union officials and Labour party members about campaigning against the EU ensured that 
the movement would be founded, as it had the human resources available to sustain a 
lengthy and competitive campaign against the next EU referendum that was to be held.  
While this can be seen as responding to public opinion, in the light of the proposition it 
can be viewed as the exploitation of an available resource.  For the sheer amount of 
resources used no other EPM matched Libertas.  It relied wholesale on the resources of 
millionaire Declan Ganley and would not have existed if he had not had the personal 
finances to back its expensive and extensive campaign against the Lisbon Treaty.  The 
explanatory factor was weakened rather than strengthened by the evidence of the Irish 
case, where the significant financial resources of Libertas were the exception and not the 
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rule.  Overall, however, other explanatory factors were far more relevant in explaining 
EPM formation in the Irish case.   
 
 
UK 
Similarly to Ireland the UK saw the formation of an EPM around private 
resources.  Business for Sterling was mobilised solely by the expenditure of resources by 
wealthy individuals.  Campaign for a Referendum was not influenced in their formation 
by the availability of resources.  It was access to like minded individuals more than for 
material resources that led them to maintain their links with political parties, but the 
decision to form Campaign for a Referendum was not based decisively on this.  The 
proposition was partly relevant in the UK case, where private resources formed Business 
for Sterling but it did not affect the formation of grass roots EPMs such as Campaign for 
a Referendum.  As Business for Sterling was the only example of this in the UK case the 
explanatory factor was not relevant in explaining EPM formation in the UK.   
 
Conclusion  
A common theme across EPMs in all the case studies was the lament at the lack 
of resources that limited their ability to campaign, putting them at an overwhelming 
disadvantage to their pro-EU counterparts.  This lack of resources did not, however, 
prevent the formation of EPMs.  The argument of individuals involved in EPM formation 
was that resources were not needed to mobilise, they were needed to campaign.  So the 
explanatory factor was not correct in a general sense.  There were individual examples 
from the case studies that contradicted this more widely applicable conclusion.  Libertas 
in Ireland and Business for Sterling from the UK were two EPMs that were based on the 
resources of wealthy individuals to campaign against European integration.  They were 
different from the other EPM examples not just for the amount of resources at their 
disposal, which ran into €2.9 million in the former and over £1 million in the later, but in 
that they were not typical grass-roots social movements and can be more accurately 
described as ‘elite-level’ movements.  In turn, they can be divided again as Libertas was 
a vehicle for an individual, Declan Ganley, to put forward his personal criticism of the 
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Lisbon Treaty.  Business for Sterling, on the other hand, was a vehicle for a group of 
disgruntled Conservative donors who wanted to prevent the UK government from 
holding a referendum on joining the Euro.  Business for Sterling folded as soon as it 
became clear that a referendum on the Euro was not going to be held, and those who 
founded the EPM went back to their involvement with the Conservatives.  Ganley went 
on to disband Libertas after the successful rejection of Lisbon in 2008, only to re-form it 
in early 2009 as a political party to contest the European Parliamentary elections in each 
member state.  Ganley’s millions were the key to Libertas emerging as an EPM.  While 
this does not discount the genuine ideological basis of his opposition to European 
integration, it states the dominant fact that he would not have been in the position to do so 
without the resources at his disposal.  In contrast Business for Sterling existed solely due 
to the financial support of a group of individuals.  The founders did none of the 
campaigning themselves, indeed almost their only inputs were the resources and the goal 
of the EPM, with professional managers and paid activists used to conduct the campaign.  
In addition to financial resources they were also able to use the elite insider connections 
of their founders to gain access to the mainstream media.  For Libertas and Business for 
Sterling the availability of private resources did encourage their formation.   
These two groups aside, the other examples discussed in the case studies had two 
main forms of resources: human and expertise.  In the Danish and Irish examples human 
resources were a significant factor in the successful role of the EPMs involved in getting 
EU referendums rejected.  In the early 1990s the People’s Movement in Denmark could 
rely on thousands of volunteers to spread campaign material throughout the Danish 
archipelago in small towns and villages in isolated islands that played an important role 
in the No vote on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.  Significantly, mainstream pro-
Maastricht parties could not mobilise this number of canvassers over such a wide 
geographic area and so the rural vote was not adequately contested by the pro-Treaty 
side.  Similarly, in Ireland the Cóir and People’s Movement EPMs had a network of 
volunteers throughout Ireland who dropped leaflets and erected posters in areas not 
covered by the mainstream Yes campaign.  Being almost free and mobilised by an 
ideological opposition to European integration, volunteers were one of the most 
important resources of EPMs.  In Ireland the EU referendum campaigns of Cóir and 
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People’s Movement were largely built around making the best use of the amount of 
volunteers that they had. 
The other resource of EPMs was that of expertise.  As EPMs focused exclusively 
on the EU, an in-depth knowledge of the workings of the EU provided an advantage over 
those who did not have a similar familiarity.  This resource was employed with profound 
effect in the Irish Nice I referendum campaign where veteran EPM activists were able to 
achieve significant legitimacy in the eyes of the public and the media, due to their ability 
to argue points of reference between existing EU law and the proposed changes of the EU 
Treaty with ministers in government and the then head of the Referendum Commission.  
The ministers in questions and the head of the Commission had to plead ignorance of the 
EU law the EPM activists were referring to, with the media highlighting this discrepancy 
between the knowledge of the two sides.  Many years of campaigning over EU-related 
issues gave EPM activists significant institutional knowledge when debating with pro-EU 
actors.  Frequently the pro-EU side was represented by government ministers, who may 
have had experience of the EU, but only in the narrow field of their ministry, and who 
relied on the briefing notes provided to them by civil servants.  This situation became 
such an issue in Ireland that the Irish government created a junior ministry for European 
Affairs in part to provide expert government representation in public debates on the EU.  
EPM activists in Denmark during the Euro referendum had a similar experience, where 
their years of campaigning experience taught them that simple, clear arguments 
referenced to relevant EU treaties would win the day, as opposed to the verbose, 
technical, economic arguments of government officials. 
Following on from the previous explanatory factor in relation to the Estonian case 
study, the Estonian government actively sought to provide financial resources to EPMs.  
These resources were provided by billionaire financier George Soros’s Estonian branch 
of his Open Society Institute and were used to ensure that Estonia had some semblance of 
a balanced debate between two sides.  Indeed, this was supplemented by government 
funding, as the Estonian government gave financial resources to EPM activists to spread 
their campaign.  The sudden infusion of resources actually damaged the Estonian EPMs’ 
campaign, as they squabbled over who should get the money and what it should be spent 
on, instead of focusing on campaigning.   
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Generally the evidence from the case studies shows that this explanatory factor 
confirmed to the social movement literature as outlined in the opening chapter that 
human and organizational resources would be the most important in EPM formation.  The 
specific examples from the UK and Ireland show that financial resources could play a 
role in exceptional circumstances.   
 
6.3 Conclusions on the Explanatory Factors 
This study outlined five explanatory factors taken from the established literature 
on Euroscepticism and social movements.  The literature on Euroscepticism has 
previously focused exclusively on two specific strands – party-based Euroscepticism and 
public support for European integration.  Using studies from these two areas as the basis 
for an analysis of civil society-based protest movements was always going to be fraught 
with difficulty and contradictions.  While the general area of Euroscepticism is still in a 
flux of theoretical development, this chapter has shown that the explanatory factors, 
while not all highly relevant, provided an excellent base to analyse the EPMs.  The 
explanatory factors did provide an illuminating insight into the scholarly debate on social 
movement formation.  Principally it was found that the resource opportunity theory, as in 
the resources and the media explanatory factors, was not widely applicable in explaining 
EPM formation but that the political opportunity theory – Eursocepticism in the party 
system, referendums and open policy process – was directly relevant.  As political 
opportunity theory is the dominant paradigm in social movement studies, the conclusions 
of this thesis not only reinforce the theory but also make a conclusive case for European 
integration as an issue that is the basis for collective action.   
 There was a significant degree of variation across the explanatory factors in that, 
strictly applied, all bar EF1 could be interpreted as not relevant in explaining EPM 
formation, but a more general interpretation made them significant.   EF2, for example, 
was most definitely useful in explaining the Estonian and Irish cases but in the Danish 
and UK cases it was not so much the low level of Euroscepticism as the low effectiveness 
of this party-based Euroscepticism that led to EPM formation.  EF3 was important again 
in a more general sense as referendums themselves were strongly linked to EPM 
formation.  A high number of referendums greatly facilitated EPM formation in Denmark 
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and Ireland.  For Estonia after one referendum it was too early to say, but the UK case 
was again an outlier.  Having just one referendum in the UK was necessary to mobilise 
some twenty-four EPMs.  There was an important condition to this in that while only one 
referendum was held in the UK, EU-related referendums were promised by the ruling 
government party on the Euro and the EU constitutional treaty.  This shows that even the 
suggestion of referendums was enough to mobilise EPMs.   EF4 again shows Denmark 
and Ireland to have had a similar experience with an explanatory factor, this time in 
relation to the importance of the openness of the policy process in facilitating EPM 
formation, which it most certainly did in both cases.  Rather differently in Estonia the 
government actively encouraged EPMs to join the policy making process, which, while 
not directly leading to formation, helped to facilitate it.   Yet again the UK was the 
outlier, as the explanatory factor was not useful in understating EPM formation there.  
The UK policy process was very much closed, relative to the other case studies but this 
did not deter EPM formation.  EF5 was found to be unimportant in all of the case studies.  
There were however, the specific examples of Libertas in Ireland and Business for 
Sterling in the UK which were formed due to the availability of resources of certain 
individuals.  Finally, EF1, the more pro-European the media are, was the one explanatory 
factor that was relevant across all the case studies.  It was influential across different case 
studies with it being highly relevant in Denmark and the UK, but less so in Estonia and 
Ireland.  
 
6.4 Interaction Between the Explanatory Factors 
This chapter has shown the relevance of the explanatory factors in an individual 
binary relationship to EPM formation.  Over the course of the study it was noted how 
several explanatory factors interacted with each other to impact upon EPM formation.  
These were: (i) referendums and the party system, (ii) referendums and the open policy 
process and (iii) media and the party system.  These relationships reveal much about the 
nature of national level relationships and discourse on European integration.  Firstly, that 
the origin and holding of referendums on European integration were strongly influenced 
by the level of Euroscepticism in the party system.  Secondly, that an open policy process 
also strongly influenced the holding of EU referendums.  And thirdly, that Eurosceptics 
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perceived the media and the party system to be pro-EU and, moreover, as part of a wider 
national EU supporting elite, which encouraged EPM formation.    
 
6.4.1 Referendums and the Party system 
In the cases of both Ireland and Denmark referendums and the party system 
interacted to significant degrees in a manner that greatly facilitated EPM formation.  This 
was especially the case with regard to the referendums explanatory factor, which on its 
own would not have had the significant effect on EPM formation it did have.  Due to 
issues within the party system, referendums were held which otherwise would not have 
been, which allowed the formation, and in several cases victory, of EPMs that in turn 
spurred further EPM formation.  Similar, though less obvious, interaction of these 
explanatory factors was witnessed in the UK and Estonia.  In the UK the inability of the 
party system to deal with the issue of a referendum on Europe caused EPMs to be 
formed, while in Estonia it was the unwillingness of any established political party to 
challenge the accession referendum that caused individuals from political parties to form 
an EPM.   
Throughout this study understanding the impact of referendums on EPM 
formation was closely linked to the party system.  This connection was obvious, as it 
became clear from the case studies that referendums were held more on the basis of 
political expediency than on the basis of constitutional need.  Though the origin of 
national referendums on European integration has been superficially thought to be rooted 
in the constitutional law of individual member states, the holding of them is in the grip of 
the political system.
560
  The Irish, Danish and UK case studies provided strong evidence 
of this.  These findings call into question the use of referendums on European integration 
as a true measure of public support for the EU given the level of political interference in 
them.  Such interference was very much more concerned with the domestic political 
situation than the EU level.  Eurosceptics in Ireland and Denmark were acutely conscious 
of this interaction of party politics and formed EPMs to exploit it successfully.  
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6.4.2 Referendums and Open Policy Process 
In Ireland and Denmark specific references to foreign policy in the constitution of 
each state allowed EPMs to be formed in both states to challenge an EU Treaty on the 
basis that it was against the national constitution and therefore necessitated a change to 
the constitution, which could only be done via a referendum.  It would have been 
pointless for EPMs to form just to contest on the basis of the constitution if a successful 
outcome would lead to another vote in parliament that would be comfortably won by pro-
Treaty political parties.  Constitutional legal challenges were made on the explicit belief 
that a favourable verdict would lead to a referendum and a rare opportunity to 
communicate Eurosceptic arguments to the public in a national campaign with the 
possibility of defeating the Treaty.  In Ireland the constitutional challenge took the form 
of an EPM being formed to launch a court action.  In Denmark, an EPM was formed to 
formulate dissent within the Social Democratic party over the SEA.  Party MPs refused to 
vote in favour of the Treaty on the grounds that it was against the Danish Constitution 
and that if a referendum was not held, a legal challenge to force the holding of one would 
be forthcoming. 
There was a conscious appreciation of the interaction between these two 
propositions by EPM activists.  EPMs were formed to take specific action based on 
interpretations of national constitutions with the goal being the holding of a referendum. 
One of the key findings of this study was that referendums were vital to the formation of 
EPMs but that this importance was largely predicated on their interaction with the level 
of Euroscepticism in the party system and the openness of the policy-making process. 
 
6.4.3 Media as Pro-EU and Level of Euroscepticism in the Party System 
 Across all the case studies it was noted how EPM activists viewed the media as 
pro-EU and that EPMs were formed in part to put forward what they believed was “the 
truth” about the negative impact of European integration on their country.561  The media 
and the party system were grouped together by EPM activists as being part of a pro-EU 
elite.  In essence the perceived failure of the media to criticise the EU was included with 
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the perceived failure of the party system to adequately challenge European integration by 
EPMs.  In Denmark the media was believed to have “done a deal with the parties” to put 
forward the same arguments as each other in favour of EU referendums.
562
  In Estonia 
and Ireland this negative sentiment against the media was not as strong as in Denmark, as 
they had more access to the media, but there was still a wide perception of the media and 
political parties cooperating together to undermine them and their arguments.   
How did the media and political parties become seen as two heads of the same 
pro-EU beast by EPM activists?  There was a strong belief amongst EPMs of a wider pro-
EU elite that stretched across the political, media, business and civil society spheres to 
actively damage them.  This led them to associate the media with the pro-EU arguments 
of mainstream pro-EU political parties.  Such a perceived atmosphere of pervasive pro-
European integration arguments in the media and political arenas caused many EPMs to 
form in order to put forward Eurosceptic arguments that were not being discussed at any 
level.   
 
6.5 An ‘Ideal Type’ Case Study 
From the case studies what can be distilled to hypothesise as to an ideal type of case 
that would particularly encourage EPM formation?  What are the explanatory factors that 
if present would drive the formation of EPMs?  This section takes the propositions of this 
study and adapts them to create an environment that would ensure EPM formation, thus:   
 
1. A high number of referendums on European integration.   
2. A low level of perceived effective Euroscepticism in the party system.   
3. A split media with some elements putting forward an uncritical stance on 
European integration and others providing space for EPM arguments (an example 
would be the UK where the broadcast media were perceived as pro-EU and the 
print media as more open to criticism of the EU by EPMs). 
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4. A policy process with weak party discipline, low executive dominance of 
parliament, strong constitutional provisions in relation to foreign policy, and an 
independent judiciary.   
5. Resources available from large institutions, which would encourage right-wing 
EPM formation, and resources available from NGOs which would encourage left-
wing EPM formations, not just through finance, but also through transfer of 
human resources.   
1.) Referendums.  While it was shown in both the Estonian and UK cases that only 
one referendum was needed to promote EPM formation, the evidence from the Danish 
and Irish cases showed that referendums on the EU were vital to EPM formation.  EPMs 
rally to referendums, as they provide two elements that are in short supply for them, 
publicity and political opportunity.  The more referendums that are held, the more 
possibilities there are for EPMs to make the public aware of their arguments and to 
challenge mainstream pro-EU political parties and civil society actors.   
2.) Euroscepticism in the party system.  All of the case studies had evidence of 
Euroscepticism in the party system but it was either deemed to be ineffective or 
ideologically incompatible by those individuals who formed EPMs.  All of the EPMs had 
activists who were also members of political parties.  Had their political parties taken the 
action that their members desired against European integration, then they would not have 
formed EPMs to take such action through civil society.  This was most explicit in the 
cases of Denmark and the UK.   
3.) The media.  The Irish and Estonian cases showed that EPMs were mobilised to 
disseminate what they believed to the true negative impact of European integration 
against a perceived pro-EU bias in the media.  They were also encouraged by the space 
the same media provided for their arguments in the name of balance despite 
“editorialising” against them563.  This provided EPMs with the justification for forming, 
firstly, to challenge the pro-EU media and secondly, with the knowledge that they could 
disseminate their arguments.  Estonian and Irish EPMs, and to a lesser extent UK EPMs 
experienced such a relationship with the media.   
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4.)  Open Policy Process.  The Danish and Irish examples provided evidence of each 
of the issues related to an open policy process being present.  EPMs formed in both of 
these examples to exploit the openness of the judiciary, the weakness of the executive 
and the weakness of party discipline.  Given that their issue was not one based on 
domestic policy but of an international dimension rooted in international treaties, there 
were more avenues of policy process approach for EPMs to exploit.  The supranational 
element of EU membership and the giving up of national sovereignty to the EU 
institutions were exploited by EPMs, in particular either through the judiciary on 
constitutional grounds or through the difficulty of party elites in achieving party unity to 
support the ceding of national sovereignty.   
5.) Resources.  This takes the form of financial resources as seen with Libertas in 
Ireland and Business for Sterling in the UK.  Resources available from NGOs and other 
civil society organisations provide mostly human and knowledge resources that benefit 
left-wing EPMs.  The respective Peoples’ Movements in both Denmark and Ireland drew 
substantially on such resources for their anti-EU referendum campaigns.  The example of 
Cóir, though, shows that in isolated examples right wing EPMs can benefit also, as Cóir 
benefitted from the financial and human resources of Catholic organisations.   
Other possible explanatory factors that emerged through the course of the thesis 
were (i) national foreign policy, (ii) length of membership and (iii) agency.  National 
foreign policy is a nebulous issue and would take considerable theoretical exertion to 
frame as an explanatory factor, but the evidence from the Danish and UK cases shows 
that it should be considered.  In both cases a specific foreign policy meant that the issue 
environment was different from the other member states.  In Denmark, it was its position 
as a Nordic state with a lengthy history of pushing specific issues into the international 
area through involvement in the UN.  In the UK, it was its separate relationships with the 
Commonwealth and the USA.  Both of these offered alternatives to European integration 
for EPMs to form on and campaign on.   
Following closely from this, not being an original member presented itself as 
another factor potentially causing EPM formation.  There is clearly a different issue 
framing environment between an original member state and one that joined later, in that 
EPMs could point to a time when the state was not involved in European integration and 
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that returning to that position was a legitimate option.  The fact that accession to the EU 
had to be debated and held to a referendum gave further issue legitimacy to EPMs in non-
original member states.  In original member states participation in European integration 
was never a widely debated public issue held to a plebiscite so there was no precedence 
of a discourse on EU membership for an EPM to claim and form around.   
Through a majority of the case studies a pattern emerged of individuals whose 
personal organisational capacity and ideological opposition to the EU was an important 
element of EPM formation.  An analysis of such individuals would have been in line with 
existing approaches in the social movements literature but would have proven to have 
been too narrative-driven and would have reduced the opportunity for an in-depth 
comparative analysis to be made.     
All of these potential explanatory factors were touched on throughout the case 
studies but they presented significant challenges in their operationalisation for a 
comparative analysis.  A single case study analysis could comfortably include them but 
this would have proved far too ambitious for this thesis.    
 
6.6 A Non-Example of EPM Formation 
While this thesis has discussed cases that have seen EPM formation, what of those 
countries listed in Table 1.2 in Chapter One that do not have examples of EPM 
formation?  Spain is an example of such a country, where all the propositions are present 
(though where resources are limited) and yet there has been no evidence of EPM 
formation.  What has prevented EPM formation in Spain? And are these factors case 
specific or more widely applicable?  
Spain represented an ideal candidate for negative testing of EPM formation.  A 
referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty was held in 2005; there was a relatively low 
level of Eursocepticism in the party system; the media was perceived as being pro-EU; 
and the policy process was relatively open (with regard to the pluralist style of decision 
making, coalition formation, and independence of the judiciary but not in regard to the 
openness of the government).
564
  The only proposition that was missing was the 
widespread availability of resources but, as was shown in the other case studies, it was no 
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great barrier to EPM formation.  Yet, still there were no EPMs in Spain.  Moreover, 
public opinion was not a barrier, as Spain had lower rates of support for European 
integration than in Denmark or Ireland (59% having a positive view of Spanish 
membership of the EU in 2010, as against 66% in Denmark and 68% in Ireland).
565
   
Why then the lack of EPMs?  Euroscepticism in Spain was dominated by those on 
the radical left, where opposition to a perceived neo-liberal EU was based on strong 
ideological principles
566
.  For these parties and their activists the main political issue was 
further autonomy for their respective regions.  Due to the highly devolved nature of 
Spanish political institutions, these parties achieved regional office frequently and so 
their efforts became focused on attacking the Spanish state more than the EU.  As this 
issue was continuous and pressing, Euroscepticism while present in Spanish politics, 
became subsumed beneath this contested relationship between the Spanish state and its 
regions.  Those activists that would be most liable to form an EPM had an outlet in 
Eurosceptic political parties that achieved office, but only at the regional level.  Given the 
dominance in Spanish politics by the only parties with a nationwide presence, the Partido 
Popular and Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), both of whom were ostensibly 
pro-European, such parties did not have the organisational capacity or national profile to 
challenge national EU policy effectively.  Spain’s EU policy was viewed as an extension 
of the competition between the two national parties.  Critiques from regional parties were 
seen in terms of their regional status and as not representative of a national policy 
alternative, regardless of the validity of their arguments.
567
   
Radical left Eurosceptic parties had the ideological and office-holding 
background to attract those most likely to form EPMs.  The spread of radical-left 
Eurosceptic parties across the Spanish regions meant that alliance formation between 
them was difficult in the development of a No campaign in the referendum on the 
European Constitution in 2005.  It would have been extremely difficult for EPMs to form, 
as there was no national structure in a highly devolved system that they could form 
through. Campaigns were regionally based and rooted in Eurosceptic political parties and 
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trade unions.  There was simply no political or institutional space for EPMs to form.  This 
leads to the assumption that EPMs are less likely to form in states where the system of 
government is highly devolved.  All of the case studies discussed are examples of 
centralised governments and political systems (with Ireland being the most centralised 
state in the EU).  The Spanish example shows that perhaps the greatest obstacle for EPM 
formation to overcome is a highly devolved system of government.  Understanding 
whether Spain is an isolated example of the national institutional structure preventing 
EPM formation would be a fascinating potential comparative case study, and could form 
the basis of a future research proposal.   
 
6.7 Conclusion on the Explanatory Factors 
Table 6.1 outlines the strong degree of variance on the explanatory factors across 
the case studies.  As was theorized in the preceding paragraph, this variance revealed 
plenty of insights in relation to how the nature of national-EU relationships are perceived 
by actors in civil society and how the latter take collective action in response to this 
differs across several cases.   
 
Table 6.1 Conclusion on the explanatory factors relative to the case studies 
 Media Parties Referendums 
Open 
Policy 
Process 
Resources 
EPM 
Presence 
Ireland Pro Low High Open Mixed Low 
UK Anti High Low Closed Mixed High 
Denmark Pro Low High Open Low Low 
Estonia Pro Low Low Closed Low Low 
 
An important element of this was the close relationship between referendums and 
the party system in combining together to influence EPM formation.  From a wider 
perspective it represents the rejection of elite political party leadership on the EU issue 
and the (in some cases) successful challenging on this issue by campaigns to reject 
referendums on the EU.  While concrete evidence of EPM formation based on the 
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presence of referendums and level of Euroscepticism in the party system may vary across 
the case studies, these propositions, together with the pervasive conception by EPMs of 
the media as pro-EU, bring a new perspective on EPM formation that is widely 
applicable.  This is the view that EPMs can be seen as a reaction against the perceived 
collective participation of the party system, media and upper echelons of civil society in 
general in the negative domestic impact of European integration.  A clear narrative 
emerges from the analysis of the explanatory factors, that EPMs do not conceive of 
European integration as a single entity in itself but as part of a process which has co-
opted the entire societal elite to participation in the EU project to the detriment of what 
they believe to be the national interest.  
The distinctiveness of Euroscepticism as an issue also emerges from the 
propositions in significant contrast to that of other social movements.  Coalitions between 
political parties and EPMs have been weak and ephemeral.  This is in stark contrast to 
‘classic’ social movements such as ecology, feminism and global justice, which typically 
develop strong and long lasting relations with related political parties.  Even in states 
with an open policy process there was no engagement on the EU issue between 
government and EPMs.  Across the case studies, despite varying degrees of access, the 
media was seen as editorialising against Eurosceptic arguments.  What best explains this 
difference of EPMs from other social movements on these issues?  It would appear that it 
was the engagement of EPMs in national level protest to deal with the supranational issue 
of European integration.  From previous chapters the reluctance of EPMs to organise at a 
European level was noted and again contrasted to the social movement norm which was 
to engage enthusiastically in international cooperation.  
In the body of literature on civil society engagement with European integration,
568
 
specific issue groups, such as trade unions, business associations, religious organisations 
and various civic groups which lobby EU institutions directly were identified as being 
representative of a Europeanized civil society.  The empirical evidence of EPM formation 
discussed in this thesis shows that this body of literature needs to include Euroscepticism 
as an element of a Europeanised civil society.  Going forward, the extensive body of 
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research on political party based Euroscepticism and public opinion towards European 
integration needs to acknowledge that Euroscepticism also exists and is active in civil 
society, and most importantly that the three are intimately linked in the wider process of 
the contestation of European integration.  
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General Conclusions  
and Suggestions for Further Research 
 
This thesis sought to locate the factors that caused the formation of EPMs.  While 
the literature on Euroscepticism has coalesced around party politics and public opinion 
towards European integration, this thesis sought to extend the understanding of the 
phenomenon of Euroscepticism by examining social movements that form solely to 
contest European integration.  This was achieved by examining in-depth case studies of 
EPM formation in Ireland, the UK, Estonia and Denmark.  The previous chapter 
synthesised the factors that led to EPM formation from the evidence of the case studies.  
This conclusion progresses on from Chapter Six to articulate the overarching theme from 
the thesis as a whole, that of the emergence of contestation of European integration in the 
face of significant formal and informal constraints.  This theme has further relevance for 
the literature on social movements, in particular to how EPMs affect our understanding of 
EU political opportunity structures. Perhaps the main findings of this thesis are most 
relevant toward the body of work on contestation and representation in European 
integration.  The emergence and relative success of EPMs represents a direct challenge to 
existing concepts of how the EU issue is represented at the national level by different 
established actors. 
In relation to the social movement element of this thesis the conclusion was that 
European integration has become an issue of collective action.  The EU has therefore 
become an issue similar to gender equality and ecology, which are also the focus of 
protest movement formation.  This finding clearly contradicts existing theories of how 
protest movements and civil society engage with European integration.  The assumption 
has been that collective action against European integration by civil society will only 
happen at the European level and strictly in terms of the European dimension of the core 
issue of the group in question.  The classic example of this from Tarrow and Imig is that 
of Belgian and French autoworker trade unions mobilising to contest single market 
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regulations which prohibited state support to save their jobs.
569
  In that case the trade 
union was the vehicle of protest and Euroscepticism was framed specifically on how 
European integration directly affected workers at those factories.  This study has shown 
that EPMs have emerged alongside existing civil society groups and social movements to 
contest European integration as a stand-alone issue at the national level.  EPMs have 
been formed and supported by members of existing civil society groups: from this study, 
these included trade unions, religious organisations, business lobby groups and global 
justice groups amongst others, but also both ordinary and elected members of political 
parties.  From the case studies a clear picture emerged of EPMs forming to contest 
European integration at the national level.  In seeking to explain this phenomenon the 
thesis isolated two widely applicable explanatory factors. 
The issue of elite ‘capture’ by the processes of European integration was a 
continuous theme across all the case studies.  Members of trade unions in Denmark and 
Ireland joined with the respective People’s Movements of both countries to oppose 
European referendums, as they believed that their trade union leaders were not contesting 
the perceived anti-worker bias of the EU Treaties under consideration.  The literature on 
civil society and the EU needs to take into account the evidence of this thesis where 
supposedly “represented peoples” have been shown to have actively formed civil society 
protest movements to oppose European integration, when they were supposedly 
“represented” at the EU level.570  This same pattern of a perception of elite level capture 
by the institutions of European integration was shown across other interests such as 
Catholicism (Cóir) and business (Business for Sterling).  Contestation of European 
integration based on the European dimension of these civil society groups at the 
European level was not possible for those who held Eurosceptic positions, as the 
perception was that civil society elites had been ‘captured’ by the EU institutions and had 
become dogmatically pro-European to the detriment of their group’s interest.  EPMs were 
therefore formed to contest European integration by ordinary members and officials of 
established civil-society groups. 
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In the cases of Denmark and Ireland EPM contestation of European treaties and of 
government EU policy in the court system, saw them achieve significant outcomes.  In 
Denmark, the People’s Movement No campaigning against the Maastricht Treaty laid the 
groundwork for Danish opt-outs from the final round of EMU and a common European 
citizenship amongst other policies.  In Ireland, No-to-Nice secured explicit guarantees 
that Irish neutrality would not be affected by ratification of the Nice Treaty after they 
acted as an umbrella group for the successful campaign to reject the Treaty in 2001.  Also 
in Ireland Libertas ensured that their issue of retaining a guaranteed Commissioner for 
each member state was included in legal declarations following the Irish rejection of the 
Lisbon Treaty in 2008.  EPMs formed to contest European referendums because it 
allowed them to effect change on EU policy at both the national and European level that 
other civil society groups had failed to achieve.   
Referendums emerged as the key access point of EPMs to the policy-making 
process.  In this regard EPMs stand out from the literature on social movements as the 
relationship between collective action and referendums has not been the subject of any 
significant amount of scholarly study.  This is the case for the simple reason that so few 
referendums have been held on issues relevant to social movements outside of 
exceptional one off events.  Evidence from this thesis, however, found that referendums 
have a powerful formation effect on EPMs of, firstly, allowing them access to the policy-
making process and, secondly, of allowing them potentially to effect significant policy 
change in a quick and decisive manner.  The media has long been highlighted as an 
important arena of contestation for social movements but this thesis has shown that the 
referendum campaign can be a far more important platform to raise public awareness of 
the issues they use to challenge European integration.  Referendums compressed many of 
the most important elements of the policy making process into a specific timeframe that 
proved beneficial for EPMs.  By far the most beneficial element of referendums was that 
it made the EU issue salient for EPMs.  Referendums gave legitimacy to the actions of 
EPMs by pushing European integration to the top of the national political agenda, which 
in turn provided access to the media.  From the case studies it was shown that media 
outlets were keen to show both sides of the argument during referendum campaigns and 
thus EPMs were allowed a national media platform for their arguments.  Referendums 
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represented an opportunity for EPMs to engage directly with the policy-making process 
and effect real policy change as Danish and Irish EPMs were able to do.  Few, if any, 
other elements of the policy making process can encompass such a range of potential 
benefits for collective action from civil society.  With a general increase in, and wider 
calls for the use of, direct democracy to resolve social issues a study of how social 
movements interact with referendums based on the evidence of this thesis will greatly 
add to the literature on the ‘political opportunity structure’ approach to social movement 
activity.   
While this thesis adds a new dimension to the study of political opportunity 
structures in the body of work on social movements, it also plugs directly into the 
important debate on political parties and their role in European integration.  Mair and 
Thomassen have shown that political parties are meant to act as interlocutors between the 
EU and national electorates.
571
  This thesis found that this specific role of political parties 
has been allowed to go fallow, with the consequence that they were identified as key 
factors causing EPM formation.  The pattern that emerged across all the case studies, 
including the supposedly outlier UK case, was one of political elite withdrawal on the EU 
issue.  Following on from the belief of members of specific civil society groups that their 
leadership had become dogmatically pro-EU and stifled all debate on European 
integration, political parties across the case studies either removed the party from the EU 
debate or stifled discussion on party support for European integration.  Most explicitly in 
the Danish, Estonian and UK cases, individual members of political parties, frustrated 
with their party’s EU policy, formed EPMs to contest European integration, where these 
parties refused or failed to do so (in the Irish example party members joined existing 
EPMs).   
The conclusions of this thesis in relation to the importance of both the low level 
of Euroscepticism in the party system and the disengagement of both mainstream and 
extremist political parties on the European issue in EPM formation highlight several 
important points.  Firstly, the comparative literature on party based Euroscepticism needs 
to take into account that ostensibly pro-European parties have both memberships and 
elected officials who are actively engaged in contesting the EU through EPMs.  
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Secondly, the evidence of the case studies found that simplistic government-opposition 
dynamics could not fully explain the anti-EU voting behaviour of pro-European 
electorates at times of referendums on European integration.
572
  The evidence from EPMs 
shows that pro-EU political parties found it difficult to deal with contestation of the EU 
from outside the party system.  Bartolini has highlighted this problem of “political 
support mobilisation” that national political parties face when seeking legitimisation for 
their participation in sovereignty pooling at the supranational level.
573
  He saw this issue 
arising principally with public opinion but EPMs show that it can be expanded to include 
civil society based protest movements as well.   
Sartori lists one of the functions of political parties as being “integration [that] 
involves ... the party as the agency that performs a ‘cohesive’ function”.574  Transferring 
this concept to parties’ roles in European integration, their cohesive function has been to 
provide legitimacy and democratic accountability for a process that has been conducted 
far out of view of the electorate.  The day to day running of the EU has moved far beyond 
the occasional, perfunctory role national political parties perform in the EU system, 
leaving them significantly removed from developments that are dominated by interest 
groups and elites.  This has had the effect of reducing the original democratic function of 
parties in the EU and reducing their exposure and therefore interest in the EU.   Parties 
were not entirely blameless in this respect, as their focus on national government office 
seeking has meant that their representative function at the EU level have been willingly 
sacrificed for domestic electoral gain.
575
  When the EU became salient, such as in 
referendum votes, pro-EU political parties were so distant from the process of European 
integration that they were unable to engage with voters in a meaningful way on the 
European issue, either by providing cues to or processing cues from voters.  The 
consequence of the reduction of this function was to lead to the erosion of political 
parties as a fundamental part of democratic accountability and legitimacy in the EU.   
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The evidence from this thesis strongly corroborated Mair and Thomassen’s 
hypothesis, where even in pro-EU countries, such as Ireland and Estonia, members of 
political parties grew frustrated with what they saw as the withdrawal of discussion on 
the EU issue.  In Ireland this had the effect of causing disorganised and divided 
campaigns in favour of EU referendums, as members of ostensibly pro-EU parties joined 
EPMs and campaigned against party cues.  In the UK even the supposedly Eurosceptic 
Conservatives marginalised the EU issue within the party, thereby strengthening UK 
EPMs that continued to exist so as to force the Conservative party elite to hold an EU 
related referendum (Campaign for a Referendum, I want a Referendum).  This 
disconnection between party and membership was at its most extreme in the Danish case, 
where the Social Democrat leadership funded and condoned their membership’s 
participation in firstly the People’s Movement and latterly the June Movement.  Such was 
their desire to avoid a party split over the EU issue that they enabled and supported EPM 
formation.  Only when the party engaged explicitly and publicly with its membership on 
the EU issue did support from Social Democrat members for these two EPMs collapse.   
This area has been emphasised by Mair as one that will be of increasing concern 
for European comparativist political scientists in the immediate future, as the viability of 
sustaining the political will for European integration is coming under considerable 
pressure.
576
  One logical progression of this thesis for further research is to expand upon 
the evidence from the case studies to engage directly with this debate on the democratic 
deficit in European integration.  The European Commission has signalled its interest in 
engaging with civil society to address this deficit and any future research project will 
seek to inform this by showing that grass roots civil society movements and groups are 
willing to engage on European integration.
577
  This thesis focused on civil society 
engagement with the EU that formed at the national level.  This is in contrast to the focus 
in previous studies, which has been on the European level.  As the conclusions of this 
research have show, the European-level representation of civil society, in addition to that 
by political parties, has come to be increasingly contested by members and officials of 
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these civil society groups.  The case studies highlighted examples of particular groups, 
such as political parties, trade unions and religious organisations, whose members had the 
perception that their group’s leadership had been ‘captured’ by the EU.  While Mair has 
discussed the consequences of the withdrawal of political parties on the EU issue, the 
evidence of the thesis can be greatly expanded in a future study to detail the extent to 
which the role has not been fulfilled by civil-society groups.  Inherent in such a study is 
developing a framework for understanding what role civil society performs in 
representing citizen interests at the EU level.  Kohler-Koch has shown that civil-society 
groups have the potential to emerge as a “grass-roots level” representative between 
citizens and the EU.
578
  This study has the potential to build on her work with both 
empirical findings and a theoretical framework. 
Testing the framework used in the thesis against additional cases can also help to 
broaden the main conclusions from this research.  As discussed in Section 6.6, Spain is an 
example of a state without the occurrence of EPMs.  A much deeper analysis of the 
reasons why EPMs failed to form there could corroborate the initial findings of the thesis 
in relation to Spain. Specifically such a study could focus on how a highly devolved 
system of government can play a substantive role in negating the emergence of 
Euroscepticism in civil society despite the presence of the explanatory factors used in the 
thesis.  Likewise, an analysis of the failure of EPM formation in Spain may identify other 
points that have not been considered across the literature on Euroscepticism and social 
movements as a whole.   
The explanatory factors developed for this thesis also show significant potential 
for further research.  In particular, the conclusion that referendums were a key component 
of EPM formation can be the subject of a study that explores how referendums and social 
movements in general interact.  Such a study would plug directly into the social 
movement literature on political opportunity structures.  A future research project that 
looks at the relationship between referendums and social movements across several 
different countries and different issues would have several potential benefits.  Firstly, it 
would allow for a concentrated understanding of political opportunity structures across a 
diverse range of states with a single common access point to the policy-making process: 
                                                 
578
 Kohler-Koch, ‘Civil society and EU democracy’, p. 106. 
  
261 
 
namely, referendums.  Secondly, it would make measuring the effectiveness of social 
movement activities more explicit and more easily comparable, as it would be based on 
the referendum result.  Research into social movements that use referendums to attain a 
particular goal is typically conducted in a case specific manner and has not been pursued 
systematically in either a comparative or large N context.  Such a study would prove 
fascinating, as it could expand on the work of this research project and potentially extend 
it into non-European countries, in particular the United States, that have seen an increase 
in social movements affecting policy outcomes through the use of referendums.  
Finally, the expert survey conducted in Chapter One provided some interesting 
findings that could be expanded into a larger study.  With greater space to analyse the 
findings of the survey far more conclusions could be drawn from it.  Additional questions 
could be introduced to the questionnaire to see how relevant the explanatory factors 
discussed in this survey, are across Europe as a whole.  Ray has used a similar survey to 
locate the extent of Euroscepticism in mainstream parties.
579
  This proposed study would 
seek to achieve something similar by possibly looking beyond EPMs into civil society as 
a whole and locating all those non-party Eurosceptic actors who have played a role in 
contesting European integration across Europe. 
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Appendix I:  
List of respondents to pan-European EPM questionnaire.  
 
Country 
Presence of 
EPMs  
Yes/No 
Number Effectiveness Expert Institution 
Austria Y 2 1 Franz Fallend 
Uni. of 
Manchester 
Belgium N     Nathalie Brack 
Uni. Libre 
Bruxelles 
Bulgaria N     Lyubka Savkova 
Sussex 
European 
Institute 
Croatia Y 1 1 Marko Stojic 
Sussex 
European 
Institute 
Cyprus N     
George 
Charalambous 
Uni. of 
Manchester 
Czech 
Republic 
Y 2 1 Sean Hanley SSEES/UCL 
Denmark Y 1 2 John FitzGibbon 
Sussex 
European 
Institute 
Estonia Y 3 2 John FitzGibbon 
Sussex 
European 
Institute 
Finland Y 2 1 Katri Vallaste 
Helsinki 
Uni. 
France N     Sally Marthaler 
Sussex 
European 
Institute 
Germany N     Kai Oppermann Uni. of Köln 
Greece N     
Susannah 
Verney 
Univ. of 
Athens 
Hungary N     Agnes Batory CEU 
Iceland Y 2 2 Jo Saglie 
Institute for 
Social 
Research, 
Norway 
Ireland Y 3 4 John FitzGibbon 
Sussex 
European 
Institute 
Italy N     Simona Guerra 
Uni. of 
L’borough 
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Latvia N     Daunis Auers 
Uni. of 
Latvia 
Lithuania N     Liudas Mazylis Kaunas Uni. 
Luxembourg N     Martine Huberty 
Sussex 
European 
Institute 
Malta Y 1 1 Roderick Pace 
Uni. of 
Malta 
Montenegro N     Marko Stojic 
Sussex 
European 
Institute 
Netherlands Y 1 1 Robert Harmsen 
Uni. of 
Luxembourg 
Norway  Y 1 5 Jo Saglie 
Institute for 
Social 
Research, 
Norway 
Poland N 1 1 Simona Guerra 
Uni. Of 
L’borough 
Portugal N     
Madalena Meyer 
Resende 
Uni. Nova 
de Lisboa 
Romania Y 1 1 Sergiu Ghergina  
Uni. of 
Leiden 
Serbia Y 4 2 Marko Stojic 
Sussex 
European 
Institute 
Slovakia N     
Karen 
Henderson 
Uni. of 
Leicester 
Slovenia N 2 1 
Alenka 
Krasovec 
Uni. of 
Ljubljana 
Spain N     
Luiz Bouza 
García 
College of 
Europe, 
Bruges 
Sweden Y 7 3 Nicholas Aylott  
Sodertorn 
Uni. College 
Switzerland Y 2 4 Clive H Church Uni. of Kent 
UK Y 25 4 John FitzGibbon 
Sussex 
European 
Institute 
 
 
 
Experts were drawn from the EPERN network of scholars.  The European Parties 
Elections and Referendums Network (EPERN) is a network of scholars researching the 
impact of European integration on parties, elections and public opinion. It was set up in 
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August 2003, has a 100-strong international email membership list, organises research 
seminars and publishes a working paper series. The Network produces an ongoing series 
of briefings on the impact of European integration on election campaigns. EPERN also 
produced a special briefing series on the 2004 and 2009 European Parliament elections. 
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Appendix II 
Irish national election results in % vote and seat number, the election results of parties 
who failed to win a seat are not displayed.   
 
 Fianna Fáil Fine Gael Labour Sinn Féin Greens 
Progressive 
Democrats 
Socialist 
Party 
2011 17.4%/20 36.1%/76 19.4%/37 9.9%/14   1%/2 
2007 41.6%/71 27.3%/51 10.1%/20 6.9%/4 4.7%/6 2.7%/2 1%/0 
2002 42%/81 23%/31 11%/21 7%/5 4%/6 4%/8 1%/1 
1997 40%/77 28%/54 10%/17 3%/1 3%/2 5%/4 1%/1 
1992 39%/68 25%/45 19%/33  1%/1 5%/10  
1989 44%/77 29%/55 10%/15  2%/1 6%/6  
1987 44%/81 27%/50 7%/12   12%/14  
1982 
(Nov.) 
45%/75 39%/70 10%/16     
1982 
(Feb.) 
47%/81 37%/63 9%/15     
1981 45%/77 37%/65 10%/15     
1977 51%/84 31%/43 12%/16     
1973 46%/68 35%/54 14%/19     
 
Workers' 
Party 
Democratic 
Left 
People Before 
Profit 
Democratic 
Socialist 
Party 
Independents Anti-H Block 
Socialist 
Labour Party 
2011   1%/2  12%/14   
2007   N/A  3%/5   
2002     8%/13   
1997  3%/4   7%/6   
1992  3%/4   6%/4   
1989 5%/7    3.4%/3   
1987 4%/4   0.4%/1 4%/3   
1982 
(Nov.) 
3%/2    2%/2   
1982 
(Feb.) 
2%/3    3%/3   
1981 2%/1    4%/4 3%/2 .4%/1 
1977     6%/4   
1973     3%/2   
 
 
 
Source: European elections database - 
http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/ireland/- accessed 25
th
 April, 
2011. 
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Appendix III 
Selected European Parliamentary results for England, Scotland and Wales only, by % 
vote and seat number.  Those parties not winning seats are not counted and so total % 
vote does not equal 100%.   
 
 
 Conservatives Labour 
Liberal 
Democrats 
UKIP Others 
2009 28%/25 16%/13 14%/11 17%/13 17%/7 
2004 27%/27 23%/19 15%/12 16%/12 9%/5 
1999 36%/36 28%/29 13%/10 7%/3 11%/6 
1994 28%/18 44%/62 17%/2  3%/2 
1989 35%/32 37%/45   3%/1 
1984 39%/45 35%/32   3%/1 
1979 51%/60 33%/17   2%/1 
 
 
Source: European Parliamentary election results from -
www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive - accessed 15th April 2011. 
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Appendix IV 
General elections results for three main parties and Eurosceptic parties in % vote and seat 
numbers.    
 Conservative Labour Lib Dem UKIP 
Referendum 
Party 
2010 36%/306 29%/258 23%/57 3%/0  
2005 32%/198 35%/355 22%/62 2.2%/0  
2001 32%/166 41%/412 18%/52 1.5%/0  
1997 31%/165 43%/418 17%/46 0.3%/0 2.6%/0 
1992 42%/336 34%/271 18%/20   
1987 42%/376 31%/229 23%/22   
1983 42%/397 28%/209 25%/23   
1979 44%/339 37%/269 14%/11   
1974 
(October) 
39%/319 36%/277 18%/13   
1974 
(February) 
37%/301 38%/334 19%/6   
1970 46.4%/330 43.1%/288 7.5%/6   
 
Source: European elections database-
http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/uk/-accessed 25
th
 April, 
2011. 
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Appendix V 
Estonian national election results in % vote and seat number, the election results of 
parties who failed to win a seat are not displayed.  The threshold for entering the 
Riigikogu is 5% for party lists but candidates can be elected if they receive more votes 
than the quota.    
 
 
Reform 
Party 
Centre 
Party 
Res 
Publica 
Pro 
Patria 
Res 
Publica 
Union 
Pro Patria 
Union 
Moderates 
Social 
Dems 
Greens 
People's 
Union 
Coalition 
Party 
Estonian 
Country 
People's Party 
2011 29%/33 23%/26  21%/23   17%/19 4%/0 2%/0   
2007 28%/31 26%/29  18%/19   11%/10 7%/6 7%/6   
2003 18%/19 25%/28 25%/28  7%/7 7%/6   13%/13   
1999 16%/18 23%/28   16%/18 15%/17    8%/7 7%/7 
1995 16%/19 14%/16   8%/8 6%/6      
1992     22%/ 29 10%/12  3%/1    
 
Estonian 
United 
People's 
Party 
Russian 
Party in 
Estonia 
Coalition 
Party 
and 
Rural 
Union 
Our 
Home is 
Estonia 
Republican 
and 
Conservative 
People's 
Party 
Secure 
Home 
Estonian 
Popular 
Front 
Estonian 
Nationlist 
Independence 
Party 
Estonian 
Royalist 
Party 
Estonian 
Citizen 
Estonian 
Entrepreneur's 
Party 
2011            
2007            
2003            
1999 6%/6 2%/0          
1995   32%/41 6%/6 5%/5       
1992      14%/17 12%/15 9%/10 7%/8 7%/8 2%/1 
 
 
 
Source: European elections database - 
http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/estonia - accessed 25th April, 
2011. 
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Appendix VI 
Danish national election results in % vote and seat number, the election results of parties 
who failed to enter parliament are not displayed.  The threshold to enter the Folketing is 
2% of the national vote.   
 
 
 
Social 
Dem’s 
Liberals 
Con. 
People’s 
Party 
Socialist 
People's 
Party 
Social 
Liberals 
Centre 
Dem’s 
Progress 
Party 
Danish 
People's 
Party 
Red/ 
Green 
New 
Alliance 
Christian 
Dem’s 
Common 
Course 
Left 
Socialist 
Party 
Comm. 
Party of 
Denmark 
Justice 
Party 
2007 26%/45 26%/46 10%/18 13%/23 5%/9     14%/20 2%/4 3%/5          
2005 26%/47 29%/52 10%/18 6%/11 9%/17     13%/24 3%6            
2001 29%/52 31%/56 9%/16 6%/12 5%/9     12%/22 2%/4   2%/4        
1998 36%/63 24%/42 9%/16 8%/13 4%/7 4%/8 2%/4 7%/13 3%/5   3%/5        
1994 35%/62 23%/42 15%/27 7%/13 5%/8 3%/5 6%/11   3%/6    2%/0        
1990 37%/69 16%29 16%30 8%/15 4%/7 5%/9 6%/12       2%/4        
1988 30%/55 12%/22 19%/35 13%/24 6%/10 5%/9 9%/16       2%/4        
1987 29%/54 11%/19 21%/38 15%/27 6%/11 5%/9 5%/9       2%/4 2%/4      
1984 32%/56 12%/22 23%/42 12%/21 6%/10 5%/8 4%/6       3%/5   3%/5    
1981 33%/59 11%/20 15%/26 11%/21 5%/9 8%/15 9%/16       3%/5   3%/5    
1979 38%/68 13%/22 13%/22 6%/11 5%/10 3%/6 11%/20       3%/5   4%/6   3%/5 
1977 37%/65 12%/21 9%/15 4%/7 4%/6 6%/11 15%/26       3%/6   3%/5 4%/7 3%/6 
1975 30%/53 23%/42 6%/10 5%/9 7%/13 2%/4 14%/24       5%/9   2%/4 4%/7  
1973 26%/46 12%/22 9%/16 6%/11 11%/20 8%/14 16%/28       4%/7     4%/6 3%/5 
1971 37%/70 16%/30 17%/31 9%/17 14%/27                    
 
 
 
Source: European elections database - 
http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/denmark- accessed 25th 
April 2011. 
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Appendix VII 
List of Author Interviews. 
 
Ireland: 
 Anthony Coughlan, Chairman National Platform, 2nd December, 2007. 
 Roger Cole, Chairman PANA, 10th December, 2007. 
 Mary-Lou McDonald MEP, Sinn Féin, 31st March, 2008.   
 Joe Higgins MEP, former TD and  leader Socialist Party, 31st March 2008. 
 Declan Ganley, founder and Chairman Libertas, 14th August, 2008.   
 Sen. Deirdre de Burca, Green Party spokesperson on Europe, 20th August, 2008. 
 Frank Keoghan, Chairman People’s Movement, 31st March, 2008. 
 Naoise Nunn, Libertas campaign manager, 14th August, 2008. 
 Dr. Paul Gillespie, former international editor of The Irish Times, 29th September, 
2010. 
UK: 
 Nick Herbert MP, former executive director of Business for Sterling, 18th May, 2008. 
 Robert Oulds, Director Bruges Group, 9th June, 2010. 
 Simon Buckby, former Chief Executive of Britain for Europe, 21st June, 2010. 
 Derek Norman and Tony Bennett, Committee members of Campaign for a Referendum 
on the European Constitution, 21
st
 May, 2008. 
Estonia: 
 Erkki Behovski, international affairs columnist with Postimees newspaper, 7th 
November, 2008.  
 Prof. Igor Gräzin, co-director UKVE and Reformikund MP and MEP 13th 
October, 2008.  
 Anders Kasekamp, Professor of International Relations University of Tartu, 
director of  the Estonian foreign policy institute, 11
th
 October, 2008. 
 Prof. Ivar Raig, founder and Chairman UKVE, 13th October, 2008.   
 Uno Silberg, founder and chairman No to the EU Movement, 5th Novemeber, 
2008. 
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Denmark: 
 Margarethe Auken, MEP for the Socialist People’s Party, 13th September, 2009. 
 Lave Broch, campaign manager People’s Movement No to the EU, 12th 
September, 2009. 
 Drude Dahlerup, Senior June Movement activist, leader No 2 Euro Alliance, 2nd 
September, 2009.  
 Rune Kristensen interview, former leader of the Young Conservatives, 14th 
September, 2009. 
 Mogens Lykketoft, Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs 2000–2001 and leader of 
the Social Democrats 2002-5, 15
th
 September, 2009. 
 Holger Nielsen, leader of the Socialist People’s Party 1991–2005, 15th September, 
2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
